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Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Hearing on 
FAMILY LAW ISSUES 
RELATING TO SB 1296, SB 1306, and SB 1341 
(and SB 13) 
December 14, 1987 
ASSEMBLYMAN PHIL ISENBERG: We give you our thanks. 
This is, I can't remember, maybe the fifteenth hearing on one or 
another of eight million bills that have come out of the State 
Senate on family law this year. 
And largely, I suspect, because the earlier hearings 
were so frustrating, at least to some Committee members, myself 
included, the Chairman agreed that during the interim we would 
try to put together a few individuals who are -- certainly you're 
free to have any opinion you want on the bill to advocate or 
oppose legislation -- but individuals who were not totally 
involved in advocating or opposing the legislation in front of us 
but whose background, training, and experience is such that you 
might be able to give us some independent comments and 
observations on the proposals; more importantly, their likely 
affects. 
Justice King and I were talking about this. In 
legislation, we often pass laws without any idea of what the 
effect actually is going to be and, of course, rarely if ever 
take a look later on to see what it has been. But, we merrily 
proceed to untangle what we think is going on. 
So, this is a little different than what we've done 
before and I appreciate your bearing with us on an experiment. 
We'll see if this works; we'll see if it gets to be any better. 
The pattern we'd like to take is we've got three bills 
up for discussion today and that is not in any way to imply that 
you should feel restricted. There are many other bills floating 
around and you may have some comments that would be relevant on 
those pieces of legislation, but we have two by Senator Hart and 
one by Senator Morgan that we particularly wanted to concentrate 
on this morning. And what we'd like to do is to start by having 
the author of the legislation make a brief comment. 
Senator Hart particular has been spending hours and 
hours and hours on his pieces of legislation. And I believe, 
also, we have some modifications in the legislation. 
Have the panelists been given copies of the 
modifications? OK, all right. So if you don't mind, I think 
what we'll do is just start. Senator Hart, if you would be good 
enough to come forward and jawbone us a bit, please. 
Also, I think we spent what was it, sixty or eighty 
million dollars rehabilitating the Capitol. Nonetheless, you 
must speak carefully and closely into the microphones or else no 
one can hear you at all. And the odds are no one can hear you 
anyway even if you speak closely and carefully. But we'll do the 
best ••. Senator Hart. 
SENATOR GARY HART: Thank you very much, Assemblyman 
Isenberg. I want to begin by thanking the Committee for holding 
this interim hearing, particularly to thank you for your many 
hours. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That isn't what you said a couple 
of months ago. 
SENATOR HART: We're dealing with an area that is 
difficult, it's complex but I think it's very important. I'm 
very pleased that the Committee is holding a hearing. I do not 
serve on the Judiciary Committee in the Senate. I am not an 
attorney. 
It's been a very interesting education for me to be 
involved in some of these matters. It's been at times 
frustrating, but I don't have any real regrets because I think 
the issues are terribly important. I got involved in this issue 
largely from reading Lenore Weitzman's book. That's a 
thought-provoking book that anyone who reads it, I think, comes 
away with having some feelings one way or another about the issue 
of no-fault divorce in the State of California. 
As I read Weitzman's book, her basic point is that there 
is some unintended consequences of divorce that may or may not 
have been foreseen with the passage of "no fault" in the early 
seventies in this state. And she documents what some of those 
unintended consequences are, particularly for women and for 
children of divorce. 
And as a result of her study and conversations that I 
had, I introduced a number of bills that responded to some of the 
concerns that were expressed in her book. As a result of the 
ongoing discussion that occurred, we felt it was appropriate in 
the Senate to establish a task force to take a look at the 
findings and the recommendations that Weitzman is putting forward 
and to make a determination as to whether or not her basic 
findings were on the mark and to make recommendations to the full 
Senate as to changes in law that might be appropriate. 
And so, some of the legislation that is before you today 
is a result of the work of the Senate Task Force that was made up 
of a number of people from the Bar, other interested parties 
including four Senators, myself included. 
I think it's important to emphasize in these matters 
that what the Senate Task Force is attempting to do -- its 
legislative approach to this problem -- is to not to roll back 
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laws. I think that basically the approach 
Legislature in the early seventies was 
there are some problems. There is some 
to place. And that's what the bills 
, that I'm carrying, seek to do. 
of those bills is SB 1296 and it's my 
format is going to be to take each of 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: If we could, we'd like to do SB 
1296 
panel's 
if we 
SENATOR 
spousal 
straight 
the courts 
on the 
sort 
trying to 
and what 
the bill 
panelists 
you on that, then deal with members of the 
SB 1296, and then move to your second bill 
HART: SB 1296 basically deals with the issue of 
I think it's a fairly simple and 
11 that attempts to establish the standard for 
a look at in making these determinations based 
living established during the marriage. It's 
, a starting point under which we will be 
whether or not spousal support is appropriate 
ought to be. There is a mock-up version of 
sume that the members of the committee and 
ISENBERG: There's a one page cover memo 
al Support- Hart." That's your cover memo, 
SENATOR HART: Right. 
and do 
mock-up 
about? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK. Do all the panelists have it 
1 members have this memo which is the 
current draft that Senator Hart's talking 
SENATOR HART: 
that the members the 
facts of matter are 
Speaking generally, the general concern 
Senate Task Force I think had is that the 
that over 85% of marriages that end in 
divorce is no support that's given. 
recent federal census data, the average 
spous 
There is a concern 
is given is approximately $400 a month. 
many circles that in many instances this is 
some of the again those unintended inadequate 
consequences of 
of 
and some issues relating to feminization 
the context of inadequate spousal 
we re attempting to do here is to, as I mentioned 
overturn but to try and give some, I think, very 
and perimeters to the court to respond to, given 
as being a problem in some of the 
are currently being made. 
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I think it might be better, Mr. Chairman, to hear from 
the panelists. They have a copy of the bill in its mock-up form 
and I think we can go from there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Although it's worth noting, I 
think in the revision of the bill that what you're doing is 
deleting the reference to long term marriages and a different 
standard for that, at least as I read the draft. 
SENATOR HART: That's right. That was particularly 
controversial and we thought in the interest of trying to move 
the legislation along that it would be best to delete that 
provision of the bill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Great. 
SENATOR HART: I think that was the most controversial 
provision of the bill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK, good. Senator, can you stay 
with us for awhile? I mean, you know, not that we want to 
dragoon you in staying here, but it would be helpful I think if 
you would. Ms. Mojonnier from San Diego has joined us also on 
the Committee. The panelists, for those of you on the Committee 
who are not familiar with them, are awfully bright and impressive 
people. We have first Justice Don King from the First District 
Court of Appeals in San Francisco who spent, I can't remember how 
many years, as the chief family law trial judge on the San 
Francisco Superior Court. (inaudible -- laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: It was one or two years. 
JUSTICE DONALD B. KING: Six years. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Six years. And, since his 
elevation to the Court of Appeal, has maintained his interest in 
the field of family law rights and speaks widely on the matter 
and was telling Senator Hart and myself earlier this morning that 
he is going back in two week increments to practice justice on 
the trial court. Thus, at least, giving all of his Superior 
Court colleagues the opportunity to say, "See, we've been telling 
you. You guys have been screwing up all this time." (laughter) 
It's a particular honor to have Justice King here. He h~s 
appeared over the years on many of the bills and so it's possible 
that there is criticism of existing law. He may have advocated 
or opposed that existing law at one or another legislative 
hearing. 
Judge Tom Murphy from San Diego is again one of the 
trial judges in the State of California who has built a 
reputation and is helping develop the field of family law as 
something more than kind of a cavalier involvement of every 
attorney the state into what is a specialty. And comes to us 
with high marks as both an interesting and provocative 
commentator on the process. 
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have 
harmony 
does 
all. 
on 
Next to the is Diana Richmond who is a very 
Law Specialist attorney in this field 
from her or read her writings and 
and Conciliation Court in Los Angeles, 
is the person who is supposed to make 
all these warring factions and naturally 
being no problems in Los Angeles at 
Sacramento, is Tom Woodruff, one of the 
our community ... a person against whom I've 
case and he's impossible to deal with which 
means 
mark, I 
Spec ist 
Sacramento 
(laughter) ... which is a high 
Tom is also a Certified Family Law 
us now is Assemblyman Tim Leslie from 
order, but Justice King you're 
table, which isn't the top of the 
not start there if you wouldn't mind. 
JUSTICE KING: OK, thank you, Assemblyman Isenberg and 
members of the ttee. I'm sure I speak for each of my 
colleagues commending you for giving us this opportunity to 
come. All of I'm sure, have been here one or another times. 
I luding me, have stopped coming because of 
the 1 s kind of opportunity to talk with you, 
being into the position of being for or against 
a bill having an opportunity to talk to you about 
what's subject matter of the bill and how it 
relates in our courts and what goes on with the 
fami 
talking to some of the other panelists 
we were at the prospect of having this kind of an 
the hurried process that often takes 
ly toward the end of the Session when a 
Can I ask one question of clarification? In the 
materials , there still was the provision about the standard 
1 term marriages. Is that, do I understand 
now 
revis 
el 
you a 
comments 
out? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's been deleted in the 
we were given within this last week, Judge. 
OK, I don't have the changes but that 
of I was going to say. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, what we'll do is we'll get 
of s while you go ahead and make your 
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JUSTICE KING: This whole area, spousal support, is a 
very very difficult area. It's difficult from your standpoint. 
It's difficult from the standpoint of parties, obviously, and 
it's difficult from the standpoint of their lawyers, it's 
difficult from, very difficult, the standpoint of judges. 
The variety of facts and circumstances that exist in each 
marriage that comes before you, the differences in the nature of 
the parties, their background, their education, their economic 
circumstances, their children, everything is so varied that it 
necessarily is an area where the trial judge has to have 
considerable discretion. 
At the same time, I think, it's an area unrelated to any 
of the bills you have -- but related I guess to some extent to a 
bill, Senate 11 1209, that did pass this Session by Senator 
Roberti -- which requires a degree of knowledge and education 
about what's going on with families that sometimes is lacking. 
And I'm hope that Senator Roberti's bill will increase and 
enhance the amount of judicial education for judges who are given 
family law assignments and I that's a major part of the 
problem in this subject matter area. 
It's been particularly true in most areas of the state 
over the last few years with the present Governor who has 
appointed a number of judges who are certainly very qualified but 
whose background essentially is from District Attorney or 
Attorney General offices where they have had no family law 
experience. San Diego has been one exception that has gotten 
several family law specialists and that's a big change. 
The troubles that we're dealing with, as I'm sure you 
know, in this area is not related just to what's going on in the 
family. They're re to age discrimination and sex 
discrimination and job discrimination and a lot of things that 
are going on in society that the Courts in some way have to 
attempt to compensate for. 
There's no easy answer to anything with regard to 
spousal support. It's probably the issue that brings more cases 
into court than any other, although I think you have to be 
careful about the statistics because when you talk about -- I'm 
not sure where the figure of 85% of the marriages where there's 
no spousal support came from -- but you have to recognize that 
about 98% of all the cases that go through the courts (and that's 
something like 175,000 filings a year in California) are resolved 
by the parties and/or their counsel and not the result of any 
court order except the court incorporating whatever the 
parties have to. 
We 
and that's 
you've got a 
especially if 
and after the 
support. 
tremendous numbers of very short term marriages 
these figures substantially because if 
of one year or two years duration, 
parties have been working both before, during 
, there's not going to be any spousal 
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In terms of the amounts, I think that you also have 
with taking a figure as to what the 
ly if you don't consider in conjunction 
the amounts are for child support. One 
example, I've had of the so-called Santa 
for child support is the child support 
lines are too high and the result of that 
of 
Clara 
figures 
is that amounts that are issued for spousal support are too 
equilibrium that you've got to have there and 
's going to go down. Because 
to be dealing with a portion of income and 
attributed between support for children and 
parent. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, let me just ask for some 
have 
We know that as a result of the Agnos 
support schedules and so on that there is 
ss that people go through right now, at 
Throughout the state, can you tell us or 
panelists can tell us how many of the counties 
ines in writing on spousal support? 
JUSTICE KING: Well, what happened ••. Oh, on spousal 
? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yeah. 
JUSTICE KING: Most of the major counties do, but not 
alJ of 
counties 
conversation 
others 
an advi 
Both Hugh Mcisaac 
committee. 
the committee • 
one of 
in the area of es 
support. 
very few, relatively few, of the smaller 
It's something that I mentioned in our 
and I can mention it for the benefit of the 
The Chief Justice has recently appointed 
to the Judicial Council on family law. 
and Diana Richmond are members of that 
's first meeting last Friday. The makeup of 
's a dynamite committee and I would expect that 
that they will be doing will be to move forward 
ishing statewide some guidelines for spousal 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Is there any evidence that you 
would suggest that in counties where there are know of 
guidelines 
award, 
higher? 
big 
and 
judges 
a matter 
to he 
support that either the frequency of the 
of the award, or the amount of the award is 
1 counties can't really be compared to 
is there any evidence to support this? 
JUSTICE KING: Well, I think they can be compared 
where you have guidelines by 
I think the approach of most 
most lawyers want this to be the approach as 
consistency, want guidelines which are going 
what the order is. Now with the guidelines 
the most part that print spousal support, 
temporary support from the time of the 
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filing until a judgment of dissolution or a permanent order or no 
permanent order on spousal support. 
The guidelines I think are intended and are applied, as 
far as I know, in each county that has them on the basis that 
this is what the courts' order will be under the circumstances 
that the guidelines provide. They often have an outline of not 
only how you calculate them but what the basis on which they are 
applied, unless there is good cause shown for the order to be 
different. There may be exceptional medical expense in a given 
case, unusual school tuition or some other major expense. There 
may be other circumstances which will cause the guidelines to 
vary but my sense of it is that the guidelines are not there as 
rules to be always applied but they're there as guidelines to be 
applied unless there's some reason shown why they shouldn't be. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, the premise of Senator 
Hart's bill is that, I'll say women although it's technically not 
a women's issue precisely, that many women are not receiving 
spousal support when they should and that the amount that they 
are receiving is very low. Is that true or false? 
JUSTICE KING: Let me deal with the two segments. In 
terms of temporary support for those counties that have 
guidelines, by and large what happens is that there is an 
allocation made of the total income of the family from the time 
there is an initial or show cause hearing until there is a final 
determination of whatever is going to happen on that subject 
matter and generally speaking there's an allocation. It tends to 
run, if there aren't very many children, in something like a 
sixty percent of the net income is going to stay with the earner 
and forty percent is going to go to the non-earner and usually 
the non-earner is the one who is also the custodial parent. 
It's not that simple because, I'm not sure about other 
places, but I know in San Francisco it was the exception to see 
families where both people were not working. There may be a 
disparity in their economic level, but generally speaking on a 
temporary basis there tends to be that kind of a breakdown of the 
60/40 percent breakdown of the income. The reason for that is 
that the law, the policy of the law at this point as to temporary 
support is to attempt as much as possible to preserve the status 
quo of the parties until there can be a permanent disposition. 
When you get to the permanent disposition of spousal support, 
we're bound by Civil Code Section 4801 which this bill provides 
amendments to. 
Again I would comment, few of these cases -- in 
terms of the numbers of cases filed -- ever come in on a 
contested trial. Even on spousal support, and it's probably the 
item that's more frequently tried than any other item. I'm not 
aware of anyone who does not apply Civil Code Section 4801. I 
think the problems sometimes are the lack of education I've 
talked about before. For example, in a place like San Francisco 
the trials of these cases are heard by the whole array of trial 
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many other counties -- Los Angeles, now San Diego judges. In 
they have a 
section 
where the judges assigned to a family law 
court do both temporary hearings and also the 
orders. In San Francisco and most of the counties, 
's not case and you're just assigned out to whomever 
happens to That may be somebody who has no knowledge or 
background In fact, some of them I suspect are 
quite surprised the counsel points out to them what the 
provis are Code Section 4801; they're not familiar with 
it. 
one of the problems is we need some current 
data. respect, Lenore Weitzman's data is way out of 
date and, , a lot it I think was during the "fault" 
days. It wasn't "no fault" and I would mention to you that for 
the bene of s Committee, the Legislature a couple of years 
ago create within the Administrative Office of the Courts and 
under the Council, an Office of Family Court Services. 
And although their orientation was to be to a great extent 
related to those child-related matters within our family law 
system, it's much broader than that and I think they can be a 
very ef resource for you in gathering data. The 
Admini of the Courts has a separate Statistical 
Section. 're now starting some programs, using these bar 
graphs that the supermarkets use for pricing, where they're going 
to be able to gather all sorts of data from the courts in terms 
of what goes on in these cases. I don't think we have that 
information now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I assume litigants don't have to 
have the bar graphs imprinted on their hands ... (laughter) 
JUSTICE KING: ... in order to get their spousal support 
check every month. We've always felt, and I know this Committee 
historically always felt, in any one of these issues that 
gets sed we are all inadequately informed. We know 
what's going on usually in our own court. We have a pretty good 
idea about that we don't know what's going on necessarily in 
the courtroom next door and certainly in the county next door, 
and I think is an area that we need more information on. 
I my impression is that trial judges of this 
state try very diligently to follow whatever the factors are that 
the Legislature provides should be looked to in making a decision 
about spous support. what the result of that is, I don't 
know we don't have enough data to know it. I do think, 
from my own experience I can tell you, I don't remember -- during 
the six years I was doing this I was doing both temporary orders 
and also s of cases -- during those six 
years, I rarely was there a case presented with a 
request for support where spousal support was not 
granted. If it wasn't a case for spousal support, it just never 
got that ; once in awhile, but not very often. 
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In terms attempt to do as a 
judge in 
make an al 
you 
s 
le. 
s created 
take 
all the circumstances to 
Some of the factors 
very well; for example, the 
, spousal support is 
's years duration 
is in a marriage of 
s are 40 years old. You have 
you try to create some 
temporary support are 
for permanent, you start 
ts limited too much. You 
whenever you have exercises 
starting point. 
you're se cases with a family 
s income, whatever is it doesn't make 
it is, whether it's a thousand a month or ten 
thousand a month-- the problems are the same. That's the income 
they've been living up to and perhaps, with Visa and Mastercharge 
and American ss, they've l beyond it. Now all of 
a sudden same income has to cover two households and in most 
of the areas state with hous expenses, that's a 
big jump And there s isn't enough money to 
cover this new situation and what trial judge is attempting 
to do, with relatively little ability many ways to know what's 
going to happen a year or two down the line. What the trial 
judge is to do is to determine what's a fair 
allocation the rcumstances of these 
parties. 
If you've got somebody who has been married for five 
years and they're sixty-five years of age and you're making an 
award for spousal support to that woman, if the man at that point 
is receiving a pension and social , you pretty well know 
what the future s going to be. 's not going to be many 
changes in that and there's ce not going to be many 
changes in employment status or her non-employment status. 
But when you're dealing with the whole range of people 
we deal 
looking at 
that the 
those as 
an easy job. 
once we 
di s 
are, you 
or with a 
calculations 
to do this. 
once 
does s 
't have certainty and it's a problem of 
factors 
slature sets forth then deciding how to apply 
to this couple that's before you. It's not 
I most 
out what the 
of us who 
actual 
and 
and 
have done it, will tell you 
are, once we resolve 
income and the expenses 
you sit down with a calculator 
through a series of 
what seems to be the fair way 
se factors come into play and 
you have the numbers. What 
usually is more than what this 
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person can 
leave them 
's fair to have this person pay and still 
of living reasonably, and especially 
when 
soc 
them enough money? In this 
it goes to another bill. 
continues to be, as I hope it 
have frequent and continuing contact 
you have to give the so-called paying 
to have sufficient funds left so that he's 
, or she, a physical facility in which this frequent 
contact can be oyed. So it's very difficult. 
In essence, what you ask trial judges to do is to 
or wave a magic wand and come up with 
to satisfy needs that cannot be satisfied 
are available. Then what happens, and I 
pass the subject up without talking about 
society where nationwide one out of every two 
In California the number is probably 
is probably higher. 
, people remarry. And 
s those marriages don't work out. And we 
and situations with children by 
, with different circumstances with ... I 
remember one doctor who came before me who was paying spousal 
support to four or five different women, child support for 
several It gets very complicated and you almost feel 
like consolidate all these actions together when one 
of them makes a to modify. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, you could at least say the 
doctor was engaged with life. (laughter) 
JUSTICE KING: He was, absolutely. Almost to the extent 
of not able to practice and earn enough money to meet all 
these obligations. But that's a continuing problem. And 
what do you do? And perhaps the most perplexing problem I think 
is -- I don't know of a single family law judge that has come up 
with a solution to it-- what do you do when there's a 
remarriage and do you count the new income or the new 
obligation to new spouse? 
do with the mother who is the custodial 
parent is employed and has an income -- so there may or may 
not spousal paid, but there's child support-- and she 
and has children by the second family and decides at 
not to and does that then affect the 
ld rst marriage? 
These cases are complicated. I don't know whether 
I'm s field or not, some people think I am, but I 
am, I 't know the answer. I know that what 
j to do is to diligently follow whatever guidelines 
I don't know of any judges that don't do that. 
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rman, I ve just been 
ask Judge Murphy to 
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• 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN FRIZZELLE: This presents too good an 
opportunity, to ask you all questions, to pass up. I presume 
that a lot of the discussion in your court revolves on what to do 
in the future with cases that have children involved instead of 
just a spouse. There are other avenues open to you or other 
opportunities or options. I presume that a certain amount of the 
award can go to the children and such that the spousal support 
would end on a second marriage, whereas the child support would 
continue regardless. That type of thing. Is that a ••. ? 
JUSTICE KING: Yes, it continues of course until the 
child reaches the age of majority or, in a few instances, becomes 
emancipated or self-supporting before that time. But the orders 
that we have to make are made on the circumstances, made 
applicable to the circumstances that are presented to us at the 
time of the order. To the extent changes occur in the future, 
either child or spousal support of course is modifiable and they 
frequently are modified. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I think one of the things that 
complicates our job in the Legislature, as much as anything else, 
is that obviously when you make a law you have to do it in such a 
manner that it applies to everybody all of the time just the same 
way and not everything is the same all the time. And so you 
to break apart the different elements that are separable in such 
a manner that you can treat them independently. 
One of those areas is the business of following with 
child support, whether they're in the state or out of the state 
is another factor, and how we establish linkage with the previous 
father who now may be somewhere else or in different 
circumstances and so forth. The trail isn't always available to 
you to follow. So does your judgment originally sometimes end up 
almost punitive in trying to account for the potential flight of 
the spouse that is freed from the obligation of direct care of 
the child? 
JUSTICE KING: No, I don't think in any way it ends up 
being punitive. There's been an evolvement of a development of 
procedures and adoption of both federal legislation and state 
legislation that pretty well now involves the District Attorney's 
Office, the Family Support Bureau of the District Attorney's 
Office, in pursuing the enforcement of any of these orders, 
whether somebody's just leaving the county and going to another 
county or going to another state and the District Attorney has 
that responsibility both as to child support and spousal support. 
Obviously, if somebody disappears it's a problem perhaps 
of locating them and, as we all know, there are opportunities in 
the society for someone to disappear if they really want to. I 
think those numbers are relatively small, but the present process 
that has finally now evolved-- if the District Attorney's 
offices have sufficient resources and that's a big question 
depending on the office; for example, I know the one in 
Sacramento is sorely overtaxed -- if they have sufficient 
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resources, through the efforts of various law enforcement 
, they are able pretty much to find people and try and do 
In fact, a good deal of our calendar loads are often 
cases where one of the parents is in another state and we're 
through process in this state to either make an order, 
to enforce an order, to modify an order. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I'm alerted only in the 
circumstance of Senator Hart's bill regarding spousal support. 
It addresses spousal support, per se. I'm concerned about the 
relative need of the children independent of the spouse or the 
's condition being potentially independent of the need of 
children. And so, it's a potential thing that needs to be 
ssed in the bill. 
JUSTICE KING: Well, until very recently, even now 
I think most of the District Attorney's of in terms 
location of resources because of benefits they receive for 
lection of ld support under certain circumstances they 
not for collection of spousal support. District 
though, now are doing that much more 
First of all, until a few years ago they didn't do at 
didn't deal with spousal support at all. They still, I 
legitimately make some allocation of their resources as to 
what they're going to put where and since collection of ld 
brings money into the office under federal and state 
they, I think, tend to put a little more priority -- and 
appropriately so -- in pursuing the collection of child 
But they are able to and many of the offices do do an 
excellent job with regard to pursuing and achieving the payment 
of spousal support also. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: OK, thank you. All right, now 
we've j Joan ly, is a psychologist and is one 
of , I guess 's fair to say, although she might not like 
description, seminal thinkers and writers on the subject. A book 
she wrote with Judy Wallerstein in 1980, "Surviving the Breakup", 
was-- well, I'll just quote myself, since when I read it at the 
time, I thought one of the most provocative and interesting 
studies kicking around. It is criticized because it's Marin 
County and all of that, and you know the rest of the world isn't 
1 Marin County, but it started to point out the value of 
longitudinal research in domestic relations and I'm just very 
pleased to see you here. You write a terrific book and a 
provocative paper which the staff passed out to us. 
All right, we're going around and Judge Murphy, if you 
would also, at one point in your comment, tell us about Senator 
Hart's bill. Is it good, bad, or does it make any difference at 
all? 
JUDGE THOMAS MURPHY: Assemblyman Isenberg, I thank you 
also and would like to echo all of Justice King's comments about 
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allowing us to have some input here, because I know that we want 
to have input, and this is a special time that you have allowed 
us to do that. 
The proposed legislation to amend Civil Code Section 
4801 -- more specifically to require the court to primarily focus 
on how the parties to a divorce lived before the divorce and to 
grant spousal support awards consistent with that lifestyle -- I 
think recognizes certain inequities that are in our court system 
and tries to solve them at this time. To any of you who are 
familiar with domestic courts in California, it is obvious that 
the present law does not provide sufficient guidelines for 
awarding permanent spousal support. 
I believe, however, that it is unrealistic for us to use 
the marital standard of living as a starting point and I say that 
with due respect, Senator Hart, and for the Committee that worked 
with him -- because I know the work that they did and in fact 
worked with the Chairman of that Committee in reviewing all of 
the information as it carne in. And the reason that I say that I 
think it is unrealistic, is exactly for the same reason that 
Justice King has said, and that is that there is seldom, if ever, 
sufficient money available for either the husband or the wife to 
maintain the standard of living that they had during the marriage 
after the breakup. It simply costs more for two families to 1 
than it does for one family to live and almost all of us spend 
what we make regardless of what it is. What should the public 
policy be, that was one of the questions that was asked, for this 
state concerning the issue of spousal support? 
I feel that we, you and me, should try to create a 
statute that is understandable by the public, that is 
understandable by the lawyers, and allows all of us to predict 
what we as judges are going to do. It also should be fair. So I 
think it should be predictable and fair. I think that is the 
basic thing that we should be looking at. 
This present statute that we have directs that we look 
at almost all of the fairness issues that all of the different 
groups want us to look at. The unfortunate aspect of it is that 
there is absolutely no predictability whatsoever. I feel that 
the existing statute needs to be completely revamped, with a 
of defining what is the purpose of permanent spousal support 
creating understandable guidelines of both amount and duration. 
Nine months ago I spoke to a hundred domestic judges, 
all of whom are very interested in domestic law. I prepared 
around eight tough hypotheticals. I have them here and was 
to go over them, but we don't have enough time. I asked them to 
answer those hypotheticals; tough hypotheticals. I must say, 
reasonable people could differ. In every single question, there 
were substantial emotional differences between all of us and 
there was no consensus on any of them. And these are 
knowledgeable, intelligent and concerned judges who want to be 
involved in domestic law. 
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The existing statute tells us to consider, as I stated, 
most if not all of those fairness factors. It doesn't tell us 
what weight should be given to each of these factors. It doesn't 
tell us how much we should award or for how long, and that's the 
final question. How much money does this, generally, woman get 
and for how long should she receive it? I suspect that everyone 
in this room would agree that if we have a fifty-eight year old 
homemaker who has been married thirty years, that she has no 
employable skills and her husband earns $5,000 a month, that she 
should get spousal support. And she should probably get it 
open-ended for as long as she lives. And I suspect that most 
judges looking at that would award her a figure somewhere between 
$1600 and $2100 a month. I also suspect that none of us in this 
room would think that a woman who is twenty-three years of age, 
has been married two years, has no kids, is employed, and is 
earning at or near what her husband is earning, should get a dime 
in spousal support. 
There are also substantial numbers of cases where it 
doesn't make any difference. We can sit here and theorize what 
spousal support should be, but there's just not enough money. 
After you've awarded child support, the parties don't ••• 
the male, he makes $1800 a month, he's got three kids, and we 
award $600 to $700 a month, and after he pays his taxes, he's 
$600 to $700 left. 
A woman doesn't care what the money is called, whether 
it's spousal or child support. Generally, it's how much money 
she puts in her pocket. In the recent handout that was given by 
Senator Hart, and they mention the Ramer and Brantner cases, most 
all open-minded people would agree that the trial judges in both 
of those cases made a big mistake -- in both of those cases. I 
believe that those cases are the exception. Judges make mistakes 
-- lots of them. 
What should be the purpose of spousal support? To 
provide a transition period during which the non or the low 
earner can try to become self-supporting. And maybe we shouldn't 
even have that. Maybe we can just have one reason for spousal 
support and that is to meet the reasonable expectations of our 
society for divorced persons; society's expectations, not 
expectation of the specific wife. 
To establish a formula for both amount and duration, 
rather than calling it a guideline, use maybe a less mandatory 
phrase, similar to what they're using in Santa Clara for other 
things; call it a rule of thumb. With the understandinq that 
each case is unique, that there must be flexibility and-
discretion left with the court. 
Most, if not all of the factors that the special 
interest group want to put in 4801, they're already there and 
they're already being considered by the courts and the parties 
and their counsel. But still, nobody has an answer to these 
tough questions. 
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I ask this to you, when if ever does the support 
obligation become a societal obligation? A three year marriage 
where the woman is severely injured and married to a physician. 
Does that mean that the physician for the rest of this woman's 
life should have to pay spousal support? She needs it and he's 
got the ability to pay it. Should it be forever or should we 
answer that? Should we say, in marriages -- half the length of 
the marriage, that should be the amount of the spousal support? 
Maybe, I don't know. That's a question you have to answer. But 
we need a specific direction. Is there an obligation on the part 
of the supported spouse regardless of how rich the husband is? 
Should she have an obligation to go get a job? That's a tough 
question to answer when you've got a fifty-three year old woman 
whose been married to a physician who makes $15,000 a month. 
Should she have to go to work at a local store selling 
foundations? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, Judge, one second. Mr. 
Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, you said that the Ramer 
case was an example of a mistake and judges make mistakes, but 
you don't think there are a lot of mistakes. Why then do you 
think if there are not a lot of mistakes, that you need 
guidelines which attempt to control the outcome of the judie 
decision? 
JUDGE MURPHY: Because I have a certain philosophy of 
what I think fairness is. I believe that on a four year marriage 
where someone has been injured -- you have a tragedy on one side 
a female whose been hurt in an automobile accident -- I believe 
within two to four years that the obligation to care for that 
woman is society's, not from the man. That is a value judgment 
of my own and if I make the correct findings, the appellate 
courts, unless they're seeking out something, are going to 
sustain me on that. But those same set of facts might go before 
him and he might feel different and give an open-ended support 
order forever. It's not fair for some woman to come in and just 
by chance get me when she could've gotten him. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well then, that suggests that 
there should be no judicial discretion under any circumstance. 
JUDGE MURPHY: Oh, I think we should have judicial 
discretion, but I think we should have some predictability. It's 
a tough thing. I mean you have to do both of them. I would 
suspect society does not want just to roll out a formula in 
and every case, but we need to have a guideline, a rule of thumb 
that may be support ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, the factors that you 
into account in the Civil Code Section now are guidelines. What 
you're saying is that they're either not the right guidelines or 
they're not specific enough or clear enough to dictate an 
outcome. On the other hand, the only thing I can think of that 
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is clear enough to dictate an outcome are mandatory limits. You 
know, kind of in the personal injury area? One arm of the male 
under the age of fifty-five is worth $150,000. You know, that 
kind of discussion. Well, the Legislature's been reluctant to 
ever do that obviously. The courts always in that field complain 
about the lack of guidelines, but at the same time there are some 
questions that society always wants to ask and never wants to 
answer. And I wonder what you're suggesting doesn't rise to that 
level? And that is that the Legislature is never going to be 
capable of saying, "OK, we agree if you've been married, 
regardless of circumstances, for less than four years ..• " If 
there's a problem with the lady, the taxpayers are going to step 
in and there'll never be a circumstance where the spouse would be 
responsible for the ex-wife. Do you really expect the 
Legislature to say that? 
JUDGE MURPHY: No, but I think we do it by presumptions 
in many areas. In that maybe that the burden should be on the 
person requesting support to prove why it should continue if 
support continues beyond half the length of the marriage. And 
maybe we should have just an arbitrary statement that 
spousal support should never continue in any case for a period 
equal to, for a period beyond the actual length of 
In other words, if it's been a ten year marriage, should we 
an individual be required to pay support for twelve, thirteen, 
fifteen years? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Is your answer then, 
this to Senator Hart's bill, your answer I suppose would be, 
"Well, it's not bad but it doesn't do very much." 
JUDGE MURPHY: I think that his bill will have no 
impact. I think that ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's one argument for passing 
it, although that is not Senator Hart's argument. (laughter) He 
thinks it will have an impact. 
JUDGE MURPHY: I understand that, but I 
interpretation in the courts will have little or no I 
think that it looks at a serious problem that we have 
courts today. But I think that it just will have no I 
mean it's already there. It's simply saying let's at s 
first. The standard of living of the parties is already 
something that's in 4801. 
And I guess maybe an answer to your question, should we 
restrict judge's discretion? I guess my answer is yes. I think 
maybe there should be some restriction in the area of spousal 
support, so that that judge's discretion should be limited within 
certain areas and he or she should know that you can't go 
further than this. You can't grant any more than that. I mean 
we do it anyway right now. 
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Justice King said that realistically in a lengthy 
marriage, the woman is going to get forty percent of the man's 
income. That's a rough rule of thumb. Up until two, three, four 
years ago, support was awarded for half the length of the 
marriage. I mean that was a rough rule of thumb that lawyers 
used in negotiating cases out. We'll give her support for 
approximately half the length of the marriage. We just need 
those rules or rules of thumb put into something so that 
everybody understands that. And I guess it is restricting 
discretion. Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. McClintock. 
ASSEMBLYMAN TOM McCLINTOCK: What I've heard so far are 
just general vague references to what maybe the guidelines should 
or shouldn't be. Could you give us some specifics? What do you 
think the guidelines should be in these matters, specifically? 
JUDGE MURPHY: I can give you a series of what the 
guidelines are. They are in great part set out in George 
Norton's article which is a part of the materials that you have. 
I personal feel you could just, with two guidelines, if it were 
put into a spousal support •.. if nothing else, two vague things: 
that it is the obligation of all of us to try to support 
ourselves to the extent possible and, I think, that the burden of 
spousal support, after it has been paid for one-half the length 
of the marriage, should be on the other side to show why it 
should continue. Those are two basic guidelines that would solve 
a lot of problems within the courts and give some real direction 
to lawyers and to parties. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK: Ok, why the figure one-half of 
the duration of the marriage? 
JUDGE MURPHY: I don't know. It's like forty percent. 
It's something that we've used in the past. It's what fairness 
is in your stomach. Spousal support, the idea of spousal support 
is simply a reflection of the mores in our society. In Texas, 
they don't award permanent spousal support. There are other 
guidelines that Mr. Norton in his article sets forth, a number of 
very very specific items. I'd be happy to give it to you. I 
have it right here. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'd like you to wait one second. I 
want to get your question answered, but I'd like to ask these 
three panelists to make their introductory comments. You may 
have questions that will generate from theirs as well. Ms. 
Richmond if you might give us your opening thoughts, we would 
appreciate that. 
MS. DIANA RICHMOND: First of all, I thank this 
Committee for the opportunity to have this dialogue about these 
important bills and I would encourage this Committee also to have 
a similar dialogue about the pending bills. I know there are 
plural on support beyond the age of eighteen. That's a critical 
issue to address. 
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I think that the comments before about this being, 
although not on its face, in effect a woman's issue are 
absolutely correct and I understand the genesis of this bill and 
am sympathetic to I observe also in my practice the 
phenomenon that Lenore Weitzman has described of women's, 
supported spouses, mostly women's, standard of living 
decreasing following the marriage and men's standard of 
living increasing. And representing both men and women on 
practically an equal basis, I know the amount of divorce 
planning that goes into income and I know the phenomenon even 
very rapidly, post dissolution, of men's income and standard of 
living tending to increase and the converse for the supported 
spouse. 
I'm not , in fact, I have real reservations about 
bill as it is now, inadequately addressing those lems. I 
first want to address some things about it that I think are very 
good. 
The adding of a factor of reduced or lost life-time 
earning capac of the supported spouse is important to look at. 
It meets the hypothetical that Tom Murphy up of 
30-year marriage with the 53-year old housewife who has 
a traditional course of married life, whose children now are 
probably adults or close to being adults so that chi support is 
not a factor, who has not been employed during the marriage. 
This is the archetype of the situation where I think spousal 
support ought to be on a level that meets the standard of living 
that the husband has, both at the time of the dis on and 
afterward and permanently. 
I fundamentally disagree with the notion of there being 
a burden imposed on that sort of wife to go to work at some later 
point in time or to justify why her support ought to last more 
than half the length of this marriage. I think that's the 
archetype where we need the kind of focus that Senator Hart's 
bill has of addressing itself both to adequacy and duration 
Another component of this bill that I like is adding a 
factor of immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. 
Most informed family law judges are doing this; it's a factor 
that tends to enhance the level of spousal support and adequately 
reflect what the paying spouse can afford, given the 
that he has and what the receiving spouse ought to given 
fact that she's got to pay taxes on it. And most practitioners 
in this field also address themselves to this point. There are a 
few judges who still are reluctant to pay attention to these 
factors and this factor would, in the legislation, 
direction. 
There's a paradox about this bill that I would 1 
bring up and that is I think that focusing on the standa 
living during the marriage could actually have the ef of 
reducing the long-term level of spousal support, rather than 
enhancing it. Now, there's a threshold issue here and that is in 
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most families they can't meet the marital standard of living 
post-dissolution because there's not enough money. So already I 
think this bill is really addressed to people who have a 
comfortable living standard. It's, in effect, an upper-middle 
class bill. And it also becomes irrelevant for the very wealthy 
because I don't think there should be equalization when you get 
to comfort levels that are luxury beyond what most of us imagine. 
Addressing myself to those people who could afford the 
standard of living during the marriage, there are instances where 
the managing spouse in the marriage has depressed the marital 
standard of living or depressed the supported spouse's standard 
of living -- sometimes his own as well and sometimes not his own 
during the marriage -- so that it would be an artificially low 
standard. 
And then there's the phenomenon that I've described at 
the beginning which is that his situation improves after the 
dissolution. I guess I would focus on refining this in such a 
way as to -- you know we already have standards of living as a 
factor; it's usually not a very important factor in spousal 
support because of the practical component of it -- I think I 
would add to the existing factor something to the effect of where 
possible not to reduce the supported spouse's standard of living 
after the dissolution. That would have the effect of preserving 
adequacy or serving as a foundation and perhaps a model for 
ensuring the continued adequacy over the long haul, taking into 
account the fact that the supporting spouse's earnings are likely 
to go up. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. So Mr. Woodruff. 
MR. THOMAS WOODRUFF: I'm honored to be here with this 
prestigious panel and to have an opportunity to address you. I 
have practiced full-time in the family law area for several 
years. I represent probably a few more women than men in my 
practice but I attempt to keep a balance. I think that is one of 
the things that helps all of us get a different perspective than 
many of the attorney's groups that testify here who have 
represented one side or the other extensively. 
Spousal support is something that I have to deal with 
everyday in practice because we have cases that we just have to 
resolve it. And the rule of thumb, of half of the length of the 
marriage, is one that I've never felt comfortable with -- I think 
I've known about it; I've used it in general cases but usually if 
it's a long-term marriage, it's just open-ended support, that's 
the law and we stick with that. 
I'd like to make some comments more specifically first 
about the bill. I think one of the things that needs to be a 
focus here is the duty of the supported spouse to find and use 
her marketable skills, the marketable skills of that person. And 
usually it is the woman who is trying to face the issue of 
becoming employed. That is a reality issue. I think the clients 
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that I've had that have found employment -- the women I've 
represented -- even if they have been out of the market for a 
number of years, they have been happier people. They have been 
able to share the children; they have gone forward from the 
dissolution and become much happier about, much better adjusted 
to the issue of the dissolution of marriage rather than staying 
home and focusing on it. 
The problem that we have here is if there are small 
children and, as was stated in the summary, the two 
classifications of people who are most hurt by the present system 
are women with young children and older women who have been out 
of the labor market. I think if we can focus on those two 
categories with the legislation, that in the middle, the other 
areas we're not having as much trouble with. It is those two 
areas where I think the biggest problem is and I think it is a 
judgment that needs to be made by the Legislature as to whether 
you want the mother of young children to be in the home, taking 
care of the children or not, and at what price you're willing to 
pay for that. 
In my experience, if the children are preschool, the 
judges usually do not expect the mother who has stayed a 
number of years to reenter the labor market until the children 
are school age and then they do expect that. That has been my 
experience and I think that's a relatively common understanding. 
I'm shocked that 85% of the people do not get spousal support and 
I think that it is a function of the knowledge of society -- the 
knowledge of women and the fact that when people go through a 
dissolution, many of them are so emotionally distraught that they 
are unable to even focus upon their legal rights. I think that 
probably is more of an issue than the rules of thumb or the 
guidelines or what the Legislature does. That is one of the 
issues that creates probably as much a waiver of spousal support 
as anything. 
In Sacramento, we have guidelines of (inaudible) 
temporary basis of 40%, less 50 cents on the dollar for the 
receiving spouse's income. That is temporary basis and on the 
long-term basis the general rule is 30-35% depending upon the 
length of the marriage and some other factors, less 50 cents on 
the dollar for the income. Those are rules that are written down 
nowhere but that after you've practiced awhile you get to know 
them. I feel that they're basically fair. 
In Sacramento, we do not have a termination date set 
marriages of any substantial length in my experience. Because if 
you go to court, you can predict what happens if you go to court. 
If you go to court and the marriage is over five or six years, 
most of the time the court will not burn the bridges, will not 
set a termination date. So ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Excuse me for a short question. 
Could you run over that one more time, briefly, for someone that 
hasn't practiced in this area like ..• 
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MR. WOODRUFF: The formulas? 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Yes, the formulas. 
MR. WOODRUFF: The formulas that are used. On a 
temporary basis, the spousal support is 40% of the payor's 
income, net spendable income, after spousal support is taken out, 
less 50 cents on the dollar for the recipient's income and on a 
permanent basis, after the trial, the trial judges are using •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: So it's the 50% thing that I'm 
trying to understand. So in other words, the husband makes 
$50,000 a year, the wife would get 40% of that? 
MR. WOODRUFF: Yes. She would get $20,000 and if she 
earned $10,000 •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: It would be reduced by $5,000. 
MR. WOODRUFF: It would be reduced by $S,OOO .•• yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Okay, thank you. 
MR. WOODRUFF: Yes. That's the formula that's been 
used. It used to be. These have all changed, by the way. I'm 
sure when Assemblyman Isenberg was there, there were some other 
rules and it was not 50 cents on the dollar -- it was dollar for 
dollar at the permanent stage. At least that was discussed. But 
these are things that really are subject to change and we do need 
to know them. Because it does have a tremendous impact on the 
predictability and there really are differing people -- a lot of 
people -- a lot of attorneys settle these cases and a lot of 
judges don't know the rules, even the rules of thumb, and ask 
another judge. 
I think the greatest thing that we could do is to have 
some, I really was in favor of the bill that said that judges 
have to be trained in the family law area. This is like 
practicing criminal law in the '60's when you didn't know from 
week to week what was going to happen. And this area is so 
complex and if we just think of the impact of the tax 
consequences ..• The two judges, Justice King and Judge Murphy, 
you wouldn't have any trouble if you were in their court talking 
about tax consequences. But, I promise you that if you go into 
many of the courtrooms and attempt to argue the tax consequences 
or the impact of a yearly bonus or something of that nature, you 
find tremendous difficulty in understanding these concepts. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Does the mathematics ever get 
difficult? 
MR. WOODRUFF: Yes it does but there are computer 
programs. The judges in Sacramento have computers on their desks 
and they run through the guidelines. The guidelines are adhered 
to as if stone. 
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JUDGE KING: For ••. temporary. 
MR. WOODRUFF: For temporary child support and temporary 
spousal support, there is no discretion that I've seen exercised. 
The problem that we're having is that we don't know -- the 
remarriage issue is the big, that's the big difficult issue-- we 
have no predictability of what happens when people remarry and 
that comes up at the modification stage -- when you're trying to 
settle the entire case, you've got spousal support, property and 
custody and all those, and you can usually find a lever and have 
something to trade off. But later when you have a modification 
of child support or modification of spousal support, you don't 
have all those trade-offs. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Do you do the math yourself? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
I don't want to be unfair. 
conclusion or any summary? 
Mr. Leslie, I denied Mr. McClintock. 
Would you like to reach any 
MR. WOODRUFF: A couple of other recommendations I would 
like to make with regard to spousal support in general -- I think 
that people should be free to contract with regard to 
support; they cannot under the present law. That was one of 
parts of the Uniform Act that was left out. I think that people 
should have that opportunity, especially because we're seeing so 
many second marriages, to at least limit their liability. I 
think that if we make spousal support tremendously higher, we're 
going to see people not getting married and that's going to have 
a significant social impact. 
I do like the focus of the legislation on the lost 
life-time earnings. That issue I do think that the courts are 
presently considering it but that wording is good. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Although it was not on the original 
agenda, I was wondering whether or not Ms. Kelly, do have any 
comments on SB 1296 which you would like to share briefly with 
us? 
DR. JOAN BERLIN KELLY: I would to express my 
appreciation for the opportunity to appear before this group and 
I don't have a lot of comments about this particular 11 except 
that I'd like to echo Judge Murphy's comments and Judge King's 
comments with regard to the expectation that there's the ability 
to base support on the standard of living during the marriage. 
On the basis of perhaps more than 200 mediations in 
which I participated of spousal support as well as property 
division and custody issues, our finding -- in fact, we're 
collecting data about the financial status of couples who are 
going through divorce -- is that probably about 90% of couples 
are, in fact, living beyond their means during marriage. And 
that one of the major issues for many families is negotiating the 
debts that will be divided up after separation and divorce. So I 
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think there's a false expectation set up that people should be 
entitled to the standard of living they had during the marriage 
because many of those standards of living were achieved by 
spending beyond their means and they come to the separation with 
a large credit history of debts. 
Secondly, I think that -- while I'm very sympathetic 
with women's economic situation after divorce and believe that at 
some level we have to address this -- one of the problems with 
the bill was that we try to address and redress society's 
inequities regarding women's pay and equity issues after divorce, 
such that we make, I think, sometimes spouses responsible for the 
fact that women have problems in the market place earning what 
they should be earning, their inequities in pay. 
The third thing that I'd like to say is that we 
definitely need to define "long-term marriages" if there's going 
to be any kind of consideration in this bill of long-term 
marriages. The current case law that has sort of defined some 
marriages as long-term that have been five, six and seven years, 
is, at some level, very disturbing. We're willing to call this a 
long-term marriage, as opposed to 10 or 15 or 20-year marriages 
And one other question that was asked about why do we 
need guidelines. It seems to me that we need guidelines because 
we have to be concerned about the cases that are not appearing 
before the judiciary. Guidelines set precedents for all 
divorcing spouses, not just those that appear in court and so 
they're important. They trickle down into decision-making at the 
level of spouses who either don't use attorneys -- there are 
probably 35% of women in California who file on their own behalf 
and do not use attorneys, as well as those who use attorneys to 
negotiate their settlements. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Mcisaac. 
MR. HUGH MciSAAC: Yes, this is a little outside of my 
area of expertise --we really deal with children but I'd like to 
echo what Joan has said. That is, I think it's really 
questionable whether the laws of divorce should be the vehicle to 
solve some of the problems in terms of the long-term consequences 
that divorce inflicts upon women in particular. I think that 
there are other issues that really need to be addressed and this 
may be a way of diverting our attention from those issues. Just 
as affirmative action, comparable worth, those kinds of questions 
really need to be addressed directly and not through the vehicle 
solely of the laws of divorce. 
I think that any system that we develop must satisfy 
three basic goals. The first has to be adequacy in terms of the 
children and also the spouse. The second is equity, and the 
third is efficiency. I think those are the basic tasks that any 
system that we device. 
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I suppose the third question is, who makes those 
decisions? the courts, through the Administrative Office 
of the Courts, empowered or asked or requested to develop 
guidelines are necessary, and I think it is essential to 
have guidel , those lines shape, in the shadow of the 
law, the negotiations that parties engage outs the law 
who never come before the court. Those are my only comments. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Now what I'd like to do, 
with the indulgence of the Committee, is for the next 10-15 
minutes perhaps any members of the Committee and Mr. Hart, if you 
have questions that you think have been raised by the comments of 
the panelists, anybody that would like to talk about them and 
explore them Hopefully what we would have out of this 
is some or different perspectives you'd like 
expounded upon. would be the opportunity to either raise 
those questions or make those recommendations. Senator Hart, 
or anyone else on the Committee? 
SENATOR HART: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple 
of comments from what I've heard. Maybe I'm being a little 
se here, some of points that I think are 
particularly is Justice King's comment, I believe it 
was, that, or maybe it was Judge Murphy's, that there are a 
of judges who get assigned to these cases who don't have much 
expertise or knowledge and if that's the case, it seems we in the 
Legislature have some responsibility to try and through the law, 
to educate or to give guidelines in a way that is not to be 
overly re , particularly when you're dealing people 
who don't much knowledge or expertise. It seems to me we 
have some respons lity to try and point people, at least, in 
the right direction, and somehow make them sensi to issues 
that we know are out there. 
Judge Murphy said that the current law is open and 
that 
doing something 
in SB 1296 but 
law does indeed 
to greater selectivity or prioritizing or 
He doesn't agree with the is 
ic point, as I understood him, was the 
to be changed. 
There seems to be some agreement from many of the people 
here that we need some greater predictability while at the same 
time not being restrictive. The one point I want to 
clarify to the panel sts and to the members of the , is 
that the standard that we are using, and maybe standard is not 
the best word, we are not attempting in this bill to say that 
we're going to have a standard that is commensurate with what the 
standard of living was during the 
Judge Murphy made reference to, and we hear it over and 
over again, that two cannot live as cheaply as one and that's 
understandable. What we are attempting to do, though, s 
bill is to have a starting off point. The operative phrase in 
the bill, on page 2, line 20, in the mock-up, is "based on the 
standard of living as established". Now, maybe someone 
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come up with some language that attempts to get at what we're 
attempting to do here which is to have a different starting 
point, a different perspective. It's not meant to be 
commensurate: it's not meant to be a standard in the sense that's 
what we always expect or expect to end up. But to start from a 
point that is different than what is alleged to oftentimes be the 
point that's started at now, which is sometimes nothing above the 
poverty level for women in certain circumstances. 
What we're attempting to do is to have a different 
starting point, a different perspective on this issue and maybe 
the language that here is giving the wrong implication. It's not 
meant to be commensurate but is meant to be a starting off point. 
And I guess the concern that I've heard expressed over 
and over again by people who support this bill or who are 
sympathetic to this bill, Mr. Chairman and members, is that too 
often it seems as if the factors of women caring for children --
women who have foregone education or employment -- is not 
sufficiently appreciated and as a result, the woman finds herself 
at a severe disadvantage when the marriage, in fact, is 
dissolved. I certainly understand the point that people have 
made that it's not the job of the law to deal, or the job of 
divorce to deal, with all of the other inequities of society but 
it does seem to me that judges and we in the Legislature have a 
responsibility to try to fashion the law in such a way that it 
does not exacerbate those inequities and those concerns that 
women oftentimes find themselves confronted with. Those are the 
principle points I'd like to make. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Frizzelle. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: When we started out here, we 
were talking about the concept of "no fault" type of separation 
or divorce. Now we're talking about the business of one paying 
and the other receiving so to speak. Doesn't sound like a "no 
fault" approach really. It's as though the person who's expected 
to provide is going to be the provider and the person who does 
not do the providing is the one who gets provided for, ad 
infinitum. I'm concerned about the concept of equity in that 
judgment. It may be traditional but it's not a "no fault" type 
of divorce. It really ascribes the fault to the person who is 
the provider and has been the provider during the marriage. It 
may be that the person, the spouse who is not the wage earner, 
after a divorce becomes more capable of earning salary or wages 
than the other. But the initial decree seems to establish a 
fault finding without intending it even. 
The standard of living, if a couple gets together and 
each has a certain credit capacity, the lady here mentioned the 
business of living beyond your means is pretty much a way of 
life, especially of young couples with growing families. It 
seems to me you're not only living on a basis of what you earn 
and what's net after you pay taxes but on how much debt you can 
service with what it is you earn. And, if one ends up paying all 
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of the basic types of living expenses, like your house payment 
and your car and your clothing and so forth, then anything that's 
earned by the other spouse ends up the gravy on the dual earnings 
that make your standard of living out of two people, maybe one 
only part-time earning, way above what one person could provide 
by themselves out of whose salary •.• (Taping error; no sound on 
approximately one-third of tape B4) 
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK: ••• divorce, I would suggest 
perhaps looking at the income rather than at the standard of 
living. But I think that after a period of five years, one can 
assume that a spouse has had enough time, even if they've not had 
any previous job experience or for that matter higher education, 
to go out and obtain a degree and to enter the job market 
successfully during a period of five years. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any response? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Elihu? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I want to present a que to 
the panel and work backwards. Is there anyone here objects 
to the language in the bill dealing with tax consequences? 
JUSTICE KING: No, that's already done. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I understand that but I just want 
to make sure. 
JUSTICE KING: It's a benefit to have it in there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are there any fundamental 
objections or reservations to the language on reduced or lost 
life-time earning capacity, which is kind of new language? 
JUSTICE KING: I think that's a benefit for 1. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. Then let's back to the 
only thing then that's left in the bill which raises 
implications -- which is the words the "standard of 1 
established during the marriage" -- as both a factor and as kind 
of a premise for the award of support. What is the 
consequence of adopting that language? 
JUSTICE KING: Well, that's currently the 
law and indeed, in Civil Code Section 4801 and two sect not 
changed, it also exists -- it's stated there, both as ability to 
pay and as to need. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Now it's during the ? 
The focus is on during the marriage. That's the change. 
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JUSTICE KING: No. That presently exists in two places 
in 4801 now. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Show it to me, Judge. 
JUSTICE KING: Under l(d) and under 2, and under 7 --
let's see-- well, now it's under the deleted 7. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's being added, Judge. 
That's the amendment, I believe. 
JUSTICE KING: No, no. The amendment as I understand it 
is to put it up under the very beginning where you talk about 
"may order any amount as just and reasonable based on the 
standard of living established during the marriage." But then if 
you go into the present section, it says "the ability to pay to 
be taken into account, various factors including the standard of 
living established during the marriage." The next paragraph says 
"the needs of each party based on the standard of living 
established during the marriage." 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Murphy. 
JUDGE MURPHY: It could have a real impact against 
women. The very legislation that you put in on Sullivan -- there 
you have the woman who is a nurse who puts her husband, who is 
going to medical school, through med school and then on the date 
that he graduates from med school or finishes his residency, he 
leaves her. The standard of living during the marriage, if 
that's the basis .•• 
SENATOR HART: It's the starting point. It's not meant 
to be locked in concrete. I mean ••• 
JUSTICE KING: 
locking it in front 
of the change. 
By putting it up in front there, you are 
you are locking it in. That's the effect 
SENATOR HART: I don't think by rearranging it and 
highlighting it, we're locking it into anything. That's not our 
intent. 
JUSTICE KING: But that's the effect, I think •.• 
JUDGE MURPHY: Senator, I don't think it's going to have 
any impact. But I know that, on those unique cases, I'll have 
lawyers arguing, "wait a minute, this law was changed and we 
don't want to give this woman any more money because she lived at 
this level during the marriage." The mere fact that you put him 
through med school, etc., etc., we were told not to take that 
into consideration. I'm saying that it's in there now-- I'm not 
sure that you want to give it priority. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge or Senator, that's one of 
the things I wanted to focus on which is the practical 
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consequences of adding court to 
focus its attention on during the marriage 
and what icat are have one 
party or a whole one part or 
the other giant drop in course the 
continuing that Ms. Kel out, which is 
that folks are spending beyond the the marriage 
anyway. You have heard that debate. It seems to me 's worthy 
of some consideration. Could you just tell me your reflection on 
that? Some of these folks suggest to you that the impact may 
well be to restrict the court's options and, at least in some 
circumstances, to leave the court to give a level of 
spousal support as a result of that language 
SENATOR HART: Well, I'm here to hear all testimony. 
The language "based on the standard of living established during 
the marriage. In making the award the court shall consider all 
of the following circumstances of the respective parties," and 
one of those is "the reduced or lost life-time earning capacity 
of the supported spouse for foregone or delayed education, 
training employment or career opportuni s ... " 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No obj to Everybody 
checks off on that -- they check off on the tax consequence. 
It's the use of the standard of living during the marriage as 
kind of the way of defining the standard of living. The Section 
now says the courts shall take into account standard of 
living of the parties, but it doesn't restrict it to the standard 
of living during the marriage, presumptively prior to separation. 
It says generically "standard of living." You are narrowing the 
focus. The courts are now defining it as standard of living 
during the marriage. 
JUSTICE KING: Actual case law s i that it 
is "standard of living during the marriage" so that if someone 
wins the lottery or someth~ng after the divorce occurs, the 
former spouse is still only ent led to consistent 
with ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: 
that, Judge? 
JUSTICE KING: The language 
the factors. I what we're 
inappropriate to have it up 
paragraph ... 
wouldn't 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: .. and 
decree ... 
JUSTICE KING: It should be 
is considered by courts both, as to need 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think we've touched 
you consider it, Senator Hart, and we wi 
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second 
or 
both, and 
to pay. 
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bill. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Wait a minute -- I just want to 
make sure I understand it. Is the implication then that by 
including the language "standard of living established during the 
marriage" in lines 20 and 21, that that may serve to be used as a 
vehicle to overturn the decision about one spouse winning the 
lottery and so on? Is that generally the opinion of the folks 
reading it? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. WOODRUFF: I think that part of the problem is that 
it makes it unclear. The law is relatively clear at this point 
and if we change it, we're going to have to litigate it. It's 
extremely expensive. Like we're doing in Civil Code Sections 
4800.1 and 4800.2. It's millions and millions of dollars going 
into these changes. I think the other concern is that, to some 
degree, it will change the focus and allow us to fail to realize 
that in most cases there's just an inability to meet that current 
standard of living. It doesn't seem that a change such as that, 
which is what we argued, has any basis. I think it would be a 
real difficult problem. 
JUSTICE KING: I think the distinction -- you have it as 
one of the factors "is one of the factors to be considered by the 
court" •.. If you have it in this first paragraph and with the 
language that you have, it seems to mandate that it has to be 
done that way. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's right. 
MS. RICHMOND: I think that's half of the concern and 
then the other half of the concern about putting it in factor 2 
in this way, as opposed to 7 where it is crossed out here ••• "the 
standard of living of the parties" ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Please speak into the microphone. We 
want to make sure that we get it recorded. Otherwise we would 
have done some of this for nothing. 
MS. RICHMOND: I think that covers half of the concern. 
The other concern is the creation of the factor as articulated in 
number 2 has the potential for limiting it in certain 
circumstances. I do think that's contrary to the Senator's 
intent. If you leave it as current language in the existing 
legislation, factor number 7, "the standard of living of the 
parties" has already been defined by case law and people know 
what it means. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Mr. McClintock. 
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK: Well, let me ask Senator Hart 
why he uses the standard of living, which is very, very 
subjective to begin with. And, furthermore, two different 
households with the same income can establish very different 
standards of living depending upon how they manage that income. 
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Why not just go r to heart of 
equalizing of the actual dollars 
individuals of 
matter and look at 
to those two 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You wou than 
standard of 1 
ASSEMBLYMAN McCLINTOCK: , which is quantifiable 
and removes all this objective problem that you have in trying to 
define what is an equal standard of living. 
SENATOR HART: I'm not sure Tom. Let me about 
that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Any other comments from members 
of the Committee on SB 1296 --we'll move along. 
JUSTICE KING: This is not on SB 1296 but it came up in 
terms of comments and I would point out that the Legislature has, 
this past session, passed two measures effective January 1st --
one which provides for a rebuttable presumption that a 10-year 
marriage is a lengthy marriage and, therefore, support should be 
permanent. And the second is the bill I referred to earlier by 
Senator Roberti, providing more judicial education for judges 
handling family law cases. Hopefully, the judicial branch of 
government will take that as a hint and take care of the 
problems. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Since Senator Hart's or one of 
his functions here is is trying to out what is we 
are thinking so that he can consider his bill. Senator, I think 
I agree with Ms. Richmond and Justice King that the inclusion of 
the language on page 2, lines 20 and 21 that is, not as a 
factor but as of 1 f 1 at 
support -- ses probably t want to have in 
your bill. And secondly, maybe Ms. Richmond's point is that ... 
SENATOR HART: Phil, could you repeat that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yes, on page 2 of your bill, 
lines 20 and 21, where you throw in the "based on the standard of 
living during the marriage," it's not a factor to be taken into 
account. If you make a spousal support order, that's the way in 
which the order will be constructed. That's essentially what 
Justice K were saying. I that raises 
implications don't want to deal with, I ieve. It gives me 
some concern. Secondly the question would be ... 
SENATOR HART: On that point though, because that's the 
guts of the bill, it already is under existing law a factor --
"the standard of living of the parties" is strike-out language on 
page 3, line 30 ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: 
"standard of living of 
argument is case law is 
it, that's true. 
the language you want 
to say that "if after 
all of a 
the spousal 
or divorced after the lottery, 
automatically entitled to 
I'd want to go that far. 
law. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
other comments from s 
Hart, do you have anything else on 
Why don't we move forward to Senator 
legislation, SB 1341? Senator Hart, 
brief introductory comment on your 
1341 that you anticipate. 
SENATOR HART: 
mock-up of the bill that I 
have before them and that 
that correct, people have .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 1 
SENATOR HART: What we're 
, go ahead. 
both in the famous Duke decision and also --
statutory language was added Assemblyman 
in law to the appropriateness o de 
certain circumstances. What our 11 
spell out what are the that the 
account in trying to make these dif 
whether or not deferral of the family 
are not making a fundamental change in 
give, a sense, some , 
the court that seems to me to be 
also intent language in the bill 
concern or focus is upon 
dealing with 
-- there 
suffer. 
ought to be 
in this s And 
to do, is to that 
criteria that the court 
to make this fficult determination as 
deferral is appropriate. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. I think with that backdrop what 
I'd like to do-- I'm not going to utilize the same order that we 
did in SB 1296 but rather I think I'll start in the reverse so 
the judges might be able to respond to some of the comments made 
by other panelists. Mr. Mcisaac, if you'd like to begin. 
MR. MciSAAC: First of all, what I'm about to say does 
not represent the opinion of or the position of the L.A. County 
Superior Court. I want that very clear. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Very clear. Very clear. 
MR. MciSAAC: I'd like to limit my comments because the 
bill is much more acceptable than it was when it was first 
introduced as a family home award. And the December 8 version, I 
think, satisfies some of our concerns. 
I'd rather take a few moments to look at the context and 
raise three or four questions about the law itself. Robert 
Mnookin talks about the effect of law in divorce in his excellent 
article on "Bargaining: The Shadow of the Law, the Case of 
Divorce of the Courts", Yale Law Journal, April 9, 1979. 
The importance of the law is not the law itself so much 
as how it shapes the bargaining parties in the shadow of the law. 
Ninety to 95% of all divorces are settled by agreement between 
the parties themselves. 
The history of this legislation in the past decade has 
been of special interests, prosecuting their individual concerns. 
We began with an emphasis on father's rights; now the emphasis 
has shifted to mother's rights. The problem is divorce is a zero 
sub-gain-- one person's solution is another's poison-- so that 
as we try to satisfy individual issues in the law itself, we 
begin to create enormous problems. 
We need to focus on the family as a system and find 
options for mutual gain; to identify underlying needs, especially 
the children's needs; and avoid positional bargaining which 
forecloses options, and leaves us no choice. There can be no 
winner or losers. 
The structure of the law and the system that administers 
it must be able to represent the needs of all the parties, not 
the narrow interests of some. It requires general principles and 
goals with wide discretion to handle individual cases. The 
system must encourage fair and peaceful resolutions, not the 
opposite -- pitting parents and spouses against one another like 
scorpions in a bottle. 
Within this context we need to analyze SB 1341. First, 
"the deferred sale contingent upon best interests of the child," 
I believe allows wide discretion while it focuses on the special 
case that identifies the goal and that's stability for the 
children. So I don't see a problem there. 
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The December 8 version eliminates the bad faith 
bargaining. And the only concern that I have with the bill are 
these questions that I would like to ask them I don't have 
answers totally. 
The first is will the linkage of custodial arrangements 
to property lead to disputes over property in the guise of the 
child's custody dispute? That's unknown. I'm not sure how that 
will factor out. 
The second is does the tenor of this bill, its earlier 
form, -- I think it's much less of a problem now-- exacerbate 
the inherent adversary nature of divorce. It's much less than 
the original bill and I think that's a problem that has been 
dealt with. 
Is having children stay in the family home always the 
best solution? The law in this case permits wide consideration 
of multiple factors. There may be situations where families move 
quite frequently and it may not be best to have a mother stay in 
a home with a huge mortgage payment, maybe really not in her 
interests, and I think the law does permit that. 
And finally, I guess the last relates to the question I 
raised earlier. Are the laws of divorce the best solution for 
redressing the documented economical inequalities that I think 
that Lenore Weitzman identified. I would say that they are not. 
And in summary, I have no problem with this particular 
bill in its current form. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Yes, Dr. Kelly. 
DR. KELLY: Again, my comments will be brief on this 
particular bill. One thing that I would like to say is that 
there is no data available that provides evidence that the sale 
of the family home is damaging in the long run to children. In 
fact, there's only one study which even looks at that issue. And 
moving once is associated with better adjustment, which is an 
interesting finding. 
We've assumed that staying in the house creates 
stability for children. On the other hand, as I say, there is no 
evidence which suggests that. One of the problems I think with 
the deferral of the family home -- and not necessarily in 
opposition to this bill but I think there are some problems that 
get raised -- is the deferring the sale of the home does provide 
new and numerous opportunities to continue to litigate around 
lots of issues, including issues of maintenance and care of the 
home, tax issues, and so on. And so it leaves open, potentially 
for many years, a case which might have been closed earlier. And 
I think there's some risk in that for families, both financial as 
well as psychological, in leaving the whole divorce issue open. 
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Secondly, the other major issue to be considered is 
there is an assumption in this bill that it will be the mother 
that is in the home with the children. And the question that I 
have is will this create substantial problems for fathers in 
terms of enabling them to have their own chance to establish 
their own residence with their children, as opposed to assuming 
that the children belong to and will be with the mother in the 
family residence. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Mr. Woodruff. 
MR. WOODRUFF: I think one of the issues is that the 
Duke case has not been applied widely and there is some question 
as to why. I think one of the major reasons in my practice that 
I have seen Duke not used a lot is because of the fact that the 
people are tied together for too long and that it is a continuing 
opportunity to litigate. 
When I tell people that they have the right to seek a 
Duke, when I'm representing the woman with children in the home, 
usually the initial reaction is "yes." And as time wears on and 
as they begin to focus upon the economic realities, and upon the 
needs of both sides, and are more willing to move on in their 
lives, there is much less attachment to the family home. If 
there is some cost or price associated with a Duke, such as 
continuing problems with regard to maintenance and things of that 
nature, most of them will give it up. 
And they want certainty. They want to know "is this my 
house or isn't this my house." If it isn't going to be their 
house forever then they want something certain. I find that most 
people don't want that uncertainty of the Duke. 
I have found difficulty in what I have felt were 
appropriate cases to get Duke orders. And I think the 
legislation may help that:--! think temporary-type Dukes that I 
have argued many times -- say two or three years till the kids 
get in school or something of that nature -- or that I have tried 
many times to negotiate or request, I've met a great deal of 
opposition. A lot is from, again, the judges not knowing the 
nature of the rule and how it works and how you actually 
implement it. 
When I've gone to trial on the issue, I've had to 
prepare a proposed order to show the judge that this could be put 
down in writing and it could be workable. But I still had a 
great deal of difficulty having it used. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, Dr. Frizzelle has a 
question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I have some concern regarding 
the ownership of the house, the award of the house so to speak, 
as it relates to the equity in the hause as a basis for credit. 
We have a circumstance that occurs if an award of a house is made 
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to one or another, the credit based upon that property -- that 
real property -- for the other individual is completely is 
eliminated. And we are asking a provider, in some circumstances, 
to provide for a spouse or children and yet, we may have 
eliminated the property equity as a basis upon which that 
person's credit is based. And I would like to have you address 
that as you go along, each of you, because it's not just an open 
and closed case regarding the value of the house as a residence 
but also what it provides. Or should we split the equity in the 
house or allow a portion of the equity to be used by each spouse 
in that circumstance as a basis for credit? 
MR. WOODRUFF: Certainly one of the problems we see is 
the out-spouse winds up being unable to afford housing in many 
circumstances because most people buy a home based upon the sale 
of the prior home and they don't have the cash available to do 
that. I think a Duke award is a deterrent to joint custody and 
the involvement of fathers in more active custodial parenting. 
I think that because of the uncertainties that there are 
and because people want an asset, I have certainly drafted a 
great number more notes and deeds of trust than I have Duke 
orders -- which have a note with a certain date, rather than 
open-ended tvpe thing that a Duke is, and more confining 
circumstances or limitations in periods when negotiating the 
case. We do negotiate deferred sales constantly and, in almost 
every case, you consider when is the house going to be sold and 
it is seldom put on the market forthwith. You wait until the 
spring or wait a year or two, but the Duke-type orders, because 
of the uncertainties, many times both people don't like to do 
that. It does tie up, many times, the only substantial asset and 
prevents them from moving forward. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. Okay. Next, I'd 
like to ask Ms. Richmond. 
MS. RICHMOND: I share all of the concerns that each of 
the prior speakers has mentioned. The only way in which I differ 
with Mr. Woodruff is that in my experience it has been somewhat 
easier in my county to get deferred sale of the family home or 
longer term Duke orders than he has described. 
I think that there has already been a lot more 
litigation over this issue by the availability of Duke orders 
than ought to be in certain families. And I also think there may 
be a misplaced emphasis on the children, where we ought to be 
looking more at economic factors. Adding the factor in here, 
renumbered number 6, "whether there may be significant 
psychological detriment to the child associated with the change 
of residence •.. " 
Yes, it is the 12/8 version. Each of the mock-ups does 
have the psychological detriment to the child associated with the 
change in the residence. 
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Although common sense would tend to tell us that we 
don't want to add to the disruption of divorce by automatically 
bouncing a child out of the family home, I do question whether 
the child has to grow up in the same home for all of his or her 
minority. And I have seen cases in which teenage children's 
depositions have been scheduled on this subject. I think for 
parents otherwise inclined to litigate, you're going to have more 
examination of children by psychologists and psychiatrists than 
you would otherwise have. And I think that it is detrimental to 
children to have them paraded as witnesses for one or the other, 
due to what are essentially economic interests of the parents. 
There are certain economic situations in which this kind 
of order really makes sense. And that is where there is a low 
house payment for example. The family has long been there. And 
keeping the custodial parent and the children there helps, among 
other things, to reduce the level of spousal support and enhance 
the overall economics of the family. And then you gear it in 
such a way so that the out-spouse's tax consequences are not 
unduly penalized by virtue of an award such as this. So that 
while I don't have any objection to the existence of such 
deferred home awards, I do have concerns about emphasizing the 
psychological components of the children. I may wish to see more 
definition of the economic consequences to both parents. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Murphy. 
JUDGE MURPHY: The basis of the Duke case and this 
proposed statute, as I understand it, is the immediate joint 
impact of divorce and the sale of the home. Many people move on 
a regular basis and the kids move with them, I assume. So it's 
the immediacy of them. I'm in favor of Duke orders, and I think 
that -- and there is another case that has been written by 
Justice King which makes a lot of inroads into Duke -- and as I 
see it, it is simply a presumption. And should-we-have a 
presumption that there should be Duke orders and should it be the 
burden on the out-house spouse to try to show why it shouldn't 
occur? Or, should it be the burden on the in-house spouse to 
show why it should occur? 
I simply feel that the burden should be on the out-house 
spouse, which is Justice King's case. Duke says the opposite. 
In Duke, it says that there should be a Duke order when it makes 
sense and the burden is on the other side to show why it should 
not occur. 
I find nothing wrong with the legislation other than 
what appears to me to be a blockbuster and that is -- do I read 
this correctly -- that you don't want to limit Duke orders even 
if there are sufficient assets to award the house to one spouse? 
MS. MIMI MODISETTE: My name is Mimi Modisette. I'm on 
Gary Hart's staff. My understanding is that that provision was 
put in to clarify that we are not trying to limit the court's 
discretion. When there are sufficient assets they may still make 
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a Duke award if they choose to. They aren't bound, as they are 
not currently bound, to sell the home immediately. 
JUDGE MURPHY: That would be a major change in the 
present law which requires a 50-50 division of assets. Let us 
assume $100,000 stock and a residence that has an equity of 
$100,000. This would allow a deferred sale of the home, allow 
the wife and the kids to live in the residence, and give her 
$50,000, when realistically she could be awarded the house and 
give the husband $100,000. That's a political decision. That's 
a major, major change in the law as it presently stands, and I 
suspect there would be substantial litigation if that were 
included. 
JUSTICE KING: Since this bill purports to say that the 
Legislature finds a lack of guidance in the law as to what 
constitutes the needs of children for purpose of implementing ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Just a moment, you are on a tape, I 
just want to make sure that I acknowledge you're speaking now. 
JUSTICE KING: Thank you. You're asked to make a 
finding as to a lack of guidance in the law. I'm not sure how 
much lack of guidance it is but there are, in effect, two lines 
of cases. The Duke case, just so we're all clear what we're 
talking about, what the Duke case did was to require the trial 
judge to, in effect, do a virtual mathematical weighing of the 
adverse impact on the child if the home were sold and the child 
couldn't live there versus the adverse economic detriment to, 
what we call, the out-spouse. And under Duke, if that 
preponderated, if the adverse impact was on the child, then the 
court had no discretion but had to order that the Duke award be 
made and further, in the opinion, required that it~made until 
the child reached the age of majority. If the child was two, 
stayed for 16 years. 
We've been involved in two cases. The most recent one 
is Horowitz, and now, this year, Stallworth, where our Division 
said -- and we don't overrule the San Diego District Court of 
Appeal, we're equal, but I think that the better rule is and the 
one that we adopted was -- it is correct that the trial judge 
ought to weigh those factors. But that's just a matter of 
weighing and then exercising discretion as to what appears to be 
appropriate. 
This bill would represent a very, very significant 
change in that law because it elevates the circumstances of the 
child. Not only elevates them, makes them primary and 
specifically says that the economic needs of the parents as 
individuals would be secondary. And I think that's a very, very 
serious thing. You're going to promote a lot of custody 
litigation which we generally don't have now with the present 
kind of Duke situation. 
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You're talking about some economic circumstances here 
that are incredible and I think you have to be aware of them. 
The tax consequences here are horrible. The present state and 
federal law provides that under, I think it's, Internal Revenue 
Code Section 1034 or 1041, that either two years before or two 
years after the sale of the primary family residence, you 
purchase another residence, you can roll over your cost basis 
into that new residence. You don't have to pay taxes on it. 
This order would preclude the use of that section by the 
noncustodial parent because it would no longer be the primary 
residence. He loses that. So when the house is sold, he's taxed 
fully on the amount, even if he wants to use it to buy a new 
residence. 
Secondly, Section 121 of the Internal Revenue Code and a 
comparable section in the California law provides that if either 
parent is age 55 or above, they're able to sell a residence and 
take a gain of up to $125,000 with no tax consequences. Tax free 
gain. And that also applies if you sell it and buy something 
smaller and you have a gain, you can use that same vehicle. That 
requires that the house that sold has to have been the primary 
residence of the taxpayer for three of the previous five years. 
So the minute you have somebody out of their house for two years, 
which is what you're virtually mandating here, they have lost 
those tax benefits. 
The other party, the one that is in the house, gets them 
and maintains them and so somewhere down the line you have a very 
unequal division of assets when that house is sold. Because one 
is going to be taxed fully on the proceeds they receive, the 
other one has no tax on the half they receive at all. 
My experience, and I must say, I was doing Duke-type 
orders, or Duke/Stallworth orders before any appellate court 
cases provided for them. And I started off with the idea that it 
was a good idea to make such an order for the benefit of the 
child and probably to do it until the child reached the age of 
majority. I changed both of those views in the course of my 
experiences as a trial judge. One is that the age of majority 
has nothing to do with it. Secondly, the age of the child may 
have everything to do with it. A two or three-year old child has 
no attachment to the home. A 17-year old, I have a 17-year old, 
we're lucky to get him home. In most cases, the situation of the 
child has nothing to do with this. It's a matter of what kind of 
housing is adequate. 
For example, under your bill, if the house were worth a 
million dollars, had an equity of a million dollars, one person 
would live in it and the other person wouldn't get it, instead of 
the court ordering it sold and letting them each buy a $500,000 
house. That's what it says. The economic needs of the parents 
as individuals will be secondary. 
In addition, you've got some definitions in here that 
are very, very troublesome, and what you're doing is you're 
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saying there should be this kind of an award if it will minimize 
the adverse impact of the dissolution on the child. That's a 
very subjective question. And I don't know that anybody can do 
that, although I'm sure we could get some psychiatrists who would 
come in and testify to that. And you're asking them to do that, 
versus the undue hardship on the other spouse. 
In my view, because of these tax consequences, as I've 
indicated in the Stallworth case, I think if the so-called 
out-spouse is in the position to take advantage or to lose either 
or both of these very substantial tax benefits, that's enough 
right then to require that the house be sold. Why should 
somebody, a few years down the line, have to pay taxes on 
$125,000 that both state and federal governments say they don't 
need to if that's their primary residence? Whereas, the person 
who is in gets that benefit. I think it ends up being a punitive 
thing and I suspect it will generate a tremendous amount of 
custody litigation that we've all been trying for so many years 
to resolve by keeping out of the courts and keeping in Hugh 
Mcisaac's office. 
And the basic problem with all of this is, and I think 
the reason why the present law to me is just fine -- I like what 
the Legislature did in Assemblyman Isenberg's bill a couple of 
years ago which made the Duke rule less rigid and gave the court 
more ability to be flexible -- there is absolutely no data that 
tells us. And I think we should be especially careful with 
something as significant as this which usually is the only asset 
that people have that is reachable right now. They may have a 
pension but that's 40 years down the road. This is there right 
now. 
We have to be very careful when we make a determination 
on this when we're talking about the effect of it on the child. 
We're trying to protect the child when we have no data to show 
this has any adverse affect on children. 
My understanding of the way it's done throughout 
California now for the most part, is by and large there are no 
really long-term Duke orders made or Stallworth orders, or 
whatever you want~call them -- family home awards. They're 
mostly short-term. Lawyers negotiate them for the most part now 
and they try to tie it in with the time the child is going to be 
changing schools and going into a different school district or 
different level of school anyway. Or they tie it to other 
circumstances that relate to that particular case. I don't know 
of any judges, with the exception of those cases that come in 
where people are way over their head in payments, that order the 
house sold immediately. And you're not going to change that 
because we're going to have to do that. They're lucky if they 
can wait until the trial without the house being foreclosed on 
them. 
So in the short-run I don't think it's a problem. 
Post-trial, I don't think it's a real problem. There are 
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relatively few cases that I am aware of where the trial judge 
orders the house sold immediately. Usually there is some sort of 
a transition. As far as I know, virtually always it's certainly 
a transition through the current school year. If the divorce is 
January, no one is going to order the house sold in January. 
They're going to say put it up for sale in June or July. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is that automatically taken into 
consideration? Or is it just basically some judges do it and 
some judges don't? 
JUSTICE KING: I think virtually everybody does that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: There's no problem though if you 
wanted to make a statutory presumption that obviously that would 
be a factor in terms •.• 
JUSTICE KING: No, but I don't even think you need to. 
I mean, with all due deference to Senator Hart and I recognize 
the problem he's trying to address, I think the present state of 
the law is working well since we got the legislation a couple of 
years ago that allowed people to come back in and under various 
circumstances allow the court to consider changing such orders. 
As the attorneys said, this is not really developing, or has not 
developed, into much of a problem. 
I guess I must say that the major concern I'd have here 
is, aside from these losses of tax benefits, I just see an 
explosion of child custody litigation if this were to go forward 
and I think that would be a most unfortunate result because in 
effect you'd have to litigate the custody issue. 
If we know what we'd be doing, we'd be going right back 
to the "fault" in a way. What used to happen before the Family 
Law Act was you could only get support and more than half of the 
assets if you were the innocent party and so you had to say what 
a lousy person the other person was and you couldn't very well 
say they were a lousy person while also saying without saying 
they were a lousy parent. So you threw that in too, and then you 
had all that evidence. 
Here you're going to get into effects on the child and 
you're bringing "fault" back in and you're bringing parents 
litigating against each other over an economic issue -- in many 
instances, the only asset -- where it simply doesn't occur at 
this point. I think most of us, when this mandatory mediation of 
custody and visitation started, got concerned. Is it really 
going to work because aren't people going to see, "Gee if we come 
in and we agree that she has custody or I have custody, then 
automatically I'm going to get the family home" and won't the 
desire for the family home really foul up the possibilities of 
mediation working. It hasn't worked that way. Very rarely is 
that really even a consideration. Even though everyone knows in 
the back of their mind that it is certainly there and it's there 
for at least some period of time. 
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I would just say that the concerns of what could happen 
here and the fact that we have something that's working -- as far 
as I can tell, very well right now -- don't call for this kind of 
action. If you want to do something to clarify the law, then I'd 
say you take a look at Duke and take a look at the Horowitz and 
Stallworth and say this-rs-the way courts should handle the 
temporary awards of family homes at the time of dissolution. And 
that, I think, would be a better approach than to place the 
interests of children above parents. I think when you are 
dealing with custody and visitation, by and large, it's a good 
area to place the interests of children above parents. But when 
you're talking about the family home, and perhaps the only asset, 
it's a dangerous place to do that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. I'd like you, Ms. 
Modisett, if you have questions to answer them at this time, but 
in your answers are there any questions of members of the panel. 
I'd wish you would kind of give me your perspectives as to what, 
if any, impact you see this legislation having on the doctrine of 
joint custody and if you think it does have an impact, why you 
think it's appropriate to modify it. If not, why not? 
MS. MODISETTE: On the question regarding joint custody, 
the people who wrote the bill attempted to make it very clear 
that either custodial parent could request the deferred sale. We 
refer to "a" custodial parent rather than "the" custodial parent. 
We put in language that specifically says this isn't meant to ••• 
I can find it for you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's okay. But that's the intent. 
You want to make sure that it's clearly stated though. That 
either party can ask for it ..• 
MS. MODISETTE: That's right. It was the suggestion of 
Mr. Cook actually who is in the audience that we put in language 
that made it very clear that this was not meant to favor either 
custodial parent. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. You had some questions you 
wanted to raise. Ms. Modisett, I didn't mean to cut you off. Do 
you want to ask something or respond to something? Okay. 
SENATOR HART: Justice King said that he thought 
existing law was working well and that the system was functioning 
smoothly. I thought I heard Mr. Woodruff say that, in his 
experience in dealing with judges, many judges were not that 
familiar with Duke and when you had the short-term Duke request 
that you often times had to do the work yourself and bring it to 
the judge. And they were really unfamiliar. I hear very 
different things that are being said by an attorney who practices 
here in Sacramento and what you were saying .•• 
JUSTICE KING: The problem is a very complicated 
procedure, especially because the attorneys have to protect their 
clients on these tax consequences. I doubt if you can count on 
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one hand the number of judges in the state who understand these 
tax consequences. But the attorneys are always critical. I 
don't there's anything wrong with that. And I think they 
should be ones are advising the court as to what the 
adverse effects or how to overcome adverse effects of what the 
court might be ordering. 
SENATOR HART: On the point of stating in the law what 
are some of the things that judges ought to look at -- in trying 
to give some education and guidance to the court -- the one 
comment that I've heard is the reference to psychological affect 
upon the child, is that accurate? I mean, it just seems common 
sense to me that taking a look at what the psychological affects 
on the child are going to be. They're going through the trauma 
of divorce and, if they're forced out of that horne, they may be 
forced out of the neighborhood, they may be forced out of the 
school, they may be forced out of their friendships. That's 
something that ought to be taken into account. 
I'm not interested in having a bevy of psychiatrists and 
others overload the courts, but it seems to me to be a reasonable 
requirement to have the court consider this. 
JUSTICE KING: That's what the both the Duke and the 
Stallworth cases require that the courts consider that. Now it 
is true that the action that you took two years ago, I guess, 
there is no statute that deals with a Duke order as such except 
that statute which really tends to deal more with 
to modify or how to change it or when to change it. And I 
think if what you're suggesting is that there should be a statute 
that talks about what the circumstances are at trial which the 
court should consider-- I guess that's really what this bill is 
-- in making such an order. 
What I'm suggesting is that if you codify the holdings 
of Duke, Horowitz and Stallworth and you can put the burdens of 
proof on whichever party you want, that's kind of unimportant. 
I must say the one real disagreement I had with Duke was 
I don't think the judge should just tote up some figures in some 
fashion and be mandated to decide something which doesn't fit for 
these people. The concept is you look at the adverse impact on 
child on one end, and the economic detriment on the other. 
In this housing market, if we're going to have a 
continued public policy-- which I guess is the next bill we'll 
be discussing -- of frequent and continuing contact between 
parents, in many instances the only way the parent who's out is 
going to be able to have any kind of housing to provide that kind 
of frequent and continuing contact is by taking the one asset 
that exists and using that as a basis for obtaining other 
housing. In this society how many people can afford two homes. 
You can't. 
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SENATOR HART: Well we do have as one of the criteria, 
in making these difficult choices, financial ability of each 
parent to obtain suitable housing. You feel that .•• 
JUSTICE KING: That's fine. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Senator Hart, let me ask a question 
for my own edification. Do you have a response or perspective as 
to the questions that have been raised as to the length of time 
of deferral? You mentioned psychological effects on the child, I 
mean, could it be throughout, again, the age of minority or is it 
a period of time for transition? Do you have a perspective on 
that? Or does the bill, as stated, in your perspective, clearly 
articulate where you are at? 
SENATOR HART: I think the intent is that it is meant to 
be discretionary. We don't say "to the age of 18 or until other 
specific factors." We assume that the court is going to take 
that into account ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But you have no limit on --
theoretically, it could be throughout the age of minority and I 
guess ... 
SENATOR HART: Theoretically it could. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So that's your intent, is that 
correct? 
SENATOR HART: That's correct. 
JUSTICE KING: I should mention I really have no dispute 
with the factors that you listed. I mean I think they are all 
appropriate to be considered and I think they fit within the 
confines of those cases. My real concern is the emphasis that 
places the children's interest above the economic circumstances 
of the parents in a way that I see as being potentially very 
destructive to the family in the future. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any comments as it relates to the 
length of time? The original sense that I had was that it was 
transitional. Now I'm getting the sense that it may, in fact, be 
more or less permanent. It could be, for example, 17 years if 
the child is a year old at the time of the dissolution. I have 
some problems with that personally. But I don't want to 
prejudice the panel in terms of •.. 
JUSTICE KING: One of the problems with that, 
Assemblyman Harris, is that, in many of these cases as we talked 
about earlier, there is a very difficult financial situation. 
And for the one who is in the home, all of a sudden, you need a 
new roof, the house needs to be painted. There is some kind of 
maintenance that had been put off during the marriage because 
they didn't have enough money to do it which now can't be put off 
any longer -- a new hot water heater, a new furnace, a new what. 
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And that's another one of the factors I think that often makes 
these orders sort of short-term because when you make your 
spousal and child support order, you're considering what those 
housing costs are. You may wish you could consider what 
maintenance costs would be but there is not enough money to do 
that. So it makes it very difficult, except in the more affluent 
cases, for people to stay in the homes very long and to be able 
to actually maintain them in the condition that they were in 
while the parties lived there. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Dr. Kelly, can you go over again 
what information is or is not available on the psychological 
impact on the kids of removal from the home? You've started off 
that way but we didn't spend much time on it. I find it very 
interesting. 
DR. KELLY: Basically, there is almost no data available 
about the longer term impact on children's adjustment with regard 
to residence. There is a lot of data available in terms of the 
quality of relationships that children have with parents and 
other kinds of factors such as conflict, for example. But the 
family home ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's reflected in the paper 
that you gave in '87 at the Psychological Association. 
DR. KELLY: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just jump ahead for a 
minute. Generally speaking, kids do better if there's less 
conflict between their parents. Minimizing the areas in which 
conflict can arise is obviously one wav to help promote that 
goal. I suppose your suggestion is if you have this never-ending 
problem hanging out there of a house, you're likely to have 
parental conflict about that, which will have some impact on the 
kids. Fair summary? 
DR. KELLY: Well, that's certainly a fair speculation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: The other point from your earlier 
works and also from this paper is the notion that to a certain 
extent, it's the first year, the second year, maybe the third 
year after the separation or the divorce that has both the 
psychological impact and the big hit economically. Any just gut 
instinct on your part as to whether that would be also true on 
family homes? If there is an impact with the kids, is it likely 
to be an immediate impact or not? 
DR. KELLY: Well, it's true the children have many 
things they have to adapt to at the point of separation --
primarily being the departure of at least one parent from the 
household. And changing residences is yet another transition. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that some children welcome 
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that change in transition, for example, because they are getting 
away from the house that has been full of anger and conflict and 
they don't like the house. Other children 't want to leave 
the house; they've been there five or 10 years. There is no firm 
data that says it's bad, it's good. It varies enormously from 
family to family. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: From your perspective in 
mediation -- and I guess, other than writing and commenting, 
that's how you spend your professional career-- is the status 
quo, the present law, regarding deferred house sale adequate 
enough from your view point as a mediator, trying to be flexible 
to do one thing one time, is it good or bad? 
DR. KELLY: I think the current status is good. I would 
agree with Justice King. I would also agree with him that I 
think that elevating the best interests of the children to the 
top of this bill, which basically equates family residence with 
the best interests of the children, is a mistake. I think they 
ought to be down where they are, further down, as one of the 
considerations that people ought to take into account if they are 
going to do a Duke order, for example. 
The other thing that concerns me about the way this is 
worded is whether there may be significant psychological 
detriment to the child. I think it does invite a lot of 
litigation and all of it is speculative and that's one of the 
problems with this. We're trying to project future damage based 
on the current sale of residences and I think that's an 
impossible task, as someone who also does forensic psychology. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are there any other comments by 
members? Yes, Mr. Woodruff. 
MR. WOODRUFF: One of the concerns that I've had about 
Duke is how to (inaudible) the guidelines. I think it would be 
easier to get a Duke order if there were some kind of an 
adjustment to the child support or spousal support as the result 
of foregoing the access to the capital that's invested in the 
major asset of the family. 
Some judges have suggested that you take the fair rental 
value of the property, less the payment that's being made, and 
divide that by two and reduce the child support by that amount. 
Where you have stone guidelines that are being applied woodenly 
by most judges, it really exacerbates the situation of the 
out-spouse if the only major asset is tied up by a Duke order and 
you have no access to that capital. ----
If we had some input as to using the rental value or the 
lost return on capital -- assume there's $50,000 and you take a 
7% return and reduce the child support by that amount -- I think 
Duke would be much more acceptable. We'd be able to work it in 
and work out something whether by way of a note or something 
else. But that is one issue on Duke that I don't think has been 
addressed well and is currently not being handled. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Senator Hart, do you yes, 
Mr. Mcisaac. 
MR. MCISAAC: Yes, having heard the testimony of this 
bill I would like to change my position. I now have a problem. 
(laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, any other comments? Yes, Dr. 
Kelly. 
DR. KELLY: I want to say one other thing. That it is 
not necessarily in the children's best interest to preserve the 
family residence. That's particularly true where there are high 
mortgages and where a disproportionate amount of net spendable 
income goes into maintaining that house such that, for example, 
parent and child or children have no money left over to do other 
things that they might ordinarily do. It depends very much on 
the size of that mortgage and certainly some of these Duke orders 
make more sense where we have long-term houses that have $300 
mortgages. In 1990 this bill will probably be irrelevant. 
(laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Any other comments? Senator Hart, do 
you have any closing comments? I think you heard the critique. 
SENATOR HART: I appreciate the input and will consider 
these comments. I would just reiterate my initial point which is 
that we are attempting to list points that the court ought to 
take into account when it is making these decisions. We are not 
obligating the courts to do anything and I think that some of the 
implications of the comments that somehow this is a major 
departure from existing law are erroneous. 
But we'll certainly listen carefully to what's been said 
and other points as well. But I hope people will keep that 
comment in mind. That we are not attempting in this bill to make 
a major departure from existing law and I don't think even 
inadvertently that we've made a major departure. The issue of 
intent language in the child versus the economic interests and I 
11 certainly take a look at that. 
It seems to me, I mean my bias is -- and having not 
appeared in court, but having heard a lot of people comment --
that oftentimes, it seems to me, that the economic interests 
oftentimes are foremost in a lot of people's judgments. And all 
we are trying to do is to have the court be sensitive to the fact 
of the needs of the child and perhaps we have gone too far with 
this ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: See, that also may presume though that 
they are not currently doing that, Mr. Hart. I think that one of 
the questions we are raising is how far they go in terms of the 
best interests of the child balancing other interests and other 
perspectives. I think we are trying to find a delicate balance 
and I think that's something that is very difficult to do. 
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So I , fully you all understand that, we are 
tinkering. Whenever you're tinkering, you always have to be a 
little concerned whether or not you're going one way too far 
or whether 've gone far enough. So you're sensitive to 
that. I we're now Mr. 
Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Just an observation. I found 
this discussion to be very, very interesting and informative. A 
whole lot of things I had not talked with, but it's worth noting 
that a whole lot of bill authors would sit through this 
discussions and be bored or get angry. Senator Hart is one of 
the few legislators I know who has cared enough to spend, God 
knows how many, hours yelling at me and everybody else, and is 
one of the few authors prepared to actually deal with objections 
raised. And I think this will be extraordinarily helpful in the 
ultimate debate on this bill. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I haven't had the experience of 
having a few authors 1 at me about the bills, Mr. Isenberg. 
So you are a perspective. (In and out of committee) But 
at least ... 
UNIDENTIFIED VOICE: I think we need a mediator here. 
(laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, absolutely, absolutely, or 
referee, med But at any rate, I think it's very 
important and I that as we debate this bill, both in terms 
of any changes Senator Hart may decide are appropriate on either 
one of these measures, that the Committee is also better informed 
to respond to Senator Hart will prepare and present to us, 
because I think we all have limited perspectives. 
Mr. , I think, has the benefit along with Mr. 
Connelly of in the family law area and has much more 
familiarity perhaps than any of us on the Committee or 
perhaps in the slature at large. But this has been helpful 
and I think, hopefully, Senator Hart and his staff, as well as 
people from the Equity Task Force, may want to take this 
transcript as soon as 's available and look at it and analyze 
it and perhaps be prepared to answer any of the questions that 
have been rai when the bill is heard in January. So I want to 
thank you for all the comments we've had on these two bills. 
All , we're going to adjourn now for lunch and we 
will reconvene at 1:15. And it will be my intent to have us out 
of here by 3:00 despite the words in the agenda. 
LUNCH BREAK 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: I thank everyone for coming back so 
that we can start. We're a little bit late but obviously not as 
late as we were this morning getting started. It is still my 
intent to try to get through this issue in the next hour and 
one-half. With everyone's cooperation we will achieve that goal. 
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Senator Morgan, what I'd like to do is perhaps initially 
give you a sense of the process. What we will do is have you 
make some introductory comments about SB 1306. We will then ask 
each of the panel members that we have assembled to make comment 
about SB 1306 from their perspective in general terms. Then we 
will engage in collective dialogue between the Committee, the 
panel members and yourself and/or staff. So we can try to 
basically give both the Committee and you, Senator Morgan, some 
direction as it relates to any appropriate changes you may want 
to make, or the Committee may want to make on this bill before it 
is finally heard. Does that make sense to you? Is that process 
acceptable? 
SENATOR REBECCA MORGAN: I understand it. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Okay, fine, Senator Morgan, then would 
you open please on SB 1306. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Member. 
What we have on SB 1306, I believe, is not the very complex bill 
that has been represented to be but rather a fairly simple bill. 
It is directed to just ensure that the child's best interest is 
the primary standard to be used in the award of custody in 
California. Now I understand the process here, Mr. Chairman, but 
I need to share with you that I could have had at least half a 
dozen judges here that are in support of my bill that would have 
loved to have testified. I am going to be quoting from them 
because in the one-day notice that we were given, we were not 
able to get them to Sacramento. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me, I want to tell you that 
that was the only purpose if you wanted to have one or two people 
that could explain the bill. This is not a pro and con type 
hearing. You have the ability the present witnesses when the 
bill is heard in January. 
We tried to bring some people who are objective experts 
to come and talk about the bill in an even-handed analytical way, 
as opposed to people who are advocating for or against the bill. 
So you understand, we are not looking for advocates and opponents 
to the bill. So I don't want you to be offended by the fact that 
you didn't have notice. We just wanted to make sure that there 
was someone, one or two people in particular, that you thought 
could give us a clear perspective from your standpoint as to the 
content ..• 
SENATOR MORGAN: I would like that opportunity, and in 
fact, Adryenn Cantor from Family Law in San Francisco and Sarah 
McCarthy from the Senate Office of Research •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's fine. 
SENATOR MORGAN: ..• are here to describe their 
understanding of the bill and what we're trying to do. I have 
over a couple of dozen people that are on the list that were 
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unaware of the 
present law ••• 
and their opportunity to be here. In the 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why is that now? Why didn't they have 
an opportuni to ? 
SENATOR MORGAN: Pardon. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't understand. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Because it was my understanding that 
only your panel was to discuss today. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's right. It was indicated you 
only wanted one or two people to help ••. this is for the purpose 
of the Legislature, you and the membership. Anybody that wants 
to testify, we can to schedule that in January. This is for 
the purpose of trying to give you some direction and the 
Committee some direction as to the policy implications of the 
bill. All of us are free to take or disregard what we hear 
today. I just want you to understand, the purpose for this 
hearing is not s to have witnesses parade in front of us, 
pro or con. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I understand. And Mr. Chairman, I hope 
that I will feel when I finish this hearing, this discussion here 
today, that we have heard both the pros and the cons of the bill, 
and that what we have here is not a staged opposition to what I'm 
trying to do. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I hope that what you ..• Let me 
reiterate -- this hearing is for the purpose of trying to 
elucidate to the Committee the issues that we are facing in this 
bill and, again you should not feel bound by anything you hear 
today. It is to you to present your bill in a final form or 
fashion as you see appropriate and you will have the opportunity 
to bring proponents before us to consider those viewpoints. We 
wanted to give you the ability to hear from the Committee, as 
well as from some experts who, in fact, we have sought out to 
come and give us their perspectives. So I don't want you to 
think this is al, because it is not. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I will proceed. As I understand the 
present law, the ld's best interest is defined "frequent and 
continuing contact" with both parents and that's created the 
implied presumption for joint custody dating back to about 1982 
when the law changed. In SB 1306, we're trying to clarify the 
present law so that joint and sole custody would be considered on 
an equal basis by the court. 
And to quote Judge Harlan Veal, the Presiding Judge of 
San Mateo County, says: "The presumption as it presently 
exists in Civil Code Section 4600.5, that joint custody is in the 
best interests of a minor child, is not in fact in the best 
interests of the minor child. The proposed amendments to SB 1306 
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appear to me to be more properly put the best interests of the 
child above the conflicting selfish interests of the parents. I 
believe the amendments would also tend to noticeably reduce the 
numbers of instructional modification hearings presently 
consuming so much judicial time and effort." And the Judge urges 
adoption of the bill as we have amended it and it has been 
amended since we first introduced it. 
I would like to just share with you an example of a 
problem that has occurred as a result of the presumption of joint 
custody in my own district with one of my constituents. 
This is a woman who moved to San Mateo County a few 
months ago from Ventura County. The boy's custody agreement 
called for him to spend one week with his father and three weeks 
with his mother. After being in San Mateo County for a few 
months, he was ready to enter first grade. His father insisted 
that the boy still spend one week out of every four with him in 
Ventura County. They went back before the courts and the 
original ruling was upheld. So what we have is a six-year old 
spending three weeks a month in first grade in San Mateo County, 
and one week a month in Ventura County. 
Now I ask you is that in the child's best interest? 
It's that kind of ludicrous situation that we're trying to 
address because, despite the best testimony of school 
authorities, the judge upheld the original custody decision. And 
what we are hearing over and over is, the judges are presuming 
that the Legislature in '82 said that joint custody was best for 
the child and making their rulings accordingly. 
Last July, I met with all of the family law judges from 
Santa Clara County, four of them, and what you have on page 4 and 
5 in the bill is a result of that meeting. Some amendments that 
they proposed as a result of their experience and they are now, 
and you have in your packet which we shared with you, a letter 
from Supervising Judge Stewart, Supervising Judge-Designate 
Fogel, Judge Eliam and Family Commissioner Kittel giving their 
enthusiastic support for the adoption of the bill as amended in 
your version of August 17th. 
The new amendments, we believe, strengthen the original 
intent of the bill to treat both joint and sole custody on an 
equal basis. The factors which are previously considered for 
"joint custody only" would be considered for "any" custody award. 
The factors would include the ability of the parents to 
cooperate; the ability of each parent to encourage the child's 
love and contact with the other parent; the geographical 
proximity of the parents; a history of child abuse; spousal 
support or parental kidnapping: the age and maturity of the 
child. 
The judges also added another factor for consideration 
in custody awards and I'll quote that: "As to the extent to 
- 52 -
which the conduct of each parent has promoted or frustrated the 
policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the resolution of 
child custody matters insofar as the conduct has affected or may 
affect the best interests of the child." The judges that I have 
worked with on this bill feel that this factor would inhibit 
either parent from creating an adversarial situation in order to 
gain custody. 
As Judge McConnell, who chaired the Task Force that was 
the source of this bill, would have been happy to testify also. 
It was sponsored, in fact, by her Task Force on Family Equity. 
It is endorsed by the Family Law Section of the California Bar 
Association; the Association of Parents without Partners and is 
co-authored by 10 bipartisan legislators. And with me today, as 
I said, is Adryenn Cantor from the State Bar Association who was 
able to join us from San Francisco and Sarah McCarthy from the 
Senate Office of Research, whom I hope will have an opportunity 
to enter into the dialogue as we proceed. Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, why don't we hear from your 
witnesses now so if they have anything they would like to add, if 
they feel it's appropriate in addition to what you've stated, 
we'd have that as an introductory remark. 
MS. ADRYENN CANTOR: Thank you very much. I'd like to 
thank the members of the Committee for allowing us to come today 
and tell the Executive Committee's position on this bill. The 
Executive Committee has chosen to support this bill, with just 
the elimination that there be no presumption that a child younger 
than three years of age, that there should be a joint custody, I 
mean a sole custody arrangement. 
The Executive Committee, as you know, is made up with 
lawyers throughout the state who are in the trenches and the 
custody arrangements ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Executive Committee of what, 
please? 
MS. CANTOR: State Bar. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay, thank you. 
MS. CANTOR: Yes, Family Law Section, and I'm the 
Legislative Coordinator. And it was our opinion that there is 
definitely an ambiguity, if not a misconception, in the law that 
is today. Too often, sometimes attorneys, sometimes judges, 
often mediators in the Family Court Services program, believe 
that there is a presumption for joint custody. The law does not 
stand for this and we think that this needs to be clarified. 
It was interesting for us to note that the Family Court 
Services personnel, and I'll let him speak for himself, felt that 
he did not want the deletion of the continuing and frequent 
contact language. A possible solution to this might be to 
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specify that there is no preference, either for sole custody or 
for joint custody, and that of course there should be continuing 
and frequent contact no matter what the arrangements might be. 
That might satisfy those particular people. 
We felt this was a sane approach to -- an irrational 
approach to a very irrational subject and I think it's important 
for the Committee to know that the population we deal with are 
the very people that have to come to the court for assistance for 
custody arrangements. 
Many people have joint custody and do not come before 
the court. Those that must come before the court and seek a 
joint custody arrangement, the court needs to have guidance in 
order to determine whether in fact this would be a good 
arrangement for the parties in these particular cases and it's 
really a case-by-case determination. 
Therefore, we are in full support of what we consider a 
very logical resolution to an ambiguous law. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just ask the State Bar or 
Senator Morgan, we will be hearing ••• Dr. Kelly's here now. Do 
you have any evidence in terms of studies or reports to indicate 
that there are detrimental affects, statistically, to significant 
proportions of children who are subject to joint custody awards? 
And if so, maybe you will describe those briefly for us. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I'd like to ask Sarah McCarthy to 
answer on my behalf, please. 
MS. SARAH MCCARTHY: Sarah McCarthy, from the Senate 
Office of Research. Senator Morgan asked me to be here today to 
provide just that type of assistance. There has been very little 
research done on joint custody that has failed and where it does 
not work out. Most of the research has been done on highly 
motivated couples who chose joint custody. They were usually 
upper middle class professional couples who really wanted it to 
work and in most cases, that I have been able to find in the 
literature, that tends to work out quite well. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But people who voluntarily enter 
into joint custody usually work it out and it's okay, right? 
MS. MCCARTHY: Yes, from my reading of the research, 
that appears to work out. One study by Susan Steinman, of 67 
children between the years of '81 and '84 -- again, most of these 
studies are nonrandom samples that are very small so it's hard 
to extrapolate to the general population -- but she did find 
that, in direct contrast to families where joint custody was 
selected, "in families where joint custody was court ordered or 
the parents were influenced into a joint physical or joint legal 
custody arrangement, they did not create a family structure to 
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support or nurture the children. In these cases the joint 
custody family was disfunctional." 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: How many cases were these ••• 
MS. MCCARTHY: The total study was on 67 children. She 
doesn't say how many •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: And of the 67 ••• 
MS. MCCARTHY: ••. fell in this particular .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So we don't know how many from 
this study were in court ordered as opposed to voluntarily 
entered into joint custody. 
MS. MCCARTHY: I could probably flip through this real 
quick. Actually, she doesn't say that. She divides them into 
three groups: the successful families where both parents agreed; 
the stress families, those who agreed to joint custody in 
mediation; and the failed families, those that even after 
mediation the parents were extremely and chronically distressed 
and dissatisfied with joint custody and, generally, they were 
very hostile towards each other and could not share their child 
rearing responsibilities without bitter and overt conflict. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. But these are .• just so I 
can understand, these were, all 67 were in fact families in which 
joint custody was a court ordered or an agreement of the parties? 
MS. MCCARTHY: Or agreement of the parties, right. 
These were all joint custody families. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So joint physical custody existed 
in each of the 67 cases. In that study do you recall how many 
were, according to the author's opinion, not satisfactory out of 
the 67? If you recall. 
MS. MCCARTHY: Let's see, I don't believe that this 
divides it, let's see. It does say that approximately 24% of the 
sample the authors considered the children to be seriously at 
risk of major emotional disturbance. I'm not sure that ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Because of joint custody? 
MS. MCCARTHY: That exactly translates into ••• well, it 
appears so. I don't know the exact answer to your question as to 
how many of the 67 were in court-imposed custody. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Who is the author of that again, 
so I can jot it down? 
MS. MCCARTHY: Susan Steinman. She has done previous 
research in this area and has published in this area and 
concludes, as do most of the serious authors in law review 
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articles and other research journals conclude, that the research 
on joint custody voluntarily chosen tends to be very positive. 
But where it is court-imposed, we just don't know enough and 
there is some evidence that it has negative effects because there 
is continual bickering. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Would it be more likely in those 
three categories that the negative results would be in, what do 
they call it, the dysfunctional or the distressed, the failed 
family? Is that likely from the study? 
MS. MCCARTHY: Yes, that's the implication of the study. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: All right. So if they are screwed 
up and they are fighting and arguing during their family 
environment, nothing is likely to change. But there is a 
mid-range of people where we don't have evidence yet to reach the 
conclusion on whether it helps or hurts. 
MS. MCCARTHY: I would say that this study would support 
that. And so, therefore, the thrust of the bill to clarify that 
there should be no legal presumption in favor of one form of 
custody or another, I believe, is supported by the research which 
just is not strong enough to say at this point that one type of 
custody is better for all families than another. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Is that the basic research 
document you're using to support that conclusion? I assume there 
are some others ••. 
MS. MCCARTHY: No, I've got a lot of different ..• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay, but that's representative 
of it? Okay. 
MS. MCCARTHY: Yes, representative. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are there any parts of that or 
other studies which reflect upon the situation that existed prior 
to the adoption of joint custody in California, as to whether or 
not there existed a de facto bias against joint custody 
arrangements. I'll just tell you from my personal experience 
practicing law, until there was a statute around that said the 
magic words "joint custody", it was real hard to convince judges 
to consider it. I know my personal experience is not valid, but 
are there any studies that would indicate that the prior law had 
a de facto bias against joint custody? 
MS. MCCARTHY: I haven't read any studies to that 
effect. I think that you're perception of what the practitioners 
believe is correct. 
ASSEMBLY~~N ISENBERG: Okay, thank you Mr. Chairman. 
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MS. MCCARTHY: The only other two points I'm going to 
mention is there are a couple of points, on which you often read 
in literature by joint custody advocates, that joint custody is 
superior to sole custody because of lower relitigation rates and 
because of higher rates of payment of child support. And I would 
just like to say that there is some reason to question both of 
those assumptions. 
One, the research I've read indicates that relitigation 
rates are definitely lower, again, when joint custody is chosen. 
But that when joint custody is court-imposed, the relitigation 
rates are just about equal to sole litigation cases. 
And, also, where joint custody is chosen by both 
parents, there is definitely a tendency for better payment of 
child support but, again, we don't have enough information to 
know when joint custody is imposed, whether or not that will be 
true also. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I'm sorry, just basic facts ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Of the total number of 140,000 
filings a year in California, do you know how many court orders 
result in joint custody awards? 
MS. MCCARTHY: I don't. It varies greatly by county. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Does anybody ••• 
SENATOR MORGAN: It's our understanding from talking 
with judges, and I can't statistically validate that, but in 
Santa Clara County, 95% are now joint custody because they 
have •.• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: You mean joint "legal" custody or 
joint "physical" custody? 
SENATOR MORGAN: Some kind of joint custody. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: There's a giant distinction in 
the law. Joint "physical" custody means there's a sharing of 
time between the parents more than just a normal visitation every 
other weekend. And so we have to be very careful when we discuss 
this. Do you know, Senator, on Santa Clara, in terms of joint 
physical custody? 
SENATOR MORGAN: That's what the judges ••• joint "legal" 
custody .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I don't want to interrupt Senator 
Morgan's presentation, but just on the factual question, Mr. 
Mcisaac said he did a study. I'd just like to try out the 
numbers. 
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MR. MciSAAC: It's about 60% in L.A. County are some 
form of joint custody which would include joint legal custody. 
Joint physical custody is less than 9%, around 9%. That's of the 
60%. About 38% are sole custody. When it's contested, in that 
same study, 17 were sole custody to the mother, one was a joint 
legal and physical custody. Very few cases are going to trial at 
this point. Most of them are resolved in mediation. Trials are 
very rare. At least in L.A. County, very rarely does a judge 
order joint custody. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay, so what we've got is, in 
L.A. at least, 9% are joint physical custody. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Nine of the 60%. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Nine of the 60% or nine of the 
total? 
MR. MciSAAC: Nine of the total. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: 
of all the domestic cases that 
over the study period involved 
proportion, how many of the 9% 
you studied it, involuntary? 
Nine of the total. Nine percent 
reach a judgment in L.A. County 
joint physical. Of that 
were voluntary as opposed to, if 
MR. MciSAAC: I don't know. I can't answer that right 
now. I don't have the data with me but I could check that out 
and get it to you. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I'd like that. It seems to me 
it's relatively important to try to figure out how extensive the 
problem is to try to pin that down and, Mr. Chairman, would you 
mind if our staff would, if your staff, would pursue that to try 
to get ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Our staff, Mr. Isenberg. We're all in 
this together. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: You always defer to Chairs .•• to 
try to get the study and try to nail that figure down. Also, 
does anybody else, Mr. Chairman, know just the answer to the 
factual question? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Not the conclusions, if anybody 
else has a different figure that's radically different. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Why don't we proceed now 
with the panel members. Judge Murphy, if you'd like to lead off? 
JUDGE MURPHY: Well, I listened to Senator Morgan's 
comment about the judge who made an order granting custody of one 
child to a parent for three weeks and then to another parent for 
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one week while the child was in school and that the child had to 
move to different counties. And I think that everyone would 
concur and agree that that judge made a ridiculous order. And I 
would suspect that if this legislation goes through, that there 
will be judges that will interpret this legislation and make just 
as ridiculous orders. 
But I think that the first thing we need to do is 
define, we have to read the statute. And the statute no where 
says there's a presumption of joint custody. I have the statute 
here and it says custody should be awarded in the following order 
of preference, according to the best interests of the children: 
(1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 or to 
either parent. There is absolutely no presumption anywhere in 
this statute of joint custody. I don't think that the 
legislation that Senator Morgan is ••• (interruption) .•• I think 
that the legislation that she is suggesting is fine. But how is 
it going to be interpreted if there are people that are saying 
today that reading this means that there is a presumption of 
joint custody and it doesn't say that. 
I mean, there's no way that anyone can interpret these 
words to say that there's a presumption of joint custody. But if 
there are people that say that this is a presumption of joint 
custody and we're changing this law to something else, are we not 
then saying that joint custody is no good? 
I have no feeling one way or the other about joint 
custody. But let me say also that I suspect that each and every 
one of us here has a different opinion of what joint custody is 
and I make orders of joint custody saying that the parties will 
have joint legal and physical custody. The mother will have them 
at all times other than alternate weekends and two weeks in the 
summer. I will then make an order saying there will be joint 
legal custody with sole physical custody to the mother and the 
father will have visitation on alternate weekends and two weeks 
in the summer, or I'll make an order of sole legal and sole 
physical custody with mother to have the kids and dad to have the 
kids on alternate weekends and two weeks in the summer. It's 
exactly the same thing. 
What is joint physical custody? Does that mean one week 
on and one week off? It's not defined. Again, it's this 
nebulous term that we have here. Joint physical custody says 
that the parents shall have significant times of physical 
custody. What does that mean? That means whatever any judge 
thinks it means. We don't have a definition out of a court ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Isenberg. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: In Dr. Kelly's speech to the 
Psychological Association which I was reading, she indicates that 
at least arbitrarily much of the research has defined joint 
physical custody as where a child is spending at least 35% of the 
time with one of the parents and the remainder of the time with 
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the other. Without arguing that 35% is a magic number-- it's 
kind of like 40% on temporary spousal support orders -- would 
that, in your experience and judgment, at least be different 
enough from conventional sole custody with visitation orders as 
to constitute a difference in-kind? Would that be in-kind ..• 
JUDGE MURPHY: There are many, many orders like that 
that are called sole physical custody orders. Because ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Really? 
JUDGE MURPHY: Because Dad will have them during the 
summer and alternate weekends or something like that, you are at 
35%. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, okay. In your experience 
in adjudicating these issues --clearly you don't feel there's a 
mandate on joint custody -- but presumptively I guess you've seen 
cases where the parents agree and have what they call a joint 
physical sharing, a physical custody arrangement. Have you 
personally ever imposed a joint physical custody arrangement 
where one of the parents or both objected? 
JUDGE MURPHY: No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No. Okay. Thank you. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Mr. Chairman, can I respond at the end 
or one by one? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. I'd rather if you can hold. If 
you have something you've got to get out •.• we don't want you to, 
you know, suffer in pain. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I just wanted to read the first 
paragraph of the code as it presently stands because that's 
usually where the Legislature puts their intent ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't you defer on that then. 
We'll give you a chance to respond. It's probably easier to 
respond collectively. If you just want to take notes on what 
they say unless it's something you think is so out of line that 
it demands an immediate response or we're going to get confused. 
I'm not confused at this point. Judge, anything else? Okay. 
Why don't we move forward then? Mr. Woodruff. 
MR. WOODRUFF: When the legislation was passed 
mentioning joint custody, in Sacramento it was basically taken as 
a mandate and embraced by the courts and family court services as 
something that was a radical change in the law. 
And, joint custody orders have become virtually, in 
every case in which the issue is mediated or in which some issue 
is raised, it winds up being a joint legal and physical custody 
order by its words and the amount of time is something that is 
litigated or decided. 
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But the terms are imposed by indications through Family 
Court Services that if you do not agree then you are not willing 
to share, and if you are not willing to share the child with the 
other parent, then you should be looked at negatively with regard 
to custody. And because of that we have a great number of 
agreements on joint legal and physical custody which are, to some 
degree, under the hammer. 
I am shocked, frankly, that it works. It has. I 
opposed many joint custody orders over the years and when it 
first came in and I've been astounded that as many fathers as 
have actually become active parents. And I think this is a 
change that if this is passed, it will be seen as a swing to the 
other end of the pendulum. 
We are starting to get away from the "all joint" custody 
and back toward the middle of the pendulum. And if we have 
something that's this much of a change in all the words of the 
statute I'm concerned that it will be perceived, not for its 
words -- the same as the prior statute was not -- but for its 
intent of cutting down on the amount of joint custody. 
I think we need a little bit more time so that we can 
have some empirical data. We do not have children who were born 
during the time that the joint custody was first set into law. 
They're not grown up yet. And we haven't really had enough time 
to do any type of a longitudinal study and I'm concerned about 
that. 
With regard to the specifics of the statute, I'm 
concerned about the amount of litigation that I think will occur 
with the addition of several of the statements in here. The 
words "spousal abuse" will cause a great deal of litigation. 
Having that as a consideration in child custody will create a 
great deal of difficulty. We will wind up back with the "fault" 
divorce and we will wind up having a great deal of difficulty in 
that. 
I think the geographical proximity raises an issue since 
it's in the statute. Will people understand that to mean that if 
they move away they can avoid joint legal custody? I don't know. 
And the statute doesn't say. 
The past ability to cooperate. Parties can effect that 
simply by creating, if they know that that is a way to avoid 
joint custody, they will simply disagree for three years and 
create that history. I think it is important that we spend more 
time in finding out how the joint custody is going to work under 
the present law. 
I don't specifically object. I think if this had been 
the law that passed originally, it would have been fine and we 
would have done well with it, and I think that some of the 
initial reactions to having joint legal custody in more cases 
than we needed. At least it created some data for us to look at. 
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But now I think before we change the direction that we're going 
down the road, we need to study where we are and the data just 
isn't in. 
I'm surprised that even in cases where there's been a 
forced joint legal custody and physical custody and increased 
parenting time far beyond what was normally given prior to the 
joint custody law, that those have worked relatively well too. 
And I don't really know why but I think that it has worked and, 
again, I'm surprised but I think that is where we are. I can see 
a great deal of effort and I would not specifically disagree with 
any of the specific statements in the statute. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Ms. Richmond. 
MS. RICHMOND: This is an area in which I really want to 
try to take a long view. We suffer from things that Mr. Woodruff 
has already observed and that is a short period of time in which 
to evaluate an important new development in child custody. 
A second arena is the whole terminology for this field. 
Someday, not today, and I'm not the first to make this 
observation, we're going to call postjudgment parenting by 
something other than custody, which has some very onerous 
overtones to the very designation. That is part of the whole 
problem in child custody awards right now. Somebody is rewarded 
by gaining rights over the child. Somebody loses. Somebody is 
relegated to the posture of visiting with a child that he or she, 
up until the time of the divorce, had much contact with and 
certainly a lot of authority over. 
A hundred years ago if a marriage fell apart, if I have 
my history correct, it would be the father who would 
automatically gain ownership rights over the child. That 
switched altogether sometime later so that the mother 
automatically had those rights. By the time I started practicing 
law about 15 years ago, we had a "tender years" doctrine but in 
practical effect the mother always got custody even if the child 
wasn't of tender years. 
I do remember, and it wasn't that many years ago, when I 
first went to court with an uncontested case where the parents 
had agreed on a joint parenting -- joint custody schedule. And 
the trial court would not permit us to go forward with that 
agreement. The trial judge thought it was an egregious way to 
grant custody of the children and ordered an investigation by the 
Office of Family Court Services, who fortunately took one look at 
the situation and said this was fine. The parents had agreed 
upon a sensible thing here. 
When our current statute came into effect, even though 
it does not grant any statutory preference for joint custody, it 
contains enough language in there referring to joint custody that 
it gave it a statutory legitimacy that it didn't have before. 
And as a result of that, more parents have been encouraged to 
- 62 -
enter into joint parenting agreements. I think that has been 
much to the good. I'm not suggesting that every family should 
have a joint custody award and I don't think every family ends up 
with one. 
I think we have seen an era of far more involved 
fathers. I think we have seen an era in which more fathers have 
become active and interested and actually carrying through on 
this frequent and continuing contact with their children and that 
the existing statute enables that. 
The wording of the proposed statute is really innocuous 
but the perception of its enactment at this point in time and 
eliminating all the verbiage about joint custody or much of it 
about joint custody, I think would be perceived as an indictment 
of joint custody. And I think that would be a grave error when 
we are still in an era of expanding it and trying to determine 
what comes of it for families who have done this. 
I might add also that with respect to subparagraph 5, 
the extent to which the conduct of each parent has promoted or 
frustrated the policy of law to encourage cooperation in the 
resolution of child custody matters, I agree with Tom Woodruff. 
That it's within the power of one of the parents to kibosh j 
custody by utilizing this and there are many judges who believe 
that you can't have joint custody if the parents are not in 
concert with one another. 
I happened to have seen a number of different lies 
where both parents were highly competent, highly involved and 
they did what was known as "parallel parenting." They couldn't 
agree with one another on very much, but independently they each 
maintained joint custody with their children, with the children 
understanding the different rules obtained in different 
households. 
I have seen a few orders of joint custody being imposed 
by court order rather than by agreement of the parties. I don't 
think that families there have been any better or worse off than 
when the court, after a contested bitter custody trial, has made 
a sole custody award to one parent or the other. It's an 
injurious situation. It's much better solved by agreement and 
the vast majority of these cases are resolved by mediation and 
agreement. 
There are two other factors about the legislation that I 
do want to point out. I do think it's constructive that it 
incorporates factors to look at for children under three. I 
think those are highly appropriate from what I've learned about 
child development issues and it would be a favorable thing to 
have that incorporated into the legislation. And the factor with 
regard to either child abuse or spousal abuse, I do think that's 
a relevant factor for consideration and I would favor the 
inclusion of that. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, thank you very much. Okay. 
Next I'd like to ask Dr. Kelly, if you'd like to comment please. 
DR. KELLY: Thank you. I would like basically to 
elaborate on major points. First of all, I think all of 
you have a copy of an invited address which I gave the American 
Psychological Association which does summarize the major reliable 
research that uses comparison groups, objective standardized 
measures, and so on, that is going to be published in the near 
future. 
To summarize what is in that paper, most of the studies 
on children divorced today have been on children in sole custody 
arrangement, with additional visiting to the father which has 
traditionally been about every other weekend or four days out of 
30. 
Children in sole custody arrangements, when compared to 
children in intact families, are not doing well. They are having 
both academic as well as social and social competence problems, 
and this is particularly true with boys. Within this, and for 
children, there's a very consistent finding which is that for the 
majority of children, the major drawback, downside, negative 
aspect of divorce is the diminished contact with the father. And 
that's been consistently documented in a number of studies. 
Within this research, as you look at what are the 
variables that are associated with better adjustment in children 
in post-divorce, we are talking longer term adjustment issues, 
which we must. All of us know and agree that the initial 
reaction to divorce is a difficult one for children, a troubled 
time of transition, but that most children, the majority of 
children in the long haul 
become well-adjusted. 
Within the research what we're finding is that the 
greater and more reliable the role of father in sole custody 
mother custody -- homes, then the better adjusted the children 
are, and again it's particularly true for boys. 
There have been very few limited joint custody studies. 
It is true that, for the most part, these studies have been 
focused on parents who have agreed to joint custody rather than 
having it imposed by the court. In these limited studies that we 
have -- again utilizing comparison groups, which is really 
critical, we have to say compared to what all this research in 
order to begin to make conclusions -- we are finding that the 
boys that have been studied in these joint custody studies are 
better adjusted psychologically on a number of different 
standardized measures and have higher self-esteem compared to 
boys in sole custody homes. 
Why do I review all this? I think it's relevant, 
because the evidence has grown in the last 10 years that children 
in sole custodial arrangements are not doing particularly well. 
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And, but that the greater the contact the child has with both 
parents and particularly the father, and particularly for boys, 
the children are either better adjusted or indistinguishable from 
well-adjusted intact family children. 
Now, I think that the California law, since 1980, 
despite its bumps and problems, has allowed fathers who wanted to 
be involved in their children's lives to continue in their role 
of parenting after divorce. And prior to the joint custody 
legislation of 1980, it was almost impossible for fathers to have 
anything other than the limited prescribed visitation role that 
children have with fathers in sole custody arrangements. 
I believe that public policy in this regard has been 
enlightened and that it has made a difference in the State of 
California and that it has been in the children's best interest 
because the statute really created a climate for change and 
alerted both lawyers and parents and judges to the reality and 
the consciousness that children of two parents need to continue 
to be children of two parents after divorce. That's what 
children say they want and that's what they've been allowed to 
have through this statute. 
Beyond that .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me one second. The consultant 
informed me there's a camera present that I've allowed. If 
anyone has any objection to it, then I'll ask him to leave. So 
don't be ashamed if you want to object to it. I'll be the bad 
guy, but .•. anybody care? All right. Go ahead. We're really 
going to put you up on a wanted poster. It won't be anything 
more. 
DR. KELLY: Okay. I want then to move on to another 
area and at least share some data with you about the normative 
divorcing family. One of the issues I think that is an important 
one that we lose sight of is that public policy should be for all 
divorcing famil s, not just for the failures of the system. I 
would quite agree with Judge Murphy that that particular decision 
is, I can use lots of words to describe that judicial decision, 
certainly "inappropriate" would be, you know, a safe word. 
But to change laws on the basis of either poor training, 
poor judgment or the failures of the system, as opposed to the 
needs of the greater numbers of divorcing families is something I 
think we have to seriously look at. I believe public policy 
should be for everyone. And, again, statutes set precedent. 
Statutes tell not just those who come to court, but also create a 
climate in the State for what shall be, the usual way that 
parents behave during and after divorce. And if we gear our 
statutes just to the failures of the system, the 10-15% which 
continue to litigate, I believe that we do a disservice to 
families that are capable of much better than that. 
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I would like to just share a little bit of data with you 
from a large study that I'm doing of 435 men and women that we're 
following over five points in time. It's a longitudinal study. 
We've run out of funds ••. if anybody knows of any funds so I can 
do the follow-up research, I'd appreciate The reason I want 
to share some of this data is that I believe that's there certain 
stereotypes that we have in our society about the divorcing 
family and myths associated with those stereotypes that lead then 
us to, or society to, be against joint custody or to attack joint 
custody. 
One of them has to do with the myth that if marriages 
breakdown then they are by definition bad parents, are unable to 
cooperate, etc. And I'd just like to show you some slides, if I 
may? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. So you can see it, why don't we, 
sergeant, turn the lights down? All right. Well, let's see. Be 
prepared to turn the lights down just in case. Okay. Why don't 
you turn down the lights in this part of the room and then I 
think that'll be •.. Okay. All right, that's fine. 
DR. KELLY: The point I want to make with s slide .•. 
oh great, okay. Thank you. The point that I want to make with 
this slide is that in the 1980's, at least, as contrast to the 
past ... there are many different clusters of marital factors that 
are leading to divorce. Not all marriages involve high conflict 
and certainly not all marriages involve high conflict around 
their children. 
The most common reason in the 1980's at least in 
Northern California, and I have no reason to expect Southern 
California as any different, is that people are divorcing for 
what they themselves are describing as, for example, a factor 
that has to do with their emotional needs are not being met by 
their spouses. A gradual growing apart in the relationship and 
at some point in the relationship, someone decides to divorce. 
By the way, divorces are being sought at a ratio of 
about three to one by women as opposed to by men. Far more 
divorces are initiated by women in our society. And this is true 
in the number of different studies across the country. The point 
I want to make here is these factors leading to divorce are not 
associated with high conflict around children. This factor is 
not associated with high conflict or poor cooperation around 
children. This one is, this one is, etc. (pointing to chart) I 
just wanted to show this as an example that we have many 
different kinds of marriages ending in divorce. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Remember this is going to be 
transcribed. So maybe you could read those into the record. 
We'll have a copy we can obviously print. 
Dr. KELLY: Well, I can. I don't know that it is all 
that critical in terms of going through each one because I know I 
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have a limited amount of time and a few other things I want to 
show but what I want to show here •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can submit the written transcript 
for our records then can't you? 
DR. KELLY: I'm sorry. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can submit this, a photocopy of 
this for our records. Okay, that's fine. 
DR. KELLY: Yes, certainly. The point that I wanted to 
make is that in at least half of the marriages ending in divorce 
today where people have children, there is not high conflict 
around their children nor is there a lack of cooperation. 
When you ask people, men and women both, to rate the 
amount of marital conflict during the last two years prior to 
their divorce, one thing I want to point out is (if you noticed 
in the "often always" category, up here) more than half the men 
and women are talking about high conflict in their marriages. 
If you then ask them a comparable question about how 
much conflict around their children, you will see down here in 
the bottom that significantly fewer men and women report 
child-specific conflict, as opposed to marital conflict. Parents 
themselves seem to be able to separate out their marital 
conflicts from their child- related conflict and see those as 
different aspects of their relationship. 
Similarly, parents themselves say that they can 
cooperate significantly better about their children, as opposed 
to other aspects of marital communication of which we measured 
six other aspects, like their relationship, their sexual 
relationship, their relationship with friends, etc., other 
aspects. They do better around their children than they do with 
regard to their adult marital relationship. 
This next slide shows the ratings of a level of 
cooperation between spouses at the time of separation which is 
"time 1" and again at "time 3" which is at final divorce. And, 
as you will see here at "time 3 final divorce" 61% of the men and 
women who are parents are saying that they are actually 
cooperating pretty well around their children. And I think 
that's fairly remarkable given that they have just come through 
and completed their divorce process. I do have measures I'm 
collecting on one and two years post-divorce so I'll be able to 
compare that to this. 
The point being that we're dealing here with small 
numbers of parents, anywhere from, depending on which slides you 
look at, 12 to 20 or 24%, who are not able to cooperate around 
their children or who have poor communication around their 
children. 
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When you ask parents to tell us how well they think 
they're going to be cooperating about their children, when you 
ask them at "time 1" when they separate, how well they'll 
cooperate, 67% or 2/3 of them believe they are going to cooperate 
reasonably or very well after divorce. And, in fact, when you 
ask them again at "time 3" when they are divorced, you are still 
finding that about 2/3rds of the population are reporting good 
cooperation around their kids and another 14% pretty good 
cooperation. Again, around 18%, 15-20%, who are having trouble. 
I won't go on except one piece of data relative to an 
earlier discussion about what are people actually doing. In the 
study we have, 85% of men and women have joint legal custody at 
final divorce, an additional 50% have the language of joint 
physical custody in their decrees. Now having the language of 
joint physical custody in your decree is different than how much 
time in fact you may spend with your children. Some of these men 
and women are truly sharing their children's time and others, 
anywhere from traditional weekend visitation and through expanded 
contacts up to more like shared parenting. 
When we looked at what people were doing at final 
divorce, we find here that 12% of the fathers have very minimal 
or no contact with their children. Another 29% are what I would 
call "weekend" or "just once monthly" dads. Nineteen percent 
have expanded contacts meaning that they're seeing their children 
anywhere from 20-30% of the time, which usually means every other 
weekend plus an overnight. For example, every week or a weekend 
extended to Monday morning, so that they have more overnights 
than traditional every other weekend fathers do. 
About 27% are actually sharing parenting in that 35-50% 
range that research has pretty much defined as shared physical 
custody and then another 13% here with primarily father custody. 
Eleanor McAbee in Santa Clara County, has a huge study -- in a 
large study in Santa Clara County, 1,100 families had 1,900 
children. This is the biggest study in the United States at this 
point. She has found that of those who had agreed to custody 
issues three months after divorce petition was filed ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What's the year of that study? 
DR. KELLY: This study is actually in press. It's being 
conducted right now. Three-quarters of the families had agreed 
on joint legal custody. An additional 20% had agreed to joint 
residential custody and 40% mother residential custody but with 
joint legal custody. And she's finding the greatest percentage 
of sharing among children range from ages of two to seven and 
that there are, amongst these families, much more sharing of boys 
in terms of physical custody arrangements than of girls. What 
she found is that father residential custody is not increasing if 
you look at previous decrees in 1979, but that joint residential 
custody ... 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me. You want to hold the mike 
closer .•. is that mike working? Okay. 
, a summary I think of various studies 
that are ongoing now, many of which have not yet been 
published, are that there certainly is an increase in the number 
of parents who are electing post-divorce to be involved in child 
custody arrangements that do maintain the involvement of both 
parents. This probably is more true of children between the ages 
of three and 10, as opposed to younger children and adolescents, 
most of whom nobody wants and the kids don't want to be at 
anybody's houses. 
And furthermore, that we're finding in our current study 
that 68% of the men at final divorce or "time 3" are satisfied 
with their current visiting or shared parenting arrangement, 
whatever it is; and 52% of the women are satisfied, with an 
additional 17% of the women sort of in-between, neither 
dissatisfied nor satisfied, just sort of right in the middle. So 
I think we're finding that the law has made a difference and it 
created the climate for children to be able to continue to be 
involved with their fathers. 
I think if we're concerned about the failures of the 
system, I think we should deal specifically with the failures of 
the system, that is those parents who come to court repeatedly to 
litigate, rather than changing the bill drastically, to sort of 
gut the intent of joint custody 
SENATOR MORGAN: Mr. Chairman, you said if we couldn't 
wait. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think we're here. All right. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I know you have one more person to 
comment but, you know, comment further later, but I hope there's 
not a misunderstanding as we go into this. I, in no way, am 
bringing forth this bill as an indictment against joint custody 
or as an attack on joint custody. That is not my intent at all 
and I get the sense from some of the testimony that we're hearing 
is that this bill is out to do away with joint custody. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think 1 S more that they think that 
may be one of the results, or by-products, whether your intent is 
to do that or not. I think they're commenting that this will be 
the effect of the bill. Now if you want to object to that •.• I'm 
not trying to characterize; that's how I interpret it. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I just want to make sure that we 
weren't starting this with that misunderstanding. That's my 
impression. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right. Mr. Mcisaac. 
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MR. MciSAAC: Senator Morgan, let me state that I agree 
with the goal of your legislation. I think there should be no 
pteference for or against joint custody and the current statutes 
so defines that. But that there may be confusion in the minds of 
some about that and I'll suggest the solution that I think is 
superior to the one here and I'll spell that out. 
This is an old debate. It's the Imbrecht versus Smith. 
Those of us who have gray hairs here 10 years ago listening to 
this debate, it calls back all those old tapes that we listened 
to a long time ago. That there, it is clearly in the law the 
Smith bill which prevailed, was the first bill that passed, was 
that there would be no preference for joint custody and that was 
indeed the law as it came forward out of that piece of 
legislation. And there is an excellent article by Steve Belzer, 
which I've given you a copy of, that traces that rather torturous 
legislative history which you can read about and don't have to 
live, which is probably good. 
The goal should be no preference. Each family is 
different. I think as Joan Kelly has very eloquently pointed 
out, the current law is working, basically. From my experience 
-- and I was opposed to joint custody originally, I thought it 
was not a particularly sensible idea -- but in looking at some of 
the families that we see, they're making a very good use of that 
law. 
I think that the judiciary needs a wide range of choices 
because each family is unique and preferences tend to 
discriminate. A macro-preference breaks down when applied to 
individual cases. It places extraordinary burdens on those 
families where the preference doesn't prevail. So, I think it's 
important that we not have a preference or presumption. 
In addition, I think Joan has pointed out that we need 
more research and unbiased research. Much of the research tends 
to be for or against, and it's not really looking at it saying 
what works and what doesn't work. It's rather somebody is taking 
an adversarial position and is really trying to document one way 
or the other. And I think we do need more to find out what works 
and works with what family. 
I think that, in regards to the specific bill, the 
problem that I have with SB 1306 is the shift of the frequent and 
continuing language for the preamble to the joint custody 
section. While on the surface, it doesn't look to be a whole lot 
and I originally didn't think it was that serious. But on proper 
reflection and seeing what that effect might be, is that it 
weakens this very significant and important statement about 
behavior. It implies this language does not apply to sole 
custody -- leading to many more disputes, in my view, over 
custody as couples look for clubs to hit one another in that 
angry phase of the divorce process. And so I think that that is 
unfortunate to shift that language. I don't think we need to do 
that. 
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The second area that I have some question about is that 
I think that any history of spousal abuse -- the other is child 
abuse, obviously, and parent kidnapping -- but I think spousal 
abuse is a little broadly worded. Many times there is an 
episodic event at the time that is not chronic abuse and in that 
situation that could be used as sort of a way to foster 
litigation. I think that that is something that needs to be 
considered, as each tries to establish its position. 
I think the factors of (inaudible) are very good and I 
think that the requirements for mediation are also very helpful 
and useful. I think a much better solution to the problem I 
think you correctly identified is this: that simply state and 
add to the preamble a sentence that says this section does not 
imply a preference for or against joint custody or sole custody 
but allows the widest possible choice for parents and courts in 
establishing a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the 
child or children. 
That simple statement would clarify once and for all the 
fact that California does not have a presumption in favor of 
joint custody or preference for joint custody. And I think that 
would be a solution. That's my testimony. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right, now, it's your turn. 
If any of your witnesses want to respond to what they've heard, 
through you or as directed by you, that will be fine. And we 
also ask that any members of the Committee that would like 
further clarification of your position or that of the panel 
members, we'll take that at this time. 
SENATOR MORGAN: First of all, I'd just like to say 
thank you to the people that have found something good about it. 
And I know Tom Woodruff said that if this had passed in '82 or 
whenever that probably the language would have been just fine. 
And I hear support for the definitions here at least from Diane 
Richmond relative to the children under three and trying to 
clarify that there is some difference in what is good for the 
kids, if you will . 
The stimulation for this bill really came from what I 
was hearing from both of the counties that I represent and has 
been documented in some other counties that both attorneys and 
mediators are telling parents that they must have joint custody 
and that it's better to work it out ahead of time than to have to 
go into court. And so we are, in fact, seeing a lot of joint 
custody, sometimes as a way to get child support, sometimes as a 
way to avoid the court proceedings, and it has nothing to do with 
whether or not it's good for the child. 
And so because, as a result of the language that's 
presently in 4600, that says "the Legislature finds and declares 
that it is the public policy of this state to assure minor 
children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents", 
judges have said to me, "With that being the intent as stated in 
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this code, then we have assumed that the Legislature preferred 
joint custody." And I think that whenever you can have parents 
agree and you can work out joint custody, that's marvelous and 
that's best, but that's not always the case. 
And for judges, because of the way the code is presently 
written, to presume that joint custody is what the Legislature 
intended, really needs some clarification and that's what we were 
trying to do through the bill that we introduced. We found it 
was not written last year in a way that was gathering support 
even in my own district. We went back with the judges and family 
law and rewrote it in the form that you see it in now and the 
items that are in italics. 
And I guess we're really open, if there is some 
clarification that would stop parents from creating adversarial 
or judicial problems as they go through the procedure, for 
clarification, fine. 
I'm a little confused I guess by Dr. Kelly's testimony 
because as late as '83, I know you were saying that divorce 
research confirms the need to seriously consider joint custody as 
an option of equal status to that of sole custody. And frank 
that's what I'm trying to do in the bill. So, if there's 
opposition to that, and in the four intervening years, Dr. Kelly, 
that you've changed your opinion on balancing the two, making 
them equal in the eyes of the judge, and then deciding which is 
best for the k , and I think that in most cases, some joint 
custody will be because it is important that that child see both 
parents. But it's trying to balance the scale, if you will, on 
behalf of children that is the purpose of what we're doing here. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Excuse me. Mr. Isenberg has a 
question. Do you want ••• okay. When you're through, I'm sorry. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I'll wait for the Senator to 
finish. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I think that we have been in touch with 
Ms. McAbee at Stanford. It is my home district. She has done 
excellent work with children over the years and has not 
officially taken a position but has been very encouraging on the 
bill feeling that the whole issue of custody needs clarification. 
What I'm trying to do, both through this bill and 
through my work on the Child Care and Development Committee that 
I'm working on, is to help our young people get off to a good 
start so that we aren't putting our money into judicial systems, 
into probation departments, but that we're doing what's best for 
the child. And it's with that in mind that we've tried to just 
clarify it in a way that judges won't presume one or the other is 
best but look at each case and determine it accordingly. 
And I'm pleased that the State Bar, Executive Committee 
of the Family Law Section is in agreement with the language as 
amended. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Senator, I've got three questions 
but the last one I'm going to present to you, not to be answered 
now but at the end of my other questions, maybe. I'm interested 
in your witness' reaction to Mr. Mcisaac's 
sugge You haven't had really much 
chance to about .•. 
SENATOR MORGAN: No, I've seen it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me, I want to ask Dr. Kelly a 
couple of questions. Dr. Kelly, when I was doing my very early 
reading in this whole area, when I was trying to figure out how 
to handle cases, I ran across the Solnit and Anna Freud book, 
Beyond the Best Interest of Child, which I thought was early, but 
very suggestive. I'm going to show my ignorance. What I drew 
from that book, people whose credentials at least seem to me 
to be quite good, is that above anything else, a child wanted 
stability. Even stability in a what objectively would be called 
a less than desirable environment. It was change and 
instability, as I recall it, that was viewed as inappropriate. 
From reading your article, the book you co-authored in 1980, it 
struck me 's -- I'm trying to think my way through what 
it means on s I wonder if you could just me from a 
kid's viewpoint, understanding you're generalizing and there is 
always going to be exceptions, is it fair to say that stability 
is more important than anything else? 
DR. KELLY: Well, the concept of stability needs to be 
discussed because there is stability that's achieved through 
geographic stabil and there is stability that's achieved 
through continuing ationships with both parents and most 
people 
would say that children are attached to their parents -- more so 
than they are to a particular crib or a particular set 
of toys in one house. But the concept of stability came out of 
predivorce era psychoanalytic theory. All of us agree, stability 
is important but we've had to add on, now, looking at the child's 
stable relationship with both parents. That is, the child who is 
two or three, who has a stable relationship with a parent who 
they now suddenly don't see very much, experiences a lot of 
anxiety and loss that may be much more important than the 
crib. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That then flows into the other 
thing implicit that argument is the notion, as you indicated 
earlier, that people who disagree with each other are going to be 
disagreeable forever. At least that's an assumption, and I know 
that's not always true-- everybody knows that's not always true 
-- but I must confess I still have this visceral feeling, after 
my fifteen years of handling divorces, from people that it was 
damn tough for folks who were argumentative during their marriage 
and during their divorce to ever become really cooperative 
afterwards. So two things on that, why would some parents 
cooperate with one another on a joint custody order if a court 
mandates it when they could never do it by themselves? 
- 73 -
DR. KELLY: I suspect those parents won't cooperate, and 
I think that many of us who are involved with divorcing men and 
women are looking for a civilized, businesslike relationship and 
if you can find that amongst 80 percent of your couples, we are 
in good shape. And a certain percentage of people will be able 
to cooperate. I think it's too much of an expectation to say 
that everybody can cooperate and be friends, but they can learn 
either in mediation or some other kind of intervention how to 
communicate and reduce conflict and work things out around their 
kids. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So would you believe, for 
example, that there should be a prohibition, essentially that a 
court could not order against the will of any party a physical 
sharing arrangement? 
DR. KELLY: Well, the language I believe is here. It 
says it should not be ordered over the objection of a party is 
that right? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No. 
DR. KELLY: Is there any language in here about that? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No. 
DR. KELLY: Was that in the other bill? 
SENATOR MORGAN: No, we are just saying that it is the 
policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the resolution of 
child custody matters. 
DR. KELLY: Okay, it was raised here today about the 
issue of should judges order joint custody over the objections of 
one parent or the other and I would be very reluctant to see that 
kind of legislation for the following reason: Women continue to 
be deemed the appropriate custodial parent in our society, that's 
a political and social fact of life. 
In order to have joint custody, men must ask for joint 
custody, because most women coming into a divorce assume they'll 
have the kids at least 80, if not 100 percent of the time. And 
men have to ask for it. 
Therefore, women are always in a position to say no to 
joint custody and therefore block the joint custody arrangement, 
even if the other parent is in fact a really terrific parent. 
So, I have some serious reservations about a statute which would 
say that you should never order it over the objections of a 
parent because it's too easy for the mother to, in this case, be 
obstructive about it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Respond to Senator Morgan's 
comment. Parties come in, they see their own attorneys, their 
own attorneys say, "Look, you're going to have to go in front of 
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Judge King or Judge Murphy, they're both awful, they'll order 
joint custody at the drop of a hat, you better cut your own 
deal." 
Wife says, "Oh, that's terrible, I can't do it." The 
attorney says "Oh well, if you don't do it, the judge is going to 
order it and you'll lose everything." And so therefore 
reluctantly, bitterly, with great antagonism, large numbers of 
women accede to voluntary joint custody orders. That's one of 
the allegations Senator Morgan made. Is your experience 
comparable to that? 
DR. KELLY: I don't think ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Without using the names of the 
two judges in particular. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Especially since he's on the Court of 
Appeal now anyway .•• (laughter) 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: He used to be a terror, and he's 
still sitting occasionally. 
DR. KELLY: I think judges ought to have discretion to 
either order it or not order it. And I think they ought to 
consider the kinds of factors that are listed here. I have no 
problem with these factors, although I do think we're holding 
parents of under 3's to a higher standard than we are of older 
kids, which I have some problem with. Or at least I'd like to 
encourage people to do that all the way up .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Well, let me just ask, in your 
own mediation experience when you mediate disputes, is a factor 
that the parties use in determining a joint physical custody the 
belief, the assertion, the claim that "Gee, judges are inclined 
to do this anyway, so we ought to at least set the terms 
ourselves rather than let some strange fellow or lady screw 
around in our live." Is that a factor that's part of the debate 
and discussion? 
DR. KELLY: I think that's a factor that's operative in 
almost every decision that people make about divorce. They'd 
rather, at some level, make the decision rather than lose control 
of the decision. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But the next question is, for 
parties who then, if you ask them, they'd say, "Well, I'd rather 
not do it but I don't want to run the risk of not doing it." Do 
those custody arrangements fail at a significantly higher rater 
than the parties who joyfully traipse into your office and in a 
blissful way work out their own arrangements? You know what I'm 
trying to say? 
DR. KELLY: Nobody joyfully traipses. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But you know what I'm trying to 
say. 
DR. KELLY: Yes, I do understand what you're trying to 
say. I need to specify that cases are coming to me are 
not the cases that are going to the HUgh Mcisaacs of the world 
because those again are the most litigious and probably the 
most •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yours are the most litigious. 
DR. KELLY: No, ours are less so. Although my study 
that I gave you is a study of both adversarial and mediation 
people. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Then in yours, the people that 
you mediate •.. 
DR. KELLY: I would say that on the average, most women 
come in reasonably opposed to any concepts of joint custody. We 
start a discussion, their spouses talk about why they want to 
continue to be involved, and at some point along the line they 
decided that that's not unreasonable. They may not like it, but 
they feel that from the kids' standpoint, it make since. 
I can give an example. The woman in my office recently 
who said "I hate this divorce. It's criminal what he's doing to 
the kids and if was up to me he would never see the kids 
again," because she's furious. But she said, "I know," and it's 
hard for her to say this, "but I know that from the kids' 
standpoint, they should see him again." Or the fact is, he's a 
good father. If they had gone the route of the court, she would 
have said "no," and her attorney was advising her to say "no." 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: So they enter into a stipulation, 
the court approves the stipulation, there is shared custody. 
Under those kinds of circumstances, do.the agreements fail any 
more often in your experience? 
DR. KELLY: No, they haven't. I have that data that I 
will be able to analyze by the end of the year. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: What is your opinion as to why 
they don't fail? Generally speaking, you'd say people who are 
dragooned or more reluctant about entering an agreement might not 
cooperate. Common sense would tell you they ought to fail more 
frequently. But you say they don't, what's your guess as to why? 
DR. KELLY: The issue is, how dragooned are they? At 
the level of Judge King's old court, they might have felt more 
dragooned then at the level of our nonprofit mediation center, 
even in Hugh Mcisaac's setting. But you're asking some hard 
questions for which it's hard to respond with specific data also. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: This is the heart of the whole 
debate, trying to figure out what the impact of this whole 
process is. 
DR. KELLY: Well, there's impact in terms of legal 
issues, relitigation and so on, and then there's impact in terms 
of the children. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Do you see more frequent 
relitigation for parties who are -- my wording -- are dragooned 
into an agreement? 
DR. KELLY: No, and not more frequently than sole 
custody. I think there's an assumption here that in sole custody 
agreements there's less conflict than in joint custody agreements 
with people of equal levels of conflict. There is no evidence to 
support that. 
We have seen for years very high levels of conflict in 
people with sole custody and limited visiting arrangements. 
There is no evidence that people with the same level of conflict 
and joint custody are expressing any more conflict, and if 
anything, they're frequently transferring the children at schools 
and child care and do not have the opportunities for those kinds 
of volatile exchanges we used to see on Friday nights in sole 
custody families. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Chairman, could I ask 
Mr. Mcisaac and maybe Ms. Richmond, who is also ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Before you do that, I was going to ask 
Justice King if he has anything to add, since he was absent when 
we took the first round. If you wanted to advise Senator Morgan 
as to your perspective on her bill ••• 
JUSTICE KING: I apologize for being late, but I had a 
meeting in the Governor's office that kept me longer than I 
anticipated. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right on. (laughter) Maybe that's 
what he was down there about. (laughter) Now that we've gotten 
through talking about your future in the Judiciary, you can talk 
about the bill. 
JUSTICE KING: I think that we all understand that the 
mediation process for almost all parents is not a therapeutic 
process, but to a great extent, as I see it, it's an educational 
process. Part of that education is to learn what needs the child 
has that can be perhaps only met, or best met, by the other 
parent. So that there is a starting point of a recognition by 
each parent that the child has needs that are met by the other 
parent and that the child suffers if there is an interference 
where they are cut off from the other parent. 
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One of the other educational processes is to learn you 
can make your own decisions and to do that, you also have to 
learn how to as parents even though you are 
no longer 
So to out what the incidence of relitigation is 
from a mediated process, or attempt to do that is probably a 
mistake because the fact is that if mediation has been 
successful, the parents have learned now to deal with each other. 
They may need help from time to time in the long run doing that. 
They've learned how to deal with each other over things affecting 
the child and they have also learned as part of that process that 
the worst way to handle their custody or visitation dispute is to 
take it before a judge and have the judge arbitrarily, to a great 
extent, say here is the way it's going to be. 
Agreements that are mediated, even if they are under 
some concern, or compulsion even, of what might ultimately happen 
in the courts if goes to a contested hearing ... All legal 
issues and all cases to some extent, if they are going to get 
settled, settled because somebody is looking down the 
line and saying, if we go to court this is what the ly 
outcome is. Sometimes the threat of might happen is very 
substantial and so you reach compromises. 
In this process what you're really trying to do is, and 
I think what good mediators do accomplish, is to reorient the 
parents to looking to what's going on in terms of their own 
conduct and in terms of the situation of the breakup of the 
marriage, and subsequent third parties' involvements with 
parents, what the impact of this is on children and how to 
minimize that 
In , for the most, part what you're doing is 
you're developing some kind of standard that people do look to, 
but as part of the mediation s the results are much 
different than they would be if it went into court because 
at that point get caught up in the adversary system. And 
the idea of working out something -- that the judge by an order 
is ever going to be able to order anything that will work well by 
comparison to whatever the parties can reach by way of agreement 
-- just isn't realistic. 
In terms of the bill f, the one concern I have, 
which I'm sure has been raised and is the materials, I have 
found from the and I know lawyers have found from their 
practice, that the present wording of Section 4600, the first 
paragraph, which talks about the public policy of the State of 
California gives the most underrepresented and least represented 
minority in the country, children, a right themselves to frequent 
and continuing contact with parents. 
It's not just the right of the parents, it's the right 
of the child, and I think that's an essential right of the child. 
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I know from my own experience -- when parents appearing 
before me who were in conflict over this -- to be able to read to 
them the first paragraph of Civil Code Section 4600 was extremely 
important, and to to them, "this is the policy of the State 
of California." 
That, perhaps, is the major concern I have with this 
bill, to shift that into some other section causes me a great 
deal of concern because I have seen in practice how important 
that can be to mediators who can show it to people. It's amazing 
once you put something in writing how much more meaningful it is. 
Or that a judge can read it from the bench or that lawyers can 
make a xerox copy of it and give it to the client, and say "This 
is the policy of the State of California." 
I would say of all the things we've been doing in this 
field in recent years, perhaps the adoption of that .•• and as I 
recall, we did that primarily at Jim Cook's suggestion. It was 
in the original legislation some years ago, it was further down 
in the bill, we put it into the first paragraph and I think in 
retrospect that was an awfully important decision. It didn't 
seem so important at the time, but it really was important. And 
I would hope that as part of whatever is done with this bill, 
that we don't change that first paragraph. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, Mr. Mcisaac, I think Mr. 
Isenberg .•. is that correct? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Do you remember the question? 
MR. MCISAAC: Yes, if highly conflicted families who are 
asked to share their custody actually do it and work it out? 
I've been very surprised at the numbers of very highly conflicted 
families where you have two competent parents who are very angry 
at each other in the spousal role, who, after a passage of time, 
are able to work things out, work very successfully. When you 
think about it, raising kids, you need all the help you can get, 
and if you don't hang together you're certainly going to get 
clobbered by those kids later. I think the parents gain a great 
deal by working together. 
If Reagan and Gorbachev can work out a settlement, 
certainly these very angry parents could do the same. So, I've 
been very amazed at the numbers of families that at first blush 
you would never think would work out that dispute who gain, and 
as a result of cooperating work together, and have a much better 
relationship. They don't like each other particularly, but it's 
a business relationship. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: In any of the studies done in Los 
Angeles, have you attempted to quantify the frequency of return 
to court, and what does that show? 
MR. MCISAAC: The Jessica Pearson Study, which is 
probably the major study of the effects of mediation on disputes, 
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is that if it's litigated, 's about a 36 percent return, if 
it's mediated, 's about an 11 percent return. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Of those who are mediated, was 
there a distinction between was a severe 
difficulty between the s to a joint custody order? 
Is there a higher return rate there? 
MR. MCISAAC: I don't think so. About 60 percent are 
some form of joint custody. I don't think, off the top of my 
head, there is any correlation. I think it's the factors within 
the personalities of the parents that are more important. If the 
parent has, and there are some people who are very bad candidates 
for joint custody, somebody who is psychotic or if there is 
somebody who chronically .•. there are some people who just love 
conflict. God forbid we resolve it. If this goes away, there's 
sort of like a living paraphrase of the quote, "I fight, 
therefore I am". (laughter) They don't want it to go away. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are you quoting one of your own 
articles? 
MR. MCISAAC: Yeah, 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Who is the one? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Ms. Richmond, I think, had a 
comment. 
MS. RICHMOND: Mr. Mcisaac said what I was going to say. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELI,E: Thank you Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Dr. zzelle? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I'd like to ask a question along 
that same line. If a youngster is involved in the awareness of 
the conflict and perpetuating the conflict between the parents 
and ultimately s some sense of guilt himself as though he is 
the sponsor of the conflict, does the court moving in and making 
a decision make it worse? Do they cement a feeling of inadequacy 
in the child -- where mediation, as you might say, helps to teach 
or instruct the parents in these circumstances with the aim of 
preventing that sense of deficiency in the child on the child's 
behalf? 
MR. MCISAAC: I think children often make very bad 
choices. Sometimes they will choose parent to rescue. They 
will become the parent and the parent becomes the child so they 
will try to rescue the parent, the parent that they think needs 
help. I think that the parents could work together, then the 
kids are freed from that. Basically most kids don't want the 
divorce, they love both , and it goes back to Joan's 
answer about stability. It's the stability of the relationship, 
of the continuity of contact with both parents that's really 
critical. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Marriage may be a learning 
process in itself. Divorce is a learning process in itself. All 
of the different instructive mechanisms involved are part of that 
instruction, I'm not sure that a youngster without judgmental 
tools is in as perceptive a role as the parents ought to be. 
I worry for fear that we in law seek to impose some kind 
of a decision that freezes a circumstance that sponsors 
hostility. I don't believe in government entering into private 
families' roles anymore than is necessary in any regard, and it's 
usually with the opposite result than what's intended. 
I wonder if in this measure, or measures like it, we 
tend to use government in the attempt at fairness to really 
freeze in circumstance this learning process at some point so 
that you don't ever get past the antagonism. 
MR. MCISAAC: I think there is a problem with the 
courtroom adversary system, and you've identified it, and that 
which is probably the most ultimate intrusion of government in 
the lives of a family -- is that it's frozen in time. They don't 
have the benefit coming back and sort of shaping that 
agreement. 
In mediation, what we do frequently is we use step-up 
agreements. You will try it, and people sort of learn how to 
become parents in this very different and new family system. And 
I think that's one of the major issues, that we're seeing a new 
family system develop and we have to invent the understandings 
and the systems. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: It seems to be oriented in that 
direction regarding keeping the thing flexible a little bit. How 
can you designate, then, different things shall happen to a 
certain degree so that lawyers and parents and different people 
know where they are in time and space, and still maintain that 
flexibility. I don't understand how you ••. 
JUSTICE KING: Well, because as part of this educational 
process that I mentioned, one of the main educational features of 
it is to get the parents to understand that the best way to solve 
the problems they are having, either with each other or with 
relationship to the child, is not in the adversary system. So 
most courts with this mediation process available allow parents 
to come back in when they have a problem. They can call up, talk 
to the mediator on the phone or come back in. It doesn't require 
the lawyer to file a motion, it doesn't require it to come back 
into court, it's an encouragement of providing assistance for 
people to solve their own problems. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: That's an arbitration process, 
then. 
JUSTICE KING: No, it's not arbitration because in 
arbitration the arbitrator makes the decision, and in the 
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adversary system the judge makes the decision, but in the 
mediation process, the mediator there is really a facilitator to 
help the parents make a decision. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: More of a counselor. 
JUSTICE KING: That's the real difference because no 
matter how conflicted people are it's remarkable how-- I was one 
of the first to require this mediation on a mandatory basis in my 
court -- and I was astonished with the success of it. Because 
once you cut through these things and once you provide this kind 
of an educational insight to parents -- no matter how conflicted 
they are and no matter how conflicted they may be on other issues 
down the line -- if you can get them to understand what this is 
doing to their children, their love for their children somehow 
seems to get them to change their conduct, change their 
perspective and to be able to separate out this issue from the 
other issues that arise. 
I don't think mediators can deal with other issues. For 
example, I think it's very difficult for them to deal with how 
much spousal support should there be, how much child support 
should there be, because you start getting a sense where one 
might feel they are favoring the other. 
But if they view the mediator as being there really as 
an advocate of what's best for the child and not taking positions 
between the parents but helping them and being willing in the 
future to help them. Some people need help semi-permanently. 
Some people we never see again. But I think our experience was 
the cases that came back with some frequency were the cases that 
were litigated on child custody or visitation. The cases that 
were mediated successfully, I'm sure the people still had 
problems, but they didn't come back in and try to solve them 
through the adversary system. By and large, they solved them 
coming back to mediation or coming back in some other way. 
Now, that's not to say occasionally there wouldn't be 
one coming back, if all of a sudden one parent is transferred in 
their job to New York and that's the custodial parent. They want 
to take the child with them, and then you get some other issues 
coming up, which maybe they can't, without the mediator, work 
out. But our experience was that by and large those cases that 
were mediated simply didn't return into the adversary system 
because they learned that wasn't going to solve their problems. 
That made second marriages better than first ones sometimes. 
SENATOR MORGAN: May I ask the Judge a question, Mr. 
Chairman? Judge, I'm Senator Morgan. It is my understanding 
that you were a part of writing the law as it was changed in '82, 
is that right? 
JUSTICE KING: '80. The mediation was in '81, and I 
guess it was before that, a year or two before we had the joint 
custody mediation-- '80. 
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SENATOR MORGAN: Is it fair to interpret what you've 
just said about the value of mediation that the presumption of 
joint custody, which seems to be what's happening in many courts 
as the law is now , that the presumption that joint 
custody is the intent of the state is a better way of getting 
parents to mediate? 
JUSTICE KING: I don't think it has any effect on 
getting them ..• well, first of all, they have to mediate whatever 
their •.. if they are corning into court, the law requires that 
they have to go through a mediation process before they can take 
any further step in the litigation process. 
I know there is a lot of misunderstanding in terms of 
the provisions of Section 4600 and whether or not, because of the 
wording, joint custody somehow has some legal significance or 
priority over sole custody. I don't know that it has so much 
effect as the perspective that might exist in a particular 
county, either in the judge or judges' handling of family law 
assignments in that county; perhaps the mediators, whether they 
are in the private sector or the public sector, and their own 
personal perspective. 
The goal here is to assist the parents to work out 
whatever arrangement they can agree to is best for the child. I 
don't think joint custody can be imposed if by joint custody we 
mean not equal sharing of time, but some very significant sharing 
of not only time of the child, but the full responsibilities and 
decisions affecting the child. There are many people who simply 
can't have that work, and to try to impose it on somebody where 
it won't work is foolish, it's absurd, it's not going to work. 
It'll come back, just the same as if you go to a contested 
custody hearing and the judge makes an order which is imposed on 
somebody. It's generally not going to work satisfactorily. Some 
people, that's the only way. Some people need somebody to tell 
them what to do, I suppose. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Are you talking about parents or 
judges? 
JUSTICE KING: Probably both. In fact, some judges are 
even parents, also. I think that there is a lot of confusion out 
there as to whether or not there is some legal preference for 
joint custody as opposed to sole custody. 
SENATOR MORGAN: And, as I said before you carne, there 
were six judges in three counties that stimulated me to write 
this bill because of the presumption that the intent of the 
Legislature as it was drafted was that joint custody was 
preferred, and that that wasn't always in the best interest of 
the child, and that's what we've been trying to work through. 
JUSTICE KING: Well, at the time of legislation some 
years back when this was all adopted, I personally had a 
preference for listing the order of preferences by saying sole 
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custody, and then second, joint, and so on. As part of a 
compromise, I think we all agreed to make sole and joint 
alternatives, and then to satisfy some who felt very strongly 
about it, I think we mentioned joint first in the language. But 
without any intention that was to mean it was preferential to 
sole. They were just to be equal alternatives, and I believe 
there has been some confusion because of the wording that joint 
custody is legally preferred. 
The other real problem with all of this is that the 
semantics are very, very important to a lot of people. What 
something is called is really more important than it should be, 
and partly because these words mean different things to different 
people. It's in the eye of the beholder. And of course the 
problem was, when the Legislature adopted this all originally, it 
didn't have any definitions; it used some words, "joint," "sole," 
and "legal" and "physical," but it never attempted to define 
them. 
Now, at least, we have some definitions or at least 
attempts at definitions but they are not very definitive in some 
ways. I agree with you that there is some confusion. I think as 
a matter of public policy, it would be appropriate, if they feel 
there is a preference, they ought to state it. 
The sense I have, and I've been out of this for ••• , --
or at least I've been a sideline observe; I've been back in it a 
little bit -- my sense is that the pendulum of joint custody kind 
of swings from time to time. And that it. was a bit more popular. 
Well, first of all this all started because judges had some 
concern about whether they could even make orders about joint 
custody because there was no statutory provision for it. That's 
how this all really happened, and some judges refused to make 
orders where the parties were stipulating to joint custody, 
because they said there is no statute that says I can make a 
joint custody order. So that's partly how this all came about. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Some judges are quite frank and just 
refuse to do it anyway, even with the statutory authority. 
JUSTICE KING: That's correct. And it's hard, Mr. 
Harris to ... I mean some people just feel it won't work, I 
suppose, but most people looking at people coming before them 
feel here it's not going to work. 
If it gets past the mediation stage, my experience is 
that there are relatively few who have not successfully mediated 
their dispute who are going to have a real shot at a successful 
joint custody arrangement. But, if they can't work it out 
through that process but at the same time, and I'd echo what Joan 
said, we have to be very careful that we just don't give one 
person the veto power. That's critical, because otherwise --
and, again, it usually is the mother who has played the primary 
child-rearing role --we just can't let one person make the 
decision, I guess, unless it's the judge. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why don't we start wrapping this up 
because I've got one more issue I'd like the panel to discuss 
that wasn't on our agenda. Mr. Isenberg, first. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Senator, I meant to get back and 
I forgot. Your to Mr. Mcisaac's suggestion on, not the 
precise alternative language, but certainly the approach. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, certainly, I'm open to trying to 
make the bill better. My concern with the addition that was 
suggested, which I believe is "Alternative 1" under a memo that I 
have. The section establishes neither a preference nor a 
presumption for or against joint custody -- Is that it, Mr. 
Mcisaac? -- and legal or physical or sole custody. I don't have 
a problem with per ~~ but if we just add that it still 
leaves the de of "child's best interest" intact. 
I think, in working with judges and family law 
professionals, we've made some progress, particularly as it 
relates to children under three for whom I think stability is 
particularly important, both emotional and physical, at that age. 
Maybe I harken to what my minister told me twenty-five years 
ago when I was pregnant with my first, but we all come with our 
biases. But I do feel very strongly about the stability for 
those young ldren. So, if we don't make any changes in the 
definition of "child's best interest" and just add this to it, I 
don't think we've far enough. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Chairman, it could really be 
"yes" or "no" answers. I'm not asking for a definitive analysis 
of Mr. Mcisaac s language. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I would add it if we can use the 
definitions that are in my bill as amended. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Okay. Let me just say, from my 
point of view, Senator, somebody has to vote on it. I mean, for 
example, I think you're going to have independent concern on 
abuse and all of the other things we've mentioned. So if what 
your reaction is that you'd consider the language but only if the 
rest of the bill is the same, I think you're going to have, 
maybe, some problems with the Committee. 
I'm not asking panel members to give a definitive 
answer. But, in general, would an approach that would state 
there is no intent to mandate or imply preference either for sole 
custody or for joint custody, would that, in your opinion as 
panel members, solve some of the ambiguity that exists without 
leading to endless more litigation on the subject? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Let me ask each of them to 
respond, if they would? Or, if you don't feel like you want to 
or can't respond, don't do it. But I'd just like to go around 
and ask Judge Murphy for a quick one sentence response to Mr. 
Isenberg's question. 
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JUDGE MURPHY: In one word, "yes." 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Judge Murphy, okay. Dr. Kelly? 
DR. KELLY: Yes, to the language that Hugh Mcisaac 
proposes but •... (inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Mr. Woodruff? 
MR. WOODRUFF: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. We already know where Mr. 
Mcisaac is on that. 
MR. MciSAAC: No. (laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, he says, "no." 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: ..• changed his mind. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: He's been persuaded by Senator ••. , 
(laughter) Justice King? 
JUSTICE KING: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Ms. Richmond? 
MS. RICHMOND: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. So, basically the panel's 
in agreement that that type of language would be appropriate, and 
obviously we understand that you don't concur, Senator Morgan. 
But I want you to understand that one of the things that 
really is in issue here is whether or not the Committee members, 
who obviously will have to vote on your bill one way or the 
other, agree with the fundamental policy shift or with a 
clarification of the policy, and that's your burden to bear. But 
you have to understand that is the issue, fundamentally. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, are you saying that if we add 
this one sentence that's being proposed, that's the only 
amendment that you want ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I'm not saying anything. 
SENATOR MORGAN: .•. or will accept? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Excuse me. I think Mr. Isenberg said 
it well. That is that you have to understand that there is a 
philosophical perspective on the Committee. It's not just a 
matter of the wording. It's a matter as to whether or not the 
Committee feels individually and, ultimately, collectively as a 
majority, that they like the changes in direction that your bill 
embraces, because, personally, that's my problem too .•. 
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SENATOR MORGAN: Well, is ... , my sense was that Mr. 
Mcisaac's amendment ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS Yes, what ... 
SENATOR MORGAN: .. was of same as to what I 
was to ish. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Right, but there's a question as 
to whether 
shift in 
understood 
ultimate 
custody, 
's a clarification, as opposed to a new 
the previously articulated policy as we 
the 1980 and 1981 discussions, which 
change •.. , on the question of joint 
SENATOR MORGAN: Can we keep the factors? 
CHAIRMAN 
trying to 
only trying 
the 
this 
You dec 
heard today, and 
But, at least we're 
to to 
We can look at all of them. We're not 
presentation to this Committee. We're 
some spective as to where members of 
relationship to what you have presented at 
that you want to reject you've 
back to something we've never seen before. 
trying to be helpful so that you don't have 
s or try to be a psychic as to where we're 
to know what some of the biases or 
are between Committee and what 
far. 
anything else that you would like to add? Is 
that it? stions? Any other statements? 
SENATOR MORGAN: I part of it is just in working 
perhaps 
propos 
the 
this 
I were 
amended by 
would be to 
think 
where we put the paragraph that he is 
any prohibition against some of 
the bill, as long as we also include 
Senator, let me just give you my 
on the bill today, I'd vote "no." If 
contained the present statute as 
to Mr. Mcisaac's, my inclination 
, although I haven't had a lot of time to 
On the hand, I have problems with the conditions 
and factors 're adding in. And the reason is that I believe 
that the purpose and the motivation for the factors, and 
certainly the 're written, is to make joint custody 
awards more They are not, in my judgment at least, 
neutral factors And that, it seems to me ... , that bothers me. 
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If the argument is we want to make this absolutely 
neutral, neither nor against, then it seems to me that you 
have to write them with that thought in mind. I'm just telling 
you that me problems, just if you want to know where I 
am on the issue. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I guess that we're trying to be 
helpful. If you want to talk to individual members of the 
Committee to attempt to get six votes out of this Committee, 
understand, at least from the standpoint of Mr. Isenberg who has 
articulated what I'm trying to tell you, we have a problem with 
the fundamental change in joint custody. And, if that's what 
you're attempting to do, then understand that I'm not in 
agreement with that. 
Okay? I want to be straight with you. I don't want you 
to think somebody's pulling your leg. I'm being straight and up 
front, okay? And you may decide you don't need my vote, or you 
may decide that you don't care where I'm at. I just wanted you 
to know that going in so that when you come back here in January, 
if you present a 11 that is basically the same as you've 
presented, my position will not have changed. 
I think, as Mr. Isenberg has indicated, that I'm 
inclined to agree with neutrality perspective that has been 
articulated by Mr. Mcisaac, but I'm not really interested in a 
fundamental shi in the joint custody. I like joint custody, 
frankly, and a fting is something I'm not prepared to support. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I understand. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right. Now, one of the 
things we'd like to do if we can .•. , unless there are any other 
questions or statements on this legislation, is to get the 
panel's reaction ... , (did you distribute, yet? would you?) Mr. 
Isenberg, why 't , please if you would, while we ask the 
panel to accept ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I know some of the panel members 
have to •.. , Judge, I think you have to get off to San Diego in 
about three minutes ••. , but let me make a suggestion, and Senator 
Morgan, maybe you can hang around. We went through this long, 
complicated hearing on your bill on the question of support past 
the age of majority, whether it's college support or child 
support, which is enormously complicated. You were very generous 
with your time at an earlier hearing. Senator Watson told us she 
couldn't be at either of these days of hearings, which is why we 
didn't schedule it. 
I'm not asking for detailed reaction, but I would like 
some thoughts from the panel members, and I'm asking for thoughts 
only, on issues that ought to be raised with regard to that. I 
mean, it's one that I've wrestled with for many, many months and 
I frankly don't know what my position is on the issue. I keep 
thinking of different problems. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Just for the purpose of the record, 
these are thoughts that we are asking on SB 13 by Senator Morgan 
and SB 215 by Senator Watson, relative to support for education, 
either or vocational, beyond the age of 18. It's a 
fundamental shift, one that causes degrees of, certainly, 
controversy, we're just trying to find out if you, as experts 
and people experience the eld, have any perspective as 
to either legal problems or policy problems in generating or 
providing a mechanism for support beyond the age of 18 for 
students pursuing educational attainment beyond high school. 
JUDGE MURPHY: You're asking for opinions? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Thomas, since you've got to go 
first, why don't you ... 
JUDGE MURPHY: No, I don't have to go and I do have an 
opinion. (laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
JUDGE MURPHY: I have an opinion both as an attorney who 
represented a father who was sued by his son, as a father who has 
a son attending Davis right now, and as a judge who has had to 
make decisions regarding parents who contracted to put their 
children through school. In each one of them, I would ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: When you say, "contracted", do you 
mean contracted with the child or contracted with a trust? 
JUDGE MURPHY: No, contracted with the other parent as 
part of an agreement in the dissolution decree. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. All right. 
JUDGE MURPHY: With the father that I litigated and 
represented him, destroyed the relationship between the father 
and the son forever. I was making decisions in the two cases 
that I've handled, as to whether or not a child had the right to 
live in Del Mar in a condominium that was costing $900 a month, 
as to whether or not that was reasonable, as to whether or not 
paying that child's reasonable tuition, educational expenses ... , 
the mother was saying that she did not want the child living with 
her; the father had agreed to pay for the educational expenses. 
So it, again, more conflict. 
As a with a son who is 18 years of age, who was a 
perfect son until he was 17!, and then decided he was smarter 
than me, (laughter) and may be, I found that my ability of 
controlling those purse strings to the point where I said to him, 
"Young man, straighten up or you're going to be attending a 
junior college," an immense impact. 
Now, I understand the problems of women, and generally 
it's women that we see it, who feel an obligation to put their 
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children through school and use their spousal support or 
accumulated earnings, because their former husbands refuse to 
assist. But let me say, there are just as many, and probably 
times ten or times a hundred, of fathers who are assisting their 
children go to slation, whatsoever. I 
suspect this will create immense numbers of problems. I mean, I 
don't know ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, maybe Senator Morgan, you might 
want to indicate as was done in previous hearings, that there's a 
study that's been done that indicated that there was a tendency 
on the part of divorced parents, for there not to be support for 
education, disproportionate to those who supported their children 
when they remained married. Is that correct? 
SENATOR MORGAN: Yes, we do have that. What we're also 
finding with the Student Aid Commission is that the student only 
has to report the income of the custodial parent, and in most 
cases that's mother with minimal income. The father may be 
earning $100,000 to $200,000 but that doesn't have to be 
reported, so student qualifies for a grant. 
So the taxpayer is in fact educating our young people 
when there is a parent with the capacity to pay. But because 
they don't have to report their income, and there's· no 
instruction from the judge that they should continue child 
support, they are in fact refusing to provide any support. 
So, we're (1) having children not supported by both 
parents in the efforts to get a college degree; (2) having the 
taxpayer fund our young people. And I am all for grants and 
scholarships, but I'm not for providing money where there is a 
parent with the capacity to pay. And what we're finding is that 
this is the trend 's going 
We keep confusing 13 and 215. My bill, SB 13, just 
would continue ld support, not the payment of tuition, not the 
payment of all educational expenses, just child support as 
determined at the time of settlement, whether it's $50 or $1,500, 
it's child support for a full-time student. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. That's an academic •.• 
SENATOR MORGAN: In an academically qualified 
university, and it excludes military, legally emancipated 
those definitions are it -- and they have to be good 
standing. So that they can't be goofing off, too. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Sure. Dr. Frizzelle? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I have a slight concern, and 
maybe you have a of addressing , I'm not sure. That is, in 
a circumstance where, because of a dissolution of a marriage, the 
courts step in and make some decisions on behalf of the family, 
this bill -- both of these bills -- seem to establish a condition 
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of support for college education and so forth, in that 
environment in which it cannot and does not do for people who are 
not in a circumstance of solution. I think there's a basic, 
inherent unfairness ion of government into one set 
of lives when it's not another set of lives. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, 
other states and •.• 
s has been tested in courts in 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The fact that it's been tested 
doesn't make it any more fair. I'm concerned about the fact of 
the government intrusion here, and the fact that it's forcing a 
circumstance to occur to the economic advantage of one set of 
people and not another. And it establishes it almost as a right, 
and I think we have to be very, very slow in establishing that 
perception in law. I don't know how you handle that. I suspect 
that you're going to have to do a whole lot more convincing among 
a number of us in the Legislature, not just on the Judiciary 
Committee, regarding that intrusion factor. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Do you rather the taxpayer pay? 
Because these kids are going to school. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Well, if they're going to 
school, they take their own responsibility. The taxpayer pays in 
the form of a loan or grant or something of that nature; that's 
something different. And, that's an establishment between the 
individual who benefits from the education and the state, or what 
the taxpayers do or don't do. But it still makes it such that 
everybody is on the same footing. Here you are seeking to put 
certain people on a different footing, and I think that's an 
unwarranted intrusion. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, I would say that, again, the 
child support is not funding for all of the education. And the 
judge could take into account the expectation within that family. 
For instance, if it's a third child and the first two had gone to 
college, and the third child had been promised that, but for the 
divorce no help was forthcoming, that is a factor that the judge 
would take into consideration. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: If there's no divorce, and a son 
or daughter ends up no longer being supported by the parents, in 
the absence of a divorce situation, what happens then? Are the 
regular parents of an 18-year-old, graduated from high school, 
obligated to provide a college education? 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, I think what the studies are 
showing -- studies and anecdotal evidence, is that, that the 
child in the vast majority of cases is helped. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Is there more than one study? I've 
only heard of •.• 
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ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The fact that they are or aren't 
is different from a compulsion that they must be. 
SENATOR MORGAN: This isn't a mandate, either. This is 
discretionary. SB 13 is discretionary. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But let me ask, are there any studies 
other than the one that has been cited? I've only seen the one. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Sarah, can you help me out there? I 
think Ms. Richmond and I think Judge King ••• , I'd like to hear 
their comments on this also. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You'll hear it. 
MS. McCARTHY: There's only one study, the one that's 
been referred to, that I know of that looked at children of 
divorced families. However the census data indicates that at 
least 60 percent of children are dependent on their parents up to 
the age of 20. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We understand that. That's not the 
issue. There's no dispute there, we can stipulate to that. The 
question is whether or not there are studies that indicate that 
there is, in fact, a discrepancy that one could attribute to 
divorce. Ms. Richmond, would you like to comment? 
MS. RICHMOND: I'm grateful to the Committee for g1v1ng 
us an opportunity to come in on these two bills, in addition. 
Addressing Assemblyman Frizzelle's concern. In Judith 
Wallerstein's ten-year study on families of divorce, in Marin 
County, one of the unlocked for findings that she came up with 
was that children who otherwise would have attended college but 
for the divorce, and who had that expectation, were being 
deprived of it for a variety of reasons. 
One of them is a situation that doesn't happen within 
the intact family where the plan was, and it was within the 
parents' discretion, to send their children to college or not. 
And that is a remarriage and new children situation, where for 
one reason or another, the new children of the new family become 
a factor that tends to detract from the expectations of the 
children of the first family. And this legislation is intended 
to help out those first families. 
As an economic reality, there are very few children 
these days who, I think, can afford to put themselves through a 
four-year college education. And I think that families across 
the board deserve some help where it can be granted. I think 
that the Legislature would not be acting prejudicially by 
enacting this legislation even though it only addresses families 
of divorce. 
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As between the two of these bills, I do have a distinct 
preference for Senator Morgan's bill for several reasons. One is 
that it is discretionary. It builds in some of the controls that 
we, as practitioners, build in when we're negotiating for this on 
behalf of spouses. One is it builds in some provisions about a 
student in good standing and contains a reasonable age 
limitation. You don't have children coming in as third party 
beneficiaries enforcing this for a six-year undergraduate degree. 
It is limited to graduation or 21 years. It's enforcement is by 
the spouse, who is entitled to the child support, rather than 
being enforceable by the child, which I do agree tends to create 
a terrible parent-child situation. 
The other bill, although it does address the specific 
finding of the study about children who would otherwise be 
expected to go to college, is a bit more amorphous in terms of 
its application, and far more difficult to set up what the 
appropriate evidentiary standards would be. Whereas SB 13 is 
really directed to an extended child support during a period of 
time that children are, in reality, dependents of their parents. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Isn't it elitist in that it is limited 
to college? I mean, that's not the only, basically, purpose of 
higher education •.. 
MS. RICHMOND: Let me read it more carefully. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It's limited to colleges and 
universities. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Or occupational training. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, occupational training? Okay. So 
it does include vocational education. That's what I kept asking 
you. Okay, fine. Mr. Isenberg? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Ms. Richmond, as a litigator, I 
read this and I think it gives an independent cause of action to 
kids to sue either or both of their parents. That's the way I 
read it. It doesn't specifically exclude it and it says, "child 
support shall continue to be paid on behalf of ..• " (that's 
defined) or "to any student." Now, I don't see how you can r~ad 
that any other way except giving an independent cause of action, 
and as a litigator, I want you to give me your gut reaction to 
that. 
MS. RICHMOND: I haven't parsed this carefully, nor are 
we in court •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I understand, and it's unfair and 
I apologize. 
MS. RICHMOND: ... but I think that case law now, of 
existing child support enforcement, limits it to the parents to 
enforce it, and not to the children directly. If I'm mistaken on 
that, I'm willing to admit that. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Let me just ask a question if I 
could. What is the logic that would say, just as an example, if 
one parent refuses to "pony up" for college education, but the 
kids living at home with mom. Mom helps put the kids through 
college. Dad won't contribute. Mom can sue or kids can sue, but 
if both parents refuse, the kid can't sue. It seems to me, 
you've either got to have it one way or the other. 
It's a child's right that the child can enforce, or can 
be enforced for the child by somebody else. Can the child deny 
it? I mean, what do you do with a mom who wants to go after dad, 
and the kid says, "Look, mom, I don't want the hassle. I've got 
a part-time job; let's not do it." I mean, these are adults. 
In some ways, this is the most provocative, puzzling, 
difficult and challenging series of bills that I've read in a 
long time. The fundamental issues of human relationships. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask as you answer, also. Do 
you have the right to go after both parents, based on ability to 
pay? Or just the parent who's been paying child support? 
MS. RICHMOND: I think this is phrased such that you can 
go after either parent for .•• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So, even if a parent has not been 
paying child support at age 18 -- that goes again back to what 
the right is. If you're going to have the right to go after the 
parent who has been paying, then it's in the parent, not in the 
child. 
MS. RICHMOND: They're very thoughtful questions. One 
point -- and I haven't thought this through -- is, if both 
parents think that money shouldn't be provided for this child, 
maybe then you're in a situation as, in an intact household where 
both parents come to that conclusion, and perhaps they ought to 
be entitled to. I put that out as a thought, not as a 
position. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Everybody feels it's complicated 
except Senator Morgan and Senator Watson. They think it's 
simple. Okay. 
MR. MCISAAC: Isn't this really an artifact of the point 
of time where we reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18? At 
one time, there was a time when parents were required to support 
their children to age 21. 
I see a lot of kids being disadvantaged because they are 
in a divorce situation and are not going to college, and I would 
be in favor of this approach provided it also provided for 
children who in intact families also had the same benefit. I 
think that's a serious concern that you treat one population 
differently. So I think it would be good to raise it to 21. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Mr. Mcisaac, speculate on 
mediation efforts in situations where you now have adult 
children, for most purposes, beyond the control ••. not Judge 
King's 17-year-old beyond his control, but really beyond control. 
I don't know how you can mediate the dispute. 
MR. MCISAAC: Well, we'd have a Sullivan situation for 
children. Children who are going to have to take care of their 
parents at some time. It would be very difficult. It would be 
very hard. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: From your point of view .•. 
MR. MCISAAC: But I think it could be accomplished. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: How would you react to the 
provision that the child was able to maintain the action his or 
herself and, presumptively I suppose, entitled to mandate 
mediation on his or her request for college education support? 
MR. MCISAAC: How would I feel about it? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Yeah. Other than you need full 
funding for your office from the Legislature and the county, and 
therefore that's the only way you'd accept it, I got that. 
MR. MCISAAC: Well, I think those are mediatory. 
disputes. I think you take a look at what the underlying needs 
are, and interests, and ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG. You've got to be able to talk 
about it. I mean the age of majority, I know, is the legal 
fiction. I understand that. No parents think their kids are 
ever adults. I understand that, too. 
MR. MCISAAC: Correct. My mother doesn't either. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: But it strikes me that one of the 
things that most crucial about this is that there is that rite of 
passage, that automatic transmission or transmutation that occurs 
when you reach the age of majority, which though parents don't 
believe it and kids don't believe it, in some way must govern 
relationship. 
And here you have the anomaly of at least in one area, 
although in a limited fashion, you're maintaining a different 
kind of relationship. And it's the interplay of the 
relationships that seems to me that is as much important as 
anything else. Murphy's comment of his case, it seems to me is 
one of those horror examples that you think of 50 examples, I 
suppose. 
MR. MCISAAC: But you have to look at it in the context 
of a very modern technological society where it requires that 
kind of training in order to survive. I think that in terms of a 
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broad social policy we ought to provide that children have the 
best opportunity and equal opportunity. It's an equal protection 
issue here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I'm not opposed for society 
promising that every kid ought to have a college education for 
free all the time. I'm for that. But this is the notion that in 
some cases of divorce some kids are entitled to sue their parents 
to force their parents to pay for it. That's the social issue. 
MR. MCISAAC: It's happening. Twenty states have this. 
The rite of passage isn't 18 in twenty other states, and yet it 
has not created a major problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: We don't know. I mean, Senator, 
there is no evidence that any of ..• unless there's something I 
haven't seen, and I've read all the stuff anybody's given me. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Well, I wasn't aware that we were going 
to be discussing this. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: No, and I know it's unfair for 
you. 
SENATOR MORGAN: I don't have my documentation here. 
But as I say, it's not longer 18. It wasn't 18 up until '72, it 
was 21, and since '72 twenty other states .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: I understand that. 
SENATOR MORGAN: ..• changed the age of majority, 
particularly for purposes of educational funding of child 
support. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS': Justice King. 
JUSTICE KING: First of all the Legislature has already 
done something that deals with this anyway, when you passed the 
bill a year or two ago about allowing child support to be paid 
beyond 18 if the child hadn't graduated from high school and was 
attending on a full-time basis and allowing him to go to 19. So 
that's a foot in the door, anyway. 
To address Assemblyman Frizzelle's concern, I think you 
have to categorize families. You can't treat families where 
there has been a divorce the same as you can families where there 
has not. Intact families operate differently, and I agree with 
you that as little intrusion as possible. But we already treat 
nonintact families differently. We've already .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: The nonintact families, the ones 
that have been separated or just dissolved, are families where 
the cost factors are greater, not lesser, than the others. And 
they are the ones you are mandating the additional costs on by 
means of this bill. 
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JUSTICE KING: But whatever cost may be mandated -- and 
I don't think it should be mandated, it should be discretionary 
-- is going to be fixed if any is order consistent with financial 
circumstances of that family. I'm not so much concerned about --
maybe I should have more concern about the-- taxpayer's dollars. 
I'm not so concerned about the problem Senator Morgan was 
addressing about use of grants. 
I'm more concerned with the people I saw who weren't 
going to go to college, or weren't going to get some occupational 
training because they couldn't get a parent who could afford to 
contribute, to contribute. That's the real loss to me because we 
all know in this society a high school diploma doesn't get. you 
anywhere. It's hard enough to get anywhere if you've got a 
Master's degree. And to put people in a position simply because 
their parents are divorced, that at that stage in their life 
their whole future is determined because their parents were 
divorced and not because of any inability of the parents to 
provide for them, I think is a serious mistake. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: It gets into a sociological 
issue, though, doesn't it? Because really, people who are very 
successful having a college education; they can be very 
unsuccessful having a college education. And people without a 
college education are often times very successful too, for the 
very fact that they shoulder some of the responsibilities 
themselves. 
JUSTICE KING: I agree with that, but I think when we 
look at the ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: You can look at statistics for a 
long time. My problem is with the government in one certain set 
of circumstances creating, in essence, a mandate or force of cost 
to families sometimes that are doubled families, where there is a 
second marriage and so forth involved, with people that don't 
have the ability. We are making the sociological judgment or 
commitment for them whether they have it or not. Or even whether 
the kids want to go to school or not. 
JUSTICE KING: Well, let me say the major road block ... 
I dealt with a log of these cases because, as you know, the 
judgements that were entered before March 2nd of 1972 parents 
still have to pay until age 21 for child support. And there are 
still those kids around, and those kids are going to college now. 
It's the ones where the divorce has occurred after March of '72 
where it end at 18, and we are powerless to do anything about 
that. 
The fact of the matter is that in most of the instances, 
most of the cases that I saw where there was an ability to pay 
and there was no payment, it was because of second marriages. 
It's very difficult to for you to take money out of your pocket 
to pay for the college education of a kid from a prior marriage, 
though you will do it for the kid of the present marriage, and 
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try to justify that to your current spouse. It's very difficult. 
Whereas if the court is in a position to say you have to do this, 
it's a whole different ball game. My experience was that the 
real road block was the spouse in the later marriage. 
There was another road block, and that's one we can't do 
anything about. And that's where the conflict between the two 
parents of the child of the first marriage reached such a degree 
that the supporting parent got so turned off that they hold their 
grudge against their former spouse against the child of that 
marriage, and that's another problem. 
MR. MCISAAC: We see a log of these cases ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: That cuts both ways. 
JUSTICE KING: Yes, it does. In some cases the child 
may indeed have picked up that cudgel and maybe have cut that tie 
themselves, and I think that should be a consideration. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I don't want the courts to cause 
more divorces in the second marriages either. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Isenberg: 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge King, why stop at age 21? 
Why restrict to education? 
JUSTICE KING: I think that's a matter of a policy the 
Legislature ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Come on, we don't have any 
policies, you know that. What's the logic of it, if there is 
any? 
JUSTICE KING: I don't think there is a logic to it. 
There's no more logic to age 18 or age 21, or anything else. Why 
do we say the age of majority is age 18? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Judge, you've been around a long 
time. When this all happened, before any of us were in the 
Legislature, you were probably observing politics. We abolished 
relatives' responsibility in the welfare and support laws of the 
State of California calling massive reform, what was it 1962 or 
'64? This, of course, at least in one level suggests that 
relatives' responsibility from adults to children extends past 
some cut off point. 
JUSTICE KING: Yes, and I don't have any problem with 
that. To answer your earlier question, I think the child should 
have the right to proceed. I don't see children getting it if 
both parents say they shouldn't get it. It's not going to 
happen. I also don't agree that it has to be available to a 
child with a intact family, either. The first thing that'll 
happen is that family won't be so intact anymore either. 
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But I think part of your policy is part of your 
determination. From our standpoint, all I can tell you is we see 
a lot of kids who should go to college, who should go to 
apprenticeship school, who should do something and they cannot do 
it. They end up going to McDonald's or they end up going 
somewhere else, and it's a dead end for them because three or 
four years later there is nothing for them to do. Those kids are 
there, and we ought to help them. 
If you feel that the policy of the State of California 
should be that the age of majority is 18 ••• I mean it's just an 
anomaly, because New York, at the same time as we did, reduced 
the age of majority to 18 and kept child support payable until 
21. So, it's just. that maybe we made the wrong judgment at that 
time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Are a higher proportion of 
children of divorced families going to college in New York, 
statistically higher than in California? 
JUSTICE KING: I don't think it make any difference. It 
doesn't have anything to do with divorce. It has to do with the 
educational level of the children. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: The only justification for a bill 
like this is to express a fact that statistically fewer children 
in divorced families attend college. If that fact can't be 
proven, as compared to another state •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It could also be a result of economic 
factors. 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Sure, I understand that. But if 
that doesn't occur, this bill never comes into play. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Well, why not? We pass all 
kinds of things that aren't based on fact. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Justice King, wouldn't it make 
it such that all of those different families would be solicited 
for the children's education by different colleges and different 
training programs because of the fact they know that the state 
has mandated they must be paid for? 
JUSTICE KING: They shouldn't mandate that anything must 
be done. This is a situation where you must look at it and 
decide whether or not this is a case where it should be done, 
based on the facts of this case. I also have a son who is 17 and 
in an intact family, and I'm getting inundated with those things 
already. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: My parents are still married and my 
father stopped child support when I was about three. (laughter) 
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ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: That's conclusive evidence this 
bill ought to pass, I suppose. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Dr. Kelly. 
DR. KELLY: I think that some of these bills, of course, 
are not unrelated. That is, I think we should be looking for 
some consistency in terms of policy matter. I think that the 
issue of children being able to be supported through college is 
an important one. 
We've also observed that when fathers in our mediation 
center through their negotiations are able to continue to be 
involved on a regular basis with their children, they are then 
very willing to negotiate agreements about support after 18 and 
the sharing of college expenses. We fairly routinely have that 
in our agreements, by mutual consent. But it comes after they 
also perceive that they are going to have a stake and a share in 
their child's life and their motivation, then, is much higher. I 
think those two are very important and they should be kept in 
mind. That people are not motivated to support kids they haven't 
seen. 
But you know, even if they remarry, I think that's an 
important issue. The fact is, if a father for example, has a 
substantial amount of time with the child and that continues on 
in the remarriage family, the new spouse sees that obligation to 
that child and does not object to the paying of college expenses 
because she perceived that it's part of his family. She has a 
relationship as well. These are not unrelated issues. I think 
we need to look at consistency and policy matters along the way. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Woodruff. 
MR. WOODRUFF: I think, first of all I'd like to request 
that the retroactivity be made really clear. I've spent 
thousands of my clients' dollars litigating the issue of 
retroactivity recently. I hate to ask them for it, and I hate to 
take it. And the clarity of this statute is, at the present 
time, such that I could charge some a fortune, would have to, in 
order to determine whether there is an existing agreement, 
whether it applies or not, whether it could be modified. If the 
child is already 18, if the child is not already 18, if the 
agreement was negotiated before January 1, 1988 but put into 
effect, entered into a judgment sometime later. So I would 
request that that be really clarified and that good history be 
made on that issue because it will be tested, I promise you, if 
it's retroactive. 
I'd also like to state that one of the issues is whether 
you continue the support in the amount that it was, or if you 
adjust it upwards because of the child attending Stanford. 
That's something that really needs to be considered and if the 
guidelines that the courts are using ... what's happening now on 
the past 18 to 19 while the child is still in high school, at 
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least in Sacramento, t.hey' re all using the guidelines. And if 
they're going to use guidelines, they also have in the past used 
as supplemental awards the amount of half the school tuition. 
And so that issue needs to be addressed or it will be very 
expensive again to litigate. I would rather have that issue 
addressed and decided here so that I don't have to charge people 
for it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Judge Murphy, I think you wanted to 
come back and respond. 
JUDGE MURPHY: Can anyone in this room say that any 
child in the State of California is deprived of education, at 
least for the first two years out of high school? We have a 
junior college system that's free. So, anybody who wants to go 
to college in the State of California can go for two years for 
free. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: At least on ability to pay. That's 
what Deukmejian says all the time. 
JUDGE MURPHY: And then added to that is the question, 
do .we want to have a policy in the State of California that says 
that someone is entitled to have their education completed within 
four years? There are ten of thousands of people going to night 
schools throughout our state. And do we want to say to children 
of divorced families that we're going to have a special thing for 
you? I think it's a real question that obviously you have to 
answer. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Senator Morgan, now you have a chance 
to respond to all the wonderful things you have heard pro and 
con. Now listen, you've had a lot of fair, and very supportive 
statements about your bill, so I hope you're happy with that 
dialogue. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Except for the shaking heads from 
yourself and Mr. Isenberg, I'm very happy. (laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can't have it all. 
SENATOR MORGAN: The statements from the witnesses were 
marvelous. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, it has been very helpful and as 
you know we will have a vote on that bill. But you might want to 
consider some of the statements you've heard, that you further 
consider this bill. I've talked to some people in support of 
your bill outside of this chamber. If possible, we'll continue 
to make the request that you and Senator Watson attempt to 
resolve this. 
You have the earlier numbered bill and I would certainly 
think that might be instructive, but it would be helpful if at 
least voting we had one bill that reconciled the difference 
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between the two. If you could expect us to make a choice between 
the two, I think that further complicates the bill for both of 
you. That's not instructive, it's just advisory. Okay. 
SENATOR MORGAN: It that encouraging, that one bill 
might make it? 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: I'm saying that one bill has a better 
chance than two bills. Although neither bill, in my 
estimation •.• 
SENATOR MORGAN: That's the bottom line. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I was trying to be a little 
facetious, Senator Morgan. But you've heard our concerns about 
the bill, and I think that some of the things we've heard today 
as we review the testimony of this hearing will be helpful in 
trying to see whether or not we can either modify our position, 
or if, in fact, you can modify yours. Okay? It's a two-way 
street, and we make every effort to try to meet you at some point 
along the road of compromise on this bill. 
I don't think anybody has been so close-minded to say 
that they don't want to discuss it anymore, or they know where 
they are at on the bill. So I hope you at least appreciate the 
fact that people have been willing to continue the discussion to 
see if we can find some way to resolve individual philosophical 
differences on the exact content and even somewhat the direction 
of the bill. Okay. Yes, Mr. Isenberg? 
ASSEMBTJYtv'AN ISENBERG: Senator Morgan, I shook my head 
"no" a couple of times, but I think I shook it "yes" a couple 
times. I still don't know what in the dickens I'm going to do on 
this bill. 
SENATOR MORGAN: Do we still have an 8:30 meeting? 
ASSEMBLYMAN ISENBERG: Only if you want to have an 8:30 
meeting. It's not required for me, God knows. I've spent enough 
time talking about the measure, but I'm still undecided on the 
issue. Although I must confess Mr. Mcisaac and Dr. Kelly shake 
11'! :t '1it 1n my skepticisrn, which I found to be .•• you even ought 
'-; .ci1d t.o be a .little helpful. I'd just like to sav to you as 
an author and also to the panelists, that this has been 
delightful. 
If I were still practicing family law, which thank God I 
am not, I would walk out of here probably a better lawyer for 
having been able to sit and think for about four or five hours 
about these issues in conjunction, because we never think about 
things in conjunction, with one another. We always think about 
them in isolation in legislation. I'd just like to say thank 
you. It's been very spirited and extraordinarily helpful. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'd like to as Chair of the Committee, 
thank all of you for your participation in this hearing today. 
I can assure you that we would number one, like any clarification 
or written extension of remarks that you'd like to share with us. 
The record for purposes of addenda, and certainly there is 
information that you made available to us by virtue of video that 
we would like to have in writing. I'm sure Ms. DeBow will be in 
touch with you about this, so that we can add it to the addendum, 
to the hearing transcript. But we are going to be looking at 
this information. I know I will be looking at it critically and 
I certainly want to echo Mr. Isenberg's statement-- this has 
been very helpful to me. 
We take these bills very seriously. We understand the 
importance of them, both to the parents and to the children, and 
ultimately to society at large. We simply need to have all this 
information and I think the perspective, I would hope Senator 
Morgan would agree, has been objectively stated and hopefully 
balanced. Whether on agrees to disagrees, at lease I think 
people have attempted to be intellectually honest in presenting 
their viewpoints on the bill and did not do it with a sense of an 
axe to grind. 
So I want to thank everyone for their participation, and 
I can assure you that your time has been well spent helping us to 
deliberate and hopefully resolve these issues when we come back 
in January. Mr. Frizzelle, do you have anything you'd like to 
add? Okay, with that then the hearing is adjourned, I want to 
thank all of you. 
* * * * * * 
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SENATE BILL No. 1296 
Introduced by Senator Hart 
March 6, 1987 
An act to amend Section 4801 of the Civil Code, relating to 
spousal support. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 1296, as introduced, Hart. Spousal support. 
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the 
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may 
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount, 
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and 
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to 
consider various circumstances, including the standard of 
living of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties. 
This bill would require such an award to generally be based 
on the standard of living established during the marriage but, 
in case of a marriage of long duration, the award would be 
required to equalize the standards of living of both 
households. 
Rather than a consideration of the earning capacity of each 
spouse the bill would require a consideration of the ability of 
the earning capacity of each spouse to maintain the standard 
of living established during the marriage, or following a 
marriage of long duration, to maintain a standard of living 
equal to that of the other spouse. It also would require, in so 
determining the consideration of the reduced or lost lifetime 
earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having 
foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or 
career opportunities during the marriage, rather than the 
existing requirement applicable to determination of earning 
capacity requiring consideration of impairment of earning 
capacity due to devotion of time to domestic duties. 
Among other things, it also would require the consideration 
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in making such an award of the ability to pay of the supporting 
spouse and of the immediate and specific tax consequences to 
each party. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. · 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 4801 of the Civil Code is 
2 amended to read: 
3 4801. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that it is 
4 the public policy of this state that marriage is an equal 
5 partnership, that both spousus have contributed equally 
6 to any economic benefits accrued as a result of this 
7 partnership, and that both spouses are entitled to share 
8 economic benefits after separation or dissolution equally. 
9 Spousal support awards shall therefore be based on the 
10 standard of living established by the parties during the 
11 marriage; however, in marriages of long duration, spousal 
12 support should serve to equalize the standards of living in 
13 the households of both parties after separation or 
14 dissolution. 
15 w 
16 (b) In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a 
17 marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court 
18 may order a party pay for the support of the other 
19 party any amount, and for any period of time, as the court 
20 may deem just and reasonable, based on the standard of 
21 living established during the marriage, except that in 
22 marriages of long duration spousal support shall serve to 
23 equalize the standards of living of both parties' 
24 households. In making the award, the court shall consider 
25 all of the following circumstances of the respective 
26 parties: 
27 (1) The ability the earning capacity of each spouse 
28 to maintain the standard of living established during the 
29 marriage, or following a marriage of long duration, to 
30 maintain a standard of living equal to that of the other 
31 spouse, taking into account all of the following: 
32 (A) The marketable skills of the supported spouse; the 
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1 job market for those skills; the time and expenses 
2 required for the supported spouse to acquire the 
3 appropriate education or training to develop those skills; 
4 and the possible need for retraining or education to 
5 acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. 
6 (B) :t:fte eKteat -te v;aiea ~ suppm"ted spettse 's 
7 preseat 61' fl::ltttre eftt'ftiag ea-paeity is impaired ~ periods 
8 ef ttH:efftpleymeat ~ wet'€ iaettrred dttriag ~ 
9 fftftt'fiage -te permit ~ sttpported spo1:1:se -te de .. ·ete time 
10 -te domestic d1:1:ties. The reduced or lost lifetime earning 
11 capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having 
12 foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or 
13 career opportunities during ~he marriage. 
14 (C) The extent to which the supported spouse 
15 contributed to the attainment of an education, training, 
16 a career position, or a license by the other spouse. 
17 (D) The ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking 
18 into account the supporting spouse's earning capacity, 
19 earned and unearned income~ assets, and the standard of 
20 living of the parties established during the marriage. 
21 (2) The needs of each party, based on the standard of 
22 living established during the marriage, or, in the case of 
23 a marriage of long duration, based on equalization of the 
24 parties' standards of living. 
25 (3) The obligations and assets, including the separate 
26 property, of each. 
27 (4) The duration of the marriage. 
28 (5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in 
29 gainful employment without interfering with the 
30 interests of dependent children in the custody of the 
31 spouse. 
32 (6) The age 61' and health of the parties. 
33 (7) +Be staadard ef liYiag ef ~ pa.Pties. The 
34 immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. 
35 (8) Any other factors which it deems just and 
36 equitable. 
37 At the request of either party, the court shall make 
38 appropriate factual determinations with respect to the 
39 circumstances. The court may order the party required 
40 to make the payment of support' to give reasonable 
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1 security therefor. Any order for support of the other 
2 party may be modified or revoked as the court may deem 
3 necessary, except as to any amount that may have 
4 accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of 
5 motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke. Any 
6 order for spousal support may be made retroactive to the 
7 date of filing of the notice of motion or order to show 
8 cause therefor, or to any subsequent date. At the request 
9 of either party, the order of modification or revocation 
10 shall include a statement of decision and may be made 
11 retroactive to the date of filing of the notice of motion or 
12 order to show cause therefor, or to any subsequent date. 
13 (b) Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in 
14 writing, the obligation of any party under any order or 
15 judgment for the support and maintenance of the other 
16 party shall terminate upon the death of either party or 
17 the remarriage of the other party. 
18 (c) When a court orders a person to make specified 
19 payments for support of the other party for a contingent 
20 period of time, the liability of the person terminates upon 
21 the happening of the contingency. If the party to whom 
22 payments are to be made fails to notify the person 
23 ordered to make the payments, or the attorney of record 
24 of the person so ordered, of the happening of the 
25 contingency and continues to accept support payments, 
26 the supported party shall refund any and all moneys 
27 received which accrued after the happening of the 
28 contingency, except that the overpayments shall first be 
29 applied to any and all support payments which are then 
30 in default. The court may, in the original order for 
31 support, order the party to whom payments are to be 
32 made to notify the person ordered to make the payments, 
33 or his or her attorney of record, of the happening of the 
34 contingency. 
35 (d) An order for payment of an allowance for the 
36 support of one of the parties shall terminate at the end of 
37 the period specified in the order and shall not be 
38 extended unless the court in its original order retains 
39 j'..lrisdiction. 
40 (e) In any proceeding under this section the court 
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1 may order a party to submit to an examination by a 
2 vocational training consultant. The order may be made 
3 only on motion, for good cause shown, and upon notice 
-t to the party to be examined and to all parties, and shall 
5 specify the time, plact.", manner, conditions, scope of the 
6 t"X~tmination, and the person or persons by whom it is to 
7 be made. The party refusing to eomply with such an 
S order shall be subject to the same consequences provided 
9 for failun• to comply with an examination ordered 
lO pursuant to St•dion 2032 of thl' Code of Civil Procedure. 
ll ~f) For the purpost'S of this section, .. vocational 
12 training consultant" means an individual with sufllcienl 
13 knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educ<ltion 
14 rf•lating to interviewing, the lt•sting and analysis of work 
15 skills, the planning of courses of training and study, tht" 
16 formuhttion of career goals, and the work market to 
17 qualify as an expert in vocational training under Section 
18 720 of tht' Evidence Code . 
0 
99 140 
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SB 1296 (Hart) 
As introduced 
@bSENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
Bill Lockyer, Chairman 
1987-88 Regular Session@p 
Hearing date: May 19, 1987 
Civil Code 
PAW 
HISTORY 
Source: Senate Task Force on Family Equity 
Prior Legislation: None 
Support: California NOW; Amador Calaveras NOW; California Home 
Economics Association; Children's Rights Advocates -
Grandparents (CRAG); Los Angeles Parent Magazine; 
Sacramento YMCA; Queen's Bench 
Opposition: Individuals 
KEY ISSUE 
SHOULD AN AWARD FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT RE BASED ON THE STANDARD OF 
LIVING ESTABLISHED DURING THE MARRIAGE EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A 
MARRIAGE OF LONG DURATION, IN WHICH THE AWARD WOULD BE REQUIRED 
TO EQUALIZE THE STANDARDS OF LIVING OF BOTH HOUSEHOLDS? 
PURPOSE 
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the 
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may 
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount, 
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and 
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to 
consider various circumstances, including the standard of living 
of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties. 
This bill would require an award for spousal support to generally 
be based also on the standard of living established during the 
marriage but, in the case of a marriage of long duration, the 
award would be required to equalize the standards of living of 
(More) 
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both households. In making such an award, the court would be 
required to consider a number of specified circumstances, 
including: the ability of the earning capacity of each spouse to 
maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, 
or following a marriage of long duration, to maintain a standard 
of living equal to that of the other spouse; the reduced or lost 
lifetime earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of 
having foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or 
career opportunities during the marriage; the needs of each 
party, based on the standard of living established during the 
marriage, or in the case of a marriage of long duration, based on 
equalization of the parties' standards of living; and the 
immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. 
The purpose of this bill is to require courts to consider how the 
parties lived before the divorce and attempt to grant awards 
consistent with that lifestyle. 
COMMENT 
1. ~~~E_fQ!_l~Ei~l~!iE~ 
According to the author of this bill, "The current standard 
for spousal support is what is 'just and reasonable'. 
Unfortunately, courts are too often defining subsistence 
level awards as being 'just and reasonable'. This bill will 
require the court to consider how the parties lived before 
the divorce and attempt to grant awards consistent with that 
lifestyle." 
This bill would require the court to consider the supporting 
spouse's ability to pay as one of the factors affecting its 
efforts to achieve the standard of living. In the case of a 
marriage of long duration where the spouses are likely to be 
elderly, the measure would require the court to try to set 
awards at a level that would equalize the standard of living 
in both households after divorce. 
"Many divorced women are living at the poverty level because 
they have not been granted reasonable levels of spousal 
support," claims the author. "While it may not be possible 
to guarantee the same standard of living achieved during the 
marriage, I think the courts can do a better job than they 
have in the past." 
(More) 
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2. ~!~!£r~~~g 
According to the sponsor of this bill, the Senate Task Force 
on Family Equity, the no-fault divorce reforms eliminated 
fault as a grounds of alimony. The primary standard for 
spousal support became the financial need of one spouse and 
the ability to pay of the other spouse. However, testimony 
and research presented to the Task Force suggested that the 
judicial interpretation and application of this standard has 
resulted in economic hardship to women. 
Under the fault system, wives were presumed financially 
dependent upon their husbands. Under the divorce reforms 
which intended to treat men and women equally at divorce, 
courts have interpreted this to mean that wives are presumed 
to be capable of supporting themselves at divorce and are 
therefore not financially in need of spousal support. For 
those women who prove that they are financially in need of 
support, the courts presume that such need will be 
shortlived. The courts assume that these women can quickly 
enter the paid labor market and become self-supporting. 
Thus, the Task Force was convinced that spousal support 
awards are typically of short duration and inadequate 
amounts. 
The Task Force declared that adequate spousal support awards 
are essential to equalizing the economic consequences of 
divorce between men and women. The awards reflect societal 
perceptions of the importance and values of homemaking and 
childrearing contributions and sacrifices made during the 
marriage. Thus, this bill has been introduced in order to 
improve the adequacy of spousal support awards. 
3. l~£l~l!!lY~-l~!~~!-~~~!l~~ 
The bill would include a legislative intent section which 
would state that it is the public policy of this state that 
marriage is an equal partnership, that both spouses have 
contributed equally to any economic benefits accrued as a 
result of this partnership, and that both spouses are 
entitled to equally share economic benefits after separation 
or dissolution. Because of this policy, spousal support 
awards would be based on the standard of livinq established 
during the marriage, except in marriages of long duration. 
(More) 
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4. £~£!Q!~_!Q_££~~i~~!-~~~~-~~~!~l~g-~~££Q!! 
The bill would require the court, when ordering a party to 
pay for the support of the other party, to base any award on 
the standard of living established during the marriage, 
except that in marriages of long duration courts would be 
required to award spousal support payments which would serve 
to equalize the standards of living of both parties' 
household. The court would be required to consider all of 
the following circumstances: 
a) the ability of the earning capacity of each spouse to 
maintain the standard of living established during the 
marriage, or following a marriage of long duration, to 
maintain a standard of living equal to that of the other 
spouse, taking into account: 
the marketable skills of the supported spouse; 
the reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the 
supported spouse as a result of having foregone or 
delayed education, training, employment, or career 
opportunities during the marriage; 
the extent to which the supported spouse contributed to 
the attainment of an education, training, career 
position, or a license by the other spouse; 
the ability to pay of the supporting spouse, taking 
into account the supporting spouse's earning capacity, 
earned an unearned income, assets, and the standard of 
living of the parties established during the marriage. 
b) the needs of each party, based on the standard of living 
established during the marriage, or, in the case of a 
marriage of long duration, based on equalization of the 
parties' standards of living; 
c) the obligations and assets of each; 
d) the duration of the marriage; 
e) the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful 
employment without interfering with the interests of 
dependent children in the custody of the spouse; 
f) the age and health of the parties; 
g) the immediate and specific tax consequences to each party; 
(More) 
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h) any other factors which the court deemed just and 
equitable. 
5. ~~rri~g~_£i_l£~g-~~r~!i£~ 
This bill would provide a different standard of living in 
cases where the marriage had been for a long duration. 
However, the bill does not define the term "marriage of long 
duration." On April 7, SB 907 (Lockyer) was passed out of 
this Committee; the purpose of that bill was to provide for 
indefinite jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support in 
marriages of long duration. The Committee determined that 
the term should be defined and declared that a marriage of at 
least 15 years was a marriage of long duration. 
SHOULD NOT THIS BILL INCLUDE A DEFINITION FOR THE TERM 
"MARRIAGE OF LONG DURATION"? 
6. Igg~l!!!~g_!~~-~!~~~~!~_£i_liYi~g 
This bill would require courts to equalize the standard of 
living in the case of a marriage of long duration. In 
essence, this provision would tie spouses of long marriages 
together, at least economically, long after their marriage 
had dissolved. One opponent of this bill states that 
although the statement of legislative intent declares that 
marriage is a partnership, this provision effectively 
declares that marriages of long duration are much more than a 
partnership-- partnerships can be terminated and proceeds can 
be divided evenly; this bill would provide that partners from 
long-term marriages could never break the economic binds--
they would be required to equalize their standards of living 
indefinitely. 
SHOULD NOT THIS BILL PROVIDE SOME LIMIT ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME 
IN WHICH SPOUSES OF MARRIAGES OF LONG DURATION COULD BE 
REQUIRED TO EQUALIZE THEIR STANDARDS OF LIVING? 
Under this bill, if one spouse married a wealthy individual 
after the dissolution was final, the married spouse would be 
required to share the wealth of her new spouse with the 
former spouse. Likewise, if one spouse bought a lottery 
ticket after the marriage had dissolved, he or she would be 
required to share the winnings with the former spouse, no 
matter how many years had elapsed since the dissolution. 
(More} 
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7. Q££~~~~1~~-!!~~~~~1~ 
Opponents are concerned that this bill would have a 
monumental impact upon the ability of divorced persons to 
remarry and to support new families. "If the supporting 
spouse was required for what could be the lifetime of the 
supported spouse to pay support in an amount sufficient to 
maintain the standard of living they enjoyed during the 
marriage, how many of those supporting spouses could afford 
to incur the financial obligations required for a second or 
subsequent family?" 
Opponents would prefer to see the issue of child support left 
to the discretion of trial judges in accordance with existing 
statutory and case law, which provides for reasonable 
criteria by which the court is to order such support. 
************ 
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SB 1296/SPOUSAL 
P'URPOSE: To 
divorce lived 
support awards 
PROBLEM: Present 
when awarding 
The factors 
guide the courts 
amount of spousal 
of more specific 
and reasonable. 
t) 
s ient 
the parties to a 
to grant spousal 
to courts 
§480l(a)(l)-(8), which are meant to 
termination a just and reasonable 
proven inadequate in the absence 
to what is considered to be just 
The purpose of require courts to award 
spousal support that guarantee a person the marital standard 
of living; its purpose to require the courts to determine an 
amount considering the factors in 480l(a), using the marital 
standard of 1 as a or starting point. The actual 
amount is still ed on the supported spouse's need and the 
ability to pay of supporting spouse. The factors in 480l(a) 
will affect need ability to pay, thereby affecting the amount 
of the award. 
Failure to provide sufficient guidance in the law has 
contributed to the of inadequate spousal support and 
thus the distressing c situation of certain categories of 
divorced peop . Women with young children and older spouses 
with few resources were singled out as needing special 
consideration when Legislature enacted no-fault divorce in 
1970. Despite Legislature's intentions, these groups have 
suffered dispropor in the intervening years. 
The Ramer case is 
currently interpret 
the supported spouse. 
employed during 
time of the divorce; 
was awarded enough 
shelter. She had 
some stock and 
ability to 
court, in 
order made by 
significantly 
affords the 
was accustomed 
indicated". 
The mari s 
to by both spouses 
spousal support cons 
one example of how the courts are 
ust and reasonable" to the detriment of 
Ramer, the wife had not been gainfully 
, was not gainfully employed at the 
was a 22 year marriage, and yet the wife 
to not quite cover the cost of her 
additional income ($198 per month from 
) while her former husband clearly had the 
er amount in spousal support. A higher 
in 1986, determined that "when the 
1 court affords one of the spouses a 
of living than the other and 
lower standard of living than 
an abuse of discretion is 
living is a way of life contributed 
, therefore, is a fair ceiling to place on 
ions. 
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CURRENT LAW AB 1296 
1. Petition the court for divorce Same 
- check the box indicating you will 
be requesting spousal support. 
2. Submit a Financial Declaration 
a. each party submits Same 
b. on each declaration, his and her Same 
current monthly expenses and income are 
declared. 
3. Supported Spouse files an Order to 
Show Cause or a Noticed Motion 
a. requesting an amount of support 
b. justifying the amount with what 
information is available and appropriate 
regarding need and ability to pay (i.e. 
supported spouse may speak to age, job 
situation, marital standard of living, 
health status, earning capacity of sup-
porting spouse, etc.) 
4. Hearing (if there's been no settle-
ment) 
- Each side puts on its case: 
supported spouse establishes her need 
and his ability to pay; supporting 
spouse refutes her need and justifies 
less ability to pay. 
c. on each declaration, the joint 
monthly expenses and income during the 
marriage are declared (these are ex-
penses which represent the marital 
standard of living.) 
Same 
Same 
\.0 
r-l 
r-l 
-5. Judge 
a. determines whatever amount 
he/she feels appropriate as the basis 
from which to start in determining a 
just and reasonable amount of support. 
b. using this amount as a start-
ing point, the judge arrives at a just 
and reasonable amount considering the 
factors in §480l(a) and the testimony. 
The judge may determine that no spousal 
support is appropriate. --
a. determines an amount reflecting 
the marital standard of living 
as the appropriate basis from which 
to start in determining a just and 
reasonable amount of support. 
b. using this amount as a start-
ing point, the judge arrives at a 
just and reasonable amount con-
sidering the factors in §480l(a) 
and the testimony. The judge may 
determine that no spousal support 
is appropriate. 
...... 
,..... 
,..... 
• 
( 
I 
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SENATE BILL No. 1296 
Introduced by Senator Hart 
March 6, 1987 
. An act to amend Section 4801 of the Civil Code, relating to 
spousal support. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 1296, as introduced, Hart. Spousal support. 
Existing law provides that in any judgment decreeing the 
dissolution of a marriage or a legal separation, the court may 
order a party to pay for the support of a party in any amount, 
and for any period of time, as the court may deem just and 
reasonable. In making such an award the court is required to 
consider various circumstances, including the standard of 
living of the parties and the earning capacity of the parties. 
This bill would require such an award to generally be based 
on the standard of living established during the marriage ~. 
ia gaco a£ a aaasRoso of )opg duration, the gnrerd '"auld be 
nijwin&l '" Ei''!'IPli;ro 'lie st&liiSAJidr of linililf:!i of bth 
}umnAolfis. 
Rather than a consideration of the earning capacity of each 
spouse the bill would require a consideration of the ability of 
the earning capacity of each spouse to maintain the standard 
of living established during the marriage, •• &eYe" tl'!t~ a 
mariass of 1ons duration, to maintain a standard or Hni.tia.g 
liUifBd *o t&gt of •h otAii' 5 rpouee. It also would require, in so 
determining the consideration of the reduced or lost lifetime 
earning capacity of the supported spouse as a result of having 
foregone or delayed education, training, employment, or 
career opportunities during the marriage, rather than the 
existing requirement applicable to determination of earning 
capacity requiring consideration of impairment of earning 
capacity duo to dn·oHon of tjme to domertio dnti9€. 
Among other things, it also would require the consideration 
MIMI MODISETTE 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT .---.._. 
............. , 
GARY K. ~ART 
C .AI.IFORNIA STATE SENATE 
lChM SEI'oiATORIAL DISTRICT 
STATE CAPITOL 
ROOtol 20S7 
SACRAMENTO. CA 
9581• 
f9U.H 44S--1540S 
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in making S\ICh an award of the ability to pay of the supporting 
spouse and of tqe immediate and specific tax consequences to 
each party. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: nq. · 
lO 
ll 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
SECTION l. Section 4801 of Civil Code is 
"'"""'"A"'A to read: 
~olution. 
~.r 
'he J..CJ(JSKIUlcU'e 
titled to share 
tion 
based on 
the p · s during the 
oflong dura · spousal 
eq11Jalize the standards o gin 
olds alter separation 
(a~ In any judgment decreeing the dissolution of a 
marriage or a legal separation of the parties, the court 
may order a party to pay for the support of the other 
party any amount, and for any period of time, as the court 
may deem just and reasonable, based on the standard of 
Jiving established during the marriage, 61"11•* &bot Ml 
~sw t1r 'e"d§ de.t'VIJJid.OJi ijllfi'JJtUtl ~e·t :tbM" :tW'1'9 kJ 
BtJMMJi1Stl tJatJ Ml*'JJj/,rfh sf Jj t 'will§ Mf :beth JlW!irJS • 
Jta~tJtn .. ,Jik. In making the award, the court shall consider 
all of the following circumstances of the respective 
parties: 
( l) The .ability of the earning capacity of each spouse 
to maintain the standard of living established during the 
marriage, fir 'ii"""*:i8',. I:N.....,..M§I1 tj[Jo•tg lilus.n&ililn; '" 
m.lliu-Wi:Q.." d·uHinrfil o' 'i1.;,.,g iiql''Jol tQ tb'lt ~'til~ .-&hr 
~use. taking into account all of the following: 
· (A) The marketable skills of the supported spouse; the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
lO 
11 
12 
13 
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job market for those skills; the time and expenses 
required for the supported spouse to acquire the 
appropriate education or training to develop those skills; 
and the possible need for retraining or education to 
acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. 
(B) !:Rte emem te wftie.ft ~ s~:t~pertee 9pettoo~ 
~reseat 6i' fttftH'e earai~~tg eaptteH)' t.s tft\psiree 6f perietiB 
ef ~:tlltefflple)'men~ ~ were ifttlttrree ~ 
marri~tge te ~ ~ lllttpf:iertee te ~ 
te een'\estie ~ The reduced 
capacity of the '""""'""'"',-~ 
1e or del; 
OPDOrtw 
14 extent to 
15 to the attainment of an cuu~.:i<~.ul:;u, traim:ng, 
16 or a license the other spouse. 
17 (D) of the """nllrtinu 
18 into account the supporting 
19 earned and unearned income; assets, and the .:mmutu 
20 living ~'dill# }JIIJ'.tifllJ' mi4'i:lii'lutd SIINiPI§i l'a> nwrri:teJi&. 
21 (2) The needs of each party, bused on the standard of 
22 living established during the marriage, w·1 in d111 l\ii'2 ei 
23 .. '\wninBt? l?f'lil1¥f lilwfilJJ'wo, !JweJ e1111 11141111•di:~M.tii:IN ,.{ .. e 
24 piJI'&riVII' olltMiii!Wll'tk fl c fi11il.lg. 
25 (3) The obligations and assets, including the separate 
26 property, of each. 
Z1 (4) The duration of the marriage. 
28 (5) The ability of the supported spouse to engage in 
29 gainful employment without interfering with the 
30 interests of dependent children in the custody of the 
31 spouse. 
32 (6) The age M and health of the parties. 
33 (7) !:Rte stsnettre ef HYittg ·ef the pttrties. The 
34 immediate alld specific tax collsequellces to each party. 
35 (8) Any other factors which it deems just and 
3tt't!quitable. 
37 At the request of either party, the court shall m.:~ke 
38 appropriate factual determinations with respec~ to the 
39 circumstan~es. The court may order the party required 
40 to make the payment of support to give reasonable 
due to 
as a result 
marital obhyci-
and a:mnit:rrents 
0\ 
,..-l 
,..-l 
·I 
,. 
I 
SB 1296 -4~ 
1 security therefor. Any order for support of the other 
2 party may be modified or revoked as the court may deem 
3 necessary, except as to any amount that may have 
4 accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of 
5 motion or ordeF to show cause to modify or revoke. Any 
6 order for support may be made retroactive to the 
34 
date of of the notice of motion or order to show 
surlS:Aimu~nr date. At the reouest 
the of modification or 
include a statement of decision and 
.,,,.,., .. ,,...r·•""" to the of the notice 
show cause tlu•.-.. uu· 
are to be made · fails to 
conungem 
terminates 
the to 
ordered to make the or the attorney record 
of the person so the happening of the 
coi:Uuagfmc~y and continues to accept support payments, 
shall refund any and aU moneys 
accrued after the happening of the 
that the overpayments shall first be 
aU payments which are then 
The court may, in the original order for 
order the to payments are to be 
to the person ordered to make the '"'"m""'n 
or his or her attorney of of the na1pp~emng 
35 for of an allowance for the 
36 of one of the parties shall terminate at the end of 
37 · period specified in the order and shall not be 
38 extended unless the court in its original order retains 
39 jurisdiction. 
40 (e) In any proceeding under this section the court 
........ .....___. ___ ~ 
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Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris 
P.O. Box 942 
Sacramento, California 
Dear Mr. Harris: 
LAKIN • SPEARS 
Attorneys at Law 
August 19, 1987 
I am a Certified Family Law Specialist in California, former 
President of the Northern California Chapter of the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and wrote the Judicial Court 
Support Guidelines used by the Judicial Counsel. I lecture and 
write extensively on spousal-arr~lCLsupport. 
/ \ ' 
I agree with you t'at SB 1296_ ad other pending senate bills 
relating to support and~J'property are not in a position 
for adoption by the California Legislature now. 
Although the Senate Task Force on Family Equity highlighted 
some real existing problems, the suggested solutions will cause 
as many problems as they solve. What we badly need is a careful 
examination of the concept of spousal support in California and a 
re-doing of the whole support statute (CC 4800). 
I believe that there is a strong movement in this direction 
among lawyers who want to cooperate with the legislature, women's 
groups, custody interest and other interested parties. An article 
by me on this subject is being published in the "California 
Lawyer" in September and will be followed shortly by a more 
complete suggestion in 11 Family Law News", the publication for all 
certified family law specialists in California. A copy of the 
latter is enclosed. 
The present legislation suggested abides bandaids for some 
existing problems and would have terrible equitable results in 
situations not considered by the task force. I hope that the 
assembly, unlike the senate, will move slowly and carefully on 
the existing problems. 
GHN/gc 

• OPINION/by 
Time for 
In Spo 
Lawyers and clients 
a more consistent 
WE NEED TO change the way Cal-ifornia courts determine spousal support. We need sup-
port guidelines that are clear, predict-
able and uniform throughout the state, 
yet leave room for judicial discretion 
when it is appropriate. 
The present scheme for determining 
support is really no scheme at all. 
tion 4801 of the Civil Code provides a 
hodgepodge of criteria for setting spous-
al support that gives courts only the 
most general guidance. 
Many California counties now use a 
spousal support schedule to determine 
temporary support payments. Called 
the California Guidelines, this """"'"""v 
was developed in Santa Clara 
and provides a mathematical formula for 
calculating temporary support 
But Marriage of Burlini (1983) 143 
CA3d 65, 191 CR 541 ruled that a sched-
ule could not determine permanent 
spousal support, and that it must in-
stead be based on the criteria in §4801. 
Unfortunately, the statute provides no 
mathematical guidance for applying its 
general criteria. A judge can award 10 
percent or 50 percent of total net income 
to a supported spouse and still make 
findings showing compliance with 
statute. 
In my opinion, the formula "''""''"·":.'"o" 
in the California Guidelines 
used consistently throughout 
to determine initial permanent 
support. Under that formula 
port payment is 40 percent of the 
net income minus 50 percent of pay-
ee's net income, excluding the amount 
George Norton practices in Palo Alto. He 
is a certified family law specialist and a 
fellow of the American Acaderny of Ma-
trimonial Lawyers. 
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APRO 
ALWAYS 
WINS. 
TOTEC PRO-SCAN 
Winning at office productivity 
means being able to cut corners 
to get things done without cut-
ting quality of work. TOTEC's 
Pro-Scan Optical Page Reader 
"reads" ordinary typewritten, 
photocopied or printed docu-
ments directly into your PC or 
word processor. Twenty differ-
ent type fonts can be read 
including proportionally spaced 
type in English or eight foreign 
languages. Pro-Scan is as easy 
to use as a desktop copier. And 
its advanced character recogni-
tion system makes it virtually 
error-free. Stop re-typing docu-
ments and let Pro-Scan from 
TOTEC do the work! 
Call or write TOTEC Co., 
Ltd. • 9205 Alabama Avenue, 
Suite B • Chatsworth, CA 
91311 • (818) 718-0055. 
18 California Lawyer 
Statewide guidelines are needed 
for determining spousal support 
Support for a divorced spouse is in fact 
a government-required transfer of fu-
ture private income for the purpose of 
allowing the state to avoid the obligation 
of supporting divorced spouses and their 
children. Other public policy considera-
tions include the more subjective goal of 
promoting "fairness," which is necessar-
ily based on changing social mores. The 
best a legislature and legal system can 
do is establish a rationale for spousal 
support that meets present government 
needs, reflects current social mores and 
provides for some degree of uniformity 
and predictability in application. 
In addition to guidelines for determin-
ing the amount of support, courts also 
need more precise guidelines for decid-
ing when to terminate or reduce sup-
port. For example, for marriages lasting 
less than 10 years, termination of sup-
port could be allowed-but not re-
quired-after half the length of the 
marriage. I would propose that a spouse 
never receive support for a longer peri-
od than the length of the marriage. 
Spousal support should not be an insur-
ance policy against disability, insanity, 
alcoholism or refusal to work. Society as 
a whole should provide for these prob-
lems after a defined length of time. 
Other issues that would need to be ad-
dressed by statewide guidelines are pay-
ment of support after retirement, the 
tax consequences of support payments 
and the division of pensions and profes-
sional goodwill. 
STATEWIDE GUIDELINES would en-able couples to consider divorce with a better understanding of 
their rights and more realistic expecta-
tions for their futures. It is easier for 
clients to accept predictable limits than 
to accept extended uncertainty followed 
by an arbitrary outcome. Some divorc-
ing couples get realistic advice and guid-
ance from their lawyers, but not all. And 
some clients are not willing to accept 
their lawyers' advice, knowing that the 
law now gives the courts great discre-
tion. No lawyer can predict with certain-
ty what a judge will do. 
Vague laws and unrealistic expecta-
tions about spousal support increase the 
likelihood of litigation and dissatisfaction 
with the outcome, whatever it is. And 
as we all know, disappointed clients gen-
erally blame their lawyers and the legal 
system. Divorcing couples, family law 
attorneys and judges all deserve a more 
rational, equitable and predictable sys-
tem for determining spousal support. 0 
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE AND 
STATE BAR MATTERS 
An established record 
of successful: 
• Disciplinary defense 
• Legal malpractice defense 
• Client Security Fund recoveries 
• Major plaintiff legal malpractice 
recoveries 
• Bar admissions 
• Fee dispute matters on behalf 
of clients and attorneys 
Former Senior Disciplinary 
Prosecutor for State Bar of 
California. Seventeen years 
trial experience. 
Our three-la"\\ryer office 
provides representation, consul-
tation, evaluation, association, 
and referral services in all 
attorney law matters. 
Advertising monthly in 
California Lawyer since 1983. 
References gladly furnished. 
LAW OFFICES OF PHILIP MARTIN 
1714 Stockton Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94133 
( 415) 433-6790 
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 18, 1987 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JULY 8, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 1341 
Introduced by Senators Hart and Watson 
March 6, 1987 
An act to amend Section 4800 of, to add Sections 4370.7 and 
4700.10 to, and to repeal Section 4800.7 of, the Civil Code, 
relating to family law. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 1341, as amended, Hart. Family law. 
Existing law provides that the respective interests of the 
husband and wife in the community property during the 
existence of the marriage relationship are present, existing, 
and equal. Existing law requires that in proceedings for 
dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, except upon 
the written agreement of the parties, or on stipulation of the 
parties in open court, the court shall divide the community 
property and the quasi-community property of the parties 
equally, except as specified. Under existing law, a court, 
rather than ordering the sale of the family home in order to 
achieve equal division, may make a "family home award," in 
which temporary use of the family home is given to the party 
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the 
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the 
welfare of the children. 
This bill would revise the law relating to the making of a 
family home award to, among other things, rename this award 
a "deferred sale of home order," specify factors that must be 
considered in determining whether to make such an order, 
require such an order if a specified determination is made, 
- 124 -
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and provide that such an order may be 
considered to additional child support. 
The bill also would a court to award 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a party requesting a 
deferred sale of home order in any case in which the court 
finds that the other party has disputed issues relating to 
physical custody of a child primarily for that party's economic 
interest not because of interests of the child. It 
would also Hi<JlSU::; 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 case 
7 disputed 
8 primarily 
9 because 
10 2. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
4700.10. 
(1) 
physical 
children. 
is added to the Civil 
...,..,.,,.,,...."'e·.-::L,u ... pursuant to Section 4700.10, 
attorney's fees and costs to 
"'*""'' ...... "'.,.. sale of home order in any 
other party has 
vJ.a,uu.r, to physical custody of a child 
economic interest and not 
interests of the child. 
"""'""'""""' to the Civil Code, to 
UVllU'-' order" means an order 
the sale and awards the 
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possession of the family 
minor children, or children 
Section 196 or 206, 
has sole or joint 
the adverse impact of 
on the welfare of the 
96 65 
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1 awaFd the family home ffi a: custodial paFeat puFsuaat ffi 
2 subdivisioa fat ef Seetioa -l800; the 6eUi't sha:ll deteFmiae 
3 'Nhether ffi ma:lre a: defeHed sa:le of home et=6:eF puFsuaat 
4 ffi -tfti.s seetioa. ffi makiag St:tCft a: deteFmiaatioa, the 6eUi't 
5 (b) In any case in which one of the parties has 
6 requested a deferred sale of home order pursuant to this 
7 section, the court, in making a determination on that 
8 request, shall consider all of the following: 
9 ( 1) Whether there are insufficient assets to award the 
10 family home to a custodial parent pursuant to subdivision 
11 (a) of Section 4800. 
12 (2) The length of time the child has resided in the 
13 home. 
14 ~ 
15 (3) The child's placement or grade in school. 
16 -f3t 
17 (4) The accessibility and convenience of the home to 
18 the child's school and other services or facilities used by 
19 and available to the child. 
20 f\1- VlhetheF the custodial paFeat er a: efHl4 lrftS 
21 ph~·sieal disabilities. 
22 (5) Whether the home has been adapted or modified 
23 to accommodate any physical disabilities of a custodial 
24 parent or child. 
25 w +fie 
26 (6) Whether there may be significant psychological 
27 detriment to the child associated with a change in 
28 residence. 
29 -f6t 
30 (7) The extent to which the location of the home 
31 facilitates the custodial parent's work optioas 
32 considerations, including child care. 
33 f'Pr 
34 (8) The financial ability of each parent to obtain 
35 suitable housing. 
36 ~ 
37 (9) Whether the custodial parent is capable of 
38 exercising a right of first refusal in the event of a proposed 
39 sale of the family residence. 
40 -fQt 
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1 (10) Any other factors the court deems just and 
2 equitable. 
3 (c) Upon a determination pursuant to subdivision (b) 
4 that a deferred sale of home order will minimize the 
5 adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the 
6 child a¥ #.l:e primary family tffi'i.f, the court shall make 
7 such an order to a custodial parent and shall specify the 
8 duration of the order. The order shall include the legal 
9 description and assessor's parcel number of the real 
10 property which is subject to the order and shall be 
11 recorded in the office of the county recorder of the 
12 county in which the real property is located. Such an 
13 order may be considered to constitute additional child 
14 support pursuant to Section 4728.5. 
15 (d) The court may order a lien against the 
16 noncustodial parent's interest the family residence to 
17 secure any support obligation arrearages of the 
18 noncustodial parent existing at the time of sale of the 
19 family residence. The lien authorized by this subdivision 
20 is created by recording a certified copy of the order 
21 containing the legal description and assessor's parcel 
22 number of the real property with the county recorder of 
23 the county in which the residence is located. The lien 
24 recorded against the noncustodial parent's interest in the 
25 family residence pursuant to this subdivision attaches to 
26 the residential real property upon recordation and is 
27 subject to Article 2 (commencing with Section 697.310) 
28 of Chapter 2 of Division 2 of Title 9 of the Code of Civil 
29 Procedure. 
30 (e) The court may a dollar limit on the amount 
31 of the expenses of maintenance of the residence to be 
32 paid solely by the party granted a deferred sale of home 
33 order. 
34 (f) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in 
35 writing, a deferred order may be modified 
36 or terminated at any time at the discretion of the court. 
37 (g) In making an order pursuant to this section, the 
38 court may reserve jurisdiction to determine any and all 
39 issues that arise with respect to the sale of the home 
40 including, but not limited to, the tax consequences to 
27 - 96 90 
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1 each party. 
2 (h) This section is applicable regardless of whether 
3 the deferred sale of home order is made before or after 
4 January 1, 1988. 
5 SEC. 3. Section 4800 of the Civil Code is amended to 
6 read: 
7 4800. (a) Except upon the written agreement of the 
8 parties, or on oral stipulation of the parties in open court, 
9 or as otherwise provided in this section and Section 
10 4700.10, the court shall, either in its judgment of 
11 dissolution of the marriage, in its judgment decreeing the 
12 legal separation of the parties, or at a later time if it 
13 expressly reserves jurisdiction to make such a property 
14 division, divide the community estate of the parties 
15 equally. For purposes of making this division, the court 
16 shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable 
17 to the time of trial, except that, upon 30 days' notice by 
18 the moving party to the other party, the court for good 
19 cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and 
20 liabilities at a date after separation and prior to trial to 
21 accomplish an equal division of the community estate of 
22 the parties in an equitable manner. 
23 For the purposes of division and in confirming or 
24 assigning the liabilities of the parties for which the 
25 community estate is liable, the court shall characterize 
26 liabilities as separate or community and confirm or assign 
27 them to the parties in accordance with subdivision (c) . 
28 As used in this section, "community estate" includes 
29 both the community and quasi-community assets and 
30 liabilities. of the parties. 
31 (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may 
32 divide the community estate as follows: 
33 ( 1) Where economic circumstances warrant, the court 
34 may award any asset to one party on such conditions as 
'·· 35 it deems proper to effect a substantially equal division of 
36 the property. 
37 (2) As an additional award or offset against existing 
38 property, the court may award, from a party's share, any 
39 sum it determines to have been deliberately 
40 misappropriated the party to the exclusion of the 
- 128 - 96 120 
SB 1341 -6-
1 interest of the other party in the community estate. 
2 ( 3) If the net value of the community estate is less than 
3 five thousand dollars ( $5,000) and one party cannot be 
4 located through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
5 court may award all such property to the other party on 
6 such conditions as it deems proper in its judgment 
7 decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or in its 
8 judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties. 
9 ( 4) Community estate personal injury damages shall 
10 be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless 
11 the court, after taking into account the economic 
12 condition and needs of each party, the time that has 
13 elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual 
14 of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, 
15 determines that the interests of justice require another 
16 disposition. In such a case, the community property 
17 personal injury damages shall be assigned to the 
18 respective parties in such proportions as the court 
19 determines to be just, except that at least one-half of the 
20 damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the 
21 injuries. As used in this subdivision, "community estate 
22 personal injury damages" means all money or other 
23 property received or to be received by a person in 
24 satisfaction of a judgment for damages for his or her 
25 personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the 
26 settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if 
27 the cause of action for the damages arose during the 
28 marriage but is not separate property as defined in 
29 Section 5126, unless the money or other property has 
30 been commingled with other assets of the community 
31 estate. 
32 (5) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (c), 
33 educational loans shall be assigned pursuant to Section 
34 4800.3 and liabilities subject to paragraph (2) of 
35 subdivision (b) of Section 5122 shall be assigned to the 
36 spouse whose act or omission provided the basis for the 
37 liability, without offset. 
38 (c) The debts for which the community estate is liable 
39 which are unpaid at the time of trial or for which the 
40 community estate becomes liable after trial, shall be 
- 129 - 96 140 
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1 confirmed or divided as 
2 ( 1) Debts incurred by 
3 marriage shall be '--'"'-'H 
4 who incurred the debt. 
spouse before the date of 
without offset to the spouse 
5 (2) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of 
6 marriage but prior to the date of separation shall be 
7 divided as set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b). To the 
8 extent that debts exceed total community 
9 and quasi-community excess of debt shall be 
10 assigned as the court just and equitable, taking 
11 into account factors as the parties' relative ability to 
12 pay. 
13 (3) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of 
14 separation but before entry of a judgment of dissolution 
15 or legal separation shall be confirmed as follows: 
16 (A) Debts incurred either spouse for the common 
17 necessaries of life of spouse or the necessaries of 
18 life of the minor children of the marriage, in the absence 
19 of a court order or agreement for support or for 
20 the payment of these shall be confirmed to either 
21 spouse according to respective needs and 
22 abilities to pay at debt was incurred. 
23 (B) Debts incurred by either spouse for 
24 nonnecessaries of that or minor children of the 
25 marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse 
26 who incurred the debt. 
27 ( 4) Debts incurred 
28 judgment of ....... ""v•u 
29 parties' marital status or 
30 separation shall 
31 who incurred 
spouse after entry of a 
to termination of the 
of a judgment oflegal 
offset to the spouse 
32 (d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), all separate 
33 debts, including those debts incurred by a spouse during 
34 marriage before that were not 
35 incurred community, shall be 
36 confirmed spouse who incurred the 
37 debt. 
38 (e) The 
39 in cases it 
40 separation 
1 
to order reimbursement 
for debts paid after 
96 160 
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1 (f) The court may make such orders as it deems 
2 necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. 
3 SEC. 4. Section 4800.7 of the Civil Code is repealed. 
0 
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Date of Hearing: August 19, 1987 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman 
SB 1341 (Hart) - As Amended: August 18, 1987 
PRIOR ACTIONS 
Sen. Com. on JUD. 6-0 Sen. Floor 21-4 
SB 1341 
SUBJECT: This bill revises the factors to be considered in granting temporary 
use of the family home under the Family Law Act. 
DIGEST 
Existing law: 
1) Provides that the respective interests of the husband and wife in the 
community property during the existence of the marriage relationship are 
present, existing, and equal. 
2) Requires that in proceedings for dissolution of marriage or for legal 
separation, except upon written agreement of the parties or on stipulation 
of the parties in open court, the court shall divide the community 
property and the quasi-community property of the parties equally except as 
otherwise specified. 
3) Permits the court to make a "family home award," rather than ordering the 
sale of the family home in order to achieve equal division. The "family 
home award 11 is the temporary use of the family home given to the party 
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the adverse impact 
of dissolution or legal separation of the welfare of the children. 
This bi 11: 
1) Renames the family home award to 11 deferred sale of home order11 (DSHO) and 
specifies factors that must be considered in determining whether to make 
such an order. 
2) Requires a DSHO be made in favor of custodial parent if a determination is 
made that such an order will minimize the adverse impact of dissolution or 
legal separation on the child. 
3) Provides that the value of a DSHO may be considered to constitute 
additional child support. 
- continued -
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4) Authorizes the creation of a lien against the noncustodial parent's 
interest in the family residence upon the recording of the DSHO. This 
lien is to secure any support obligation arrearages which may arise prior 
to the sale of the family residence. 
5) Authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a 
party requesting a DSHO in any case in which the court finds that the 
other party has disputed issues relating to the physical custody of a 
child primarily for that party's economic interest and not because of the 
best interests of the child. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
COMMENTS 
1) The source of this bill is the Senate Task Force on Family Equity. 
According to the author, this bill requires judges under certain 
circumstances to defer the sale of the family home in divorces involving 
minor children. Further, the author states: 
This measure was recommended by the Senate Task Force on Family Equity 
who were concerned that such deferrals, while permitted under current 
statute and actually required pursuant to case law in the Duke 
decision, were not being widely implemented. They (the Ta~orce) 
felt (there) was lack of clarity in the law as to under what 
circumstances deferrals were supposed to occur •.. In response, the 
Task Force members developed guidelines to be used by the courts, 
guidelines which are oriented to the children's needs ... 
Maintenance of the family home can provide some semblance of 
continuity and stability otherwise missing from the child's life. 
Proponents assert that divorce is a traumatic experience for children. 
Both the loss of a parent and the loss of their home compound the negative 
emotional effects of divorce. They state that this bill would provide the 
extra protection needed for children during these times. According to 
supporters, minor children and their caretakers require the support 
provided by neighbors, friends, classmates, and familiar surroundings 
during and after a divorce. 
- continued -
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2) In Duke, the court found that in marital dissolutions the courts have the 
authority to award temporary use of the family home to the party having 
custody of minor children in order to minimize the adverse impact of the 
dissolution on the welfare of the children. The award delays the sale of 
the home and division of the proceeds during the period of the temporary 
use. In making a "Duke" award, the court is to weigh the economic, 
social, and emotional benefits of the award against the economic 
detriments to the party temporarily denied his or her share of the 
proceeds of the family home (which may be the only substantial asset of 
the marriage). 
AB 2739 (Isenberg) - Chapter 419, Statutes of 1984, codified the decision 
(Civil Code Section 4800.7) and clarified the Duke decision which had been 
inconsistently interpreted by subsequent decisTOnS. 
The California Law Revision Commission, the sponsor of AB 2739, concluded 
after studying the law that the courts should be afforded broad discretion 
in making the home award because of the differing economic, social and 
emotional circumstances in each marriage. Any statutory standards might 
restrict the existing flexibility the court has to fashion an award that 
is appropriate under the circumstances of each case where such an award is 
justified. 
3) The Judicial Council and the California Judges Association (CJA) oppose 
this bill because it substantially restricts a court's discretion with 
respect to the disposition of the family home and to the award of 
appropriate attorneys' fees. 
CJA states that "the court must weigh the economic detriment of the 
non-custodial parent with the psychological benefit to the children. This 
is too complex and subtle a matter to fit statutory 'litmus tests'." 
4) Factors which the court is to consider in making the determination to 
order a deferred sale of the family home under this bill include: 
a) Whether there are sufficient assets to award the family home to a 
custodial parent when equally dividing the community property. 
Should this not be the threshold issue which must be determined by the 
court prior to the court making any determination regarding DSHO? 
b) The length of time the child has resided in the home. 
c) The child's placement or grade in school. 
- continued -
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d) The accessibility and convenience of the home to the child's school 
and other services or facilities used by and available to the child. 
e) Whether there may be significant psychological detriment to the child 
associated with a change in residence. 
f) The extent to which the home location facilitates the custodial 
parent's work considerations, including child care. 
The author suggests that the court will be able to consider whether a 
parent may be forced to leave an area due to lack of available/ 
affordable housing and in doing so have to leave a job. 
g) The financial ability of each parent to obtain suitable housing. 
Should not the court also consider the ability of the parent making 
the deferred home request to financially afford to maintain the 
mortgage and residence, prior to making such an award? 
h) Whether the custodial parent is capable of exercising a right of first 
refusal in the event of a proposed sale of the family residence. 
Is not this factor irrelevant to a determination of the minor's 
current welfare? 
i) Whether the home has been adapted or modified to accommodate any 
physical disabilities of a custodial parent or child. 
The DSHO is for the benefit of the child. Are not the physical 
disabilities of a custodial parent more relevant with respect to 
spousal support determinations? 
j) Any other factors the court deems reasonable and just. 
How is the court to apply and weigh each of these factors? 
5) Existing law permits the court to make a family home award on behalf of an 
adult child who is incapacitated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means. Should not this bill include such an adult child within 
its protections? 
6) The Family Law Section of the State Bar, states in opposition: 
a) This bill unnecessarily mandates payment of attorneys' fees and costs 
as a sanction against a parent who disputes issues relating to 
- continued -
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physical cus of a child primarily for economic reasons, rather 
than the child's best interests. 
Attorneys fees are presently available under existing law against 
parties who do not deal in good faith (Civil Code Section 4370.5 and 
Civil Procedure Code Section 128.5) 
b) The factors 
the court. 
a deferred home sale are already factors considered by 
c) The support lien is already available under existing law. 
7) Other critics have raised the following concerns: 
a) The sanction provision may encourage parties to seek a deferral of the 
home sale in order to obtain payment of attorneys fees and to avoid 
possible assessment of such sanctions. 
b) Under this bill, sanctions may be imposed against a parent whose 
primary purpose in disputing the home sale deferral may be based on 
valid economic considerations (e.g. the desire to afford proper 
housing to exercise custodial and other parental responsibilities). 
This sanction may foreclose a party's right to seek an equal division 
of the community property at the time of the dissolution. 
In contrast, the bill recognizes economic motives as appropriate for 
the custodial parent in seeking a DSHO. 
c) This bill dilutes the existing provision which specifies that the 
family home award is for "temporary use" of the family home to the 
party having custody of minor children. 
d) This bill deletes the rebuttable presumption that further delay in the 
sale of the home and division of the proceeds is no longer an 
equitable method of minimizing the adverse impact of the dissolution 
on the child's welfare when the party with temporary use remarries or 
there is a change in circumstances affecting the economic status of 
the parties or children. 
e) The bill fails to address the issue of the cohabitation/remarriage of 
the parent in-residence as a basis for terminating the DSHO. The bill 
may encourage custody disputes between parents and discourage the 
courts from awarding joint custody. 
- continued -
- 136 -
SB 1341 
Page 5 
SB 1341 
Page 6 
f) The bill does not require the court to consider the economic impact on 
the sale deferral on either parent, particularly the parent not 
receiving the use benefit of the home who may be subject to loss of 
use of equity for 18 years. 
8) Committee staff is advised the the author is willing to (a) retain 
existing law with respect to the rebuttable presumption upon remarriage or 
change in economic status and (b) delete Section 1 of the bill, which 
provides for special sanctions against the party disputing custody for 
that party's economic interest rather than the child's best interests. 
Support Opposition 
Commission On the Status of Women, Judicial Council 
Los Angeles 
Women Lawyers of Sacramento 
Committee On Moral Concerns 
California Home Economics Association 
Single Parents United 'N Kids 
Family Law Section, State Bar 
California Judges Association 
Family Law Coalition 
Women For: 
California NOW 
Queen's Bench 
United Service Employees, Local 616 
California Minority Women's Legislative 
Roundtable 
Lutheran Office of Governmental Ministry 
California 
San Luis Obispo Business & Professional 
Women Older Women's League, Santa Cruz 
San Mateo County NOW 
El Cajon Republican Women's Club 
Amador-Calaveras NOW 
Sisterhood of Temple Bat Yahn 
Marin Abused Women's Services 
San Diego Chapter of N.A.F.M.W. 
Contra Costa County Advisory Committee on 
Employment & Economic Status of Women 
Children's Rights Advocate - Grandparents 
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Assemblymember Elihu Harris 
Chair, Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Elihu: 
BUDGET & FISCAL REVIEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
EDUCATION 
ENERGY & PUBLIC UTILITIES 
NATURAL RESOURCES & WILDLIFE 
TRANSPORTATION 
Enclosed is a mock-up of my bill relating to the disposition 
of the family home in divorce proceedings. Since the bill was 
analyzed by your staff in August, it has been amended in response 
to concerns raised by members and staff in meetings held during 
the interim. The following is a brief description of the 
amendments. 
1. I have added intent language to indicate that while the bill 
leaves to the courts a final determination as to whose needs 
prevail, it is our intention that the needs of the children come 
first. The needs of the parents and the needs of the children 
are, of course, often interrelated. This interrelationship is 
recognized in various provisions in the bill. 
2. I have added language on p.2 (c) of the mock-up which 
substitutes for factor (1) on p. 3 of the printed version of the 
bill. Factor (1) was thought to be inadequately worded and 
inappropriately placed. The new language says that the courts 
may order a deferral even when there is sufficient property to 
make an award; and that the courts may make an award when the 
community estate is sufficient to accomodate one, regardless of 
findings made under this section which may indicate a deferral to 
be appropriate. 
3. On p.3 of the mock-up I have inserted a threshhold 
requirement to be considered by the courts prior to proceeding 
with a consideration of the needs of the children. This 
basically tells the courts that if the deferral is not 
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"affordable" it is not in the interest of anyone and should not 
be further considered. 
4. The remaining two amendments on p.3, lines 19 and 31 are 
technical in nature. 
5. On p.4, I have in (e) of the mock-up amended out the mandate 
to make a deferral; the bill now merely provides guidelines or 
factors which the court must consider when deciding on a request 
for a deferral. 
6. Also on p.4, I have at line 35 amended back into the bill the 
rebuttable presumption that on remarriage the need for the 
deferral terminates. 
7. In (i) on p.4 of the mock-up I have amended the bill to 
mandate rather than authorize the courts to reserve jurisdiction 
to consider any matters that arise regarding the deferral. This 
addresses the concern regarding potential tax consequences that 
become apparent; unanticipated maintenance needs; and any other 
matters relating to the home that have a financial impact on one 
or both owners. 
8. On p.2 I have amended out the mandatory attorneys' fees 
provision. 
I'm looking forward to discussing the mock-up of SB 1341 
with the members of the Committe in the interim hearing on 
December 14. Please don't hesitate to contact my office should 
you or your staff have questions regarding the enclosure. 
RT 
-GKH:mm 
cc: Assemblymembers Phil Isenberg, Terry Friedman, Maxine 
Waters, Lloyd Connelly 
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MOCK-UP 
AME~DED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 18, 1987 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JULY 8, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 1341 
Introduced by Senators Hart and Watson 
March 6, 1987 
An act to amend Section 4800 of, to add Sections 4370.7 and 
4700.10 to, and to repeal Section 4800.7 of, the Civil Code, 
relating to family law. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 1341, as amended, Hart. Family law. 
Existing law provides that the respective interests of the 
husband and wife in the community property during the 
existence of the marriage relationship are present, existing, 
and equal. Existing law requires that in proceedings for 
dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, except upon 
the written agreement of the parties, or on stipulation of the 
parties in open court, the court shall divide the community 
property and the quasi-community property of the parties 
equally, except as specified. Under existing law, a court, 
rather than ordering the sale of the family home in order to 
achieve equal division, may make a "family home award," in 
which temporary use of the family home is given to the party 
having custody of minor children in order to minimize the 
adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the 
welfare of the children. 
This bill would revise the law relating to the making of a 
family home award to, among other things, rename this award 
a .. deferred sale of home order," specify factors that must be 
considered in determining whether to make such an order, 
require such an order if a specified determination is made, 
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The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 
2 Code, f 
3 4370.7. In a oceeding pursuan~ 
4 a court shall award r able 
5 a party requesting a de~ le of home order in any 
6 case in which th t finds t e other party has 
7 disputed · elating to physical c of a child 
8 p or that party's economic intere 
9 use of the best interests of the child. 
10 SEC.'\ I. Section 4700.10 is added to the Civil Code, to 
11 read: r----------------
12 4700.10. ( t+ As used in this section: 
13 (1) "Custodial parent" means a party awarded 
14 physical custody of a child. 
15 (2) "Deferred sale of home order" means an order 
16 that temporarily delays the sale and awards the 
17 temporary exclusive use and possession of the family 
18 home to a custodial parent of minor children, or children 
19 for whom support is authorized under Section 196 or 206, 
20 whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint 
21 custody, in order to minimize the adverse impact of 
22 dissolution or legal separation on the welfare of the 
23 children. (c)'--:;---:-:-;;------;-;;,.--r--
24 i3t "Fi'im&ry ~ tfftH!! ffteftft!l tt efttM ftfltl tt ~ 
25 w#ft f'A' !tie&l ettstaey ef +he eM!&: 
26 ~ ltuttty ettSe ffi wlrHeft Mtef'iHtre iHsttffieieHt ~ te 
(a) The Legislature finds that there is a lack of guidance in law 
as to what constitutes the needs of children for purposes of 
implementing the mandate to the ourts in In Re M~~!J~ji~~ 
Duke, regarding the disposition of the family home in divorce. 
It_1_s the intent of the Legislature, in proposing the follow-
ing guidelines, that the needs of the children be the primary 
concern of the courts when making decisions regarding the 
disposition of the family home and that the economic needs 
of the parents as individuals be secondary. 
__ Nothing herem shall be construed to limit the court's 
discretion pursuant to ~4800 to divide the community estate 
of the parties equally, nor shall it be construed to limit 
the court's discretion to make a deferred sale of home order 
when a division of the community assets pursuant to ~4800 
could be accomplished by awarding the family home to one party. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
'10 
1-'H 
12 
13 
I 14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
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tlWftPd the fMftily heme te & ettsteEii&l ~ pttrsttMtt te 
sttetli .. ·isieft -fet ef Seet:ieft li8QQ; the eetlft shtHl Eletermifte 
whether te fftftlfe & EleferreEI 9ftle ef heme erftet. IBttrsttaftt 
seetieft. Itt tftakiftg 9tleft ft EletePfftift&til1ft, 
(d) In any case in which one of the parties has 
requested a deferred sale of home order pursuant to this " . . . . . 
section,riliii 6iiiiuJII;; iB Jiiislfi•8' 11 irtlillilliiBsif8111 8111 lliat the c;:ourt shall dXSt cons1der. whe~her 1 t 1s econom1cally 
re<j'"11'6t; l)pQII QOBSidot gil gf 'AS (elht"'iRg: feas1ble for the par~nts to ma1nta1n the trust. deed payme~tS 1 
rthereareinsuflicienta e property taxes, and H~surance for the hom~ dur11;g the pe~1od familvhometo tt bd" . . the sale of the home 1s deferred. In mak1ng th1s determ1na-
. 
4800 
rsuan osu IVJSJOn tion, the court shall consider the resident parent's income, 
, IOn · . • . . the availability of spousal and/or child support", and any 
(].) The length of bme the ch1ld has restded m the other sources of funds available to make those payments. 
home. It is the intent of this requirement to avoid the like-
fBt . lihood of possible default and resulting foreclosures 
(~ The ch1ld's placement or grade in school. thereby jeopardizing both parents' equity in the home. After 
f3t such a determination is made, the court in making a 
(3) Theaccessibilityandconvenienceofthehometo determination on a request for a deferred sale of home 
the child's school and other services or facilities used by order 1 shall consider all of the following: 
and available to the child, including child care. 
-f4t \\'het;her the ettstedi&l ~ ep & eftiM hM 
physie&l Elis&Bilities. ( 41 Whether the home has been adapted or modified 
to accommodate any physical disabilities of a custodial 
parent or child. 
~=Ate 
( r} Whether there may be significant psychological 
detriment to the child associated with a change in 
residence. 
~ ( ~ The extent to which the location of the home 
facilitates the custodial parent's rl';iW8iiili:~~=ee;t;p~ti~·e~ft~s----------------,, 
QQPSi"eadians1 ioelusliiiS oll:ilsl tan. employment· 
f1t ( 1 The financial ability of each parent to obtain 
suitable housing. 
-f8t 
( s) Whether the custodial parent is capable of 
exercising a right of first refusal in the event of a proposed 
sale of the family residence. 
-f9T 
1--' 
..p-
N 
::t> 
I 
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1 ( 9 •) Any other factors the court deems just and 
2 equitable. 
3 (e) Upon a determination pursuant to s;:.u:.:::b:;::d::..;iv:.:i::;si:.:::o.:.:n~(l,-d..L) __________ _ 
4 that a deferred sale of home order ..W.Immimize the 
is necessary in order to 
5 adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the may 
6 child 61" #te priHutry ifttttHy tift#, the courtlliil.al make 
7 such an order to a custodial parent and shall specify the 
8 duration of the order. The order shall include the legal 
9 description and assessor's parcel number of the real 
10 property which is subject to the order and shall be 
11 recorded in the office of the county recorder of the 
12 county in which the real property is located. Such. an 
13 order may be considered to constitute additional child 
14 support pursuant to Section 4728.5. \ 
15 (f) The court may order a lien against ·.the 
16 nsu 11hM'ia!lparent's mterest m the family residence to 
17 secure any support obligation arrearages of the 
18 noncustodial parent existing at the time of sale of the 
19 family residence. The lien authorized by this subdivision 
20 is created by recording a certified copy of the order 
21 containing the legal description and assessor's parcel 
22 number of the real property with the county recorder of 
23 the county in which the residence is located. The lien 
24 recorded against •h.l iii ••• 1 tcitiiiJ parent's interest in the 
25 family residence pursuant to this subdivision attaches to 
26 the residential real property upon recordation and is 
27 subject to Article 2 (commencing with Section 697.310) 
28 of Chapter 2 of Division 2 of Title 9 of the Code of Civil 
29 Procedure. 
30 ( ~) The court may specify a dollar limit on the amount 
31 of the expenses of maintenance of the residence to be 
32 paid solely by the party granted a deferred sale of home 
33 order. 
34 ( t) ExceE_t as otherwise a~eed to by the 2arties in 1 
35 writingJa i86erreiii 8M8 el hMile erfaer iRa, he41neflined 
36 Sf t?fliliii&,IUJ llt llRY time ll' •&.a MiUPl!aiSR af 'hi lUll t 
37 ( :i.) In makin an order ursuant to this section the 
nonresident 
_____ (l)A deferred sale of home order may be modified or terminated 
at any time at the discretion of the court. 
(2)If the party awarded the deferred sale remarries, or 
there is otherwise a change in circumstances affecting 
the status of the parties or the children pursuant to 
subdivision (d), a rebuttable presumption, affecting 
the burden of proof, is created that further deferral 
of the sale is no longer an equitable method of 
minimizing the adverse impact of the dissolution or 
legal separation on the welfare of the children. 
shall 
38 court . reserve juris iction to determine any and all _deferred sale of fiiu;~ily home order 
39 issues that arise with respect to the fiQI@. ef Uils llama d th 
40 including, but not limited to, thq tax consequences to __ maintenance of the home an e 
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1 each party. 
2 ( j) This section is applicable regardless of whether 
3 the deferred sale of home order is made before or after 
4 January 1, 198 . 
5 SEC. 2 .Section 4800 of the Civil Code is amended to 
6 read: 
7 4800. (a) Except upon the written agreement of the 
8 or on oral stipulation of parties in open court, 
9 provided in this section and Section 
court shall, in its judgment of 
11 of in its judgment decreeing the 
parties, or at a later time if it 
reserves jurisdiction to make such a property 
the community estate of the parties 
~ • .,. ..... ,""" of making this division, the court 
assets and liabilities as near as practicable 
excent that, 30 days' uuo_ncc; 
to the court for 
nru·tion of assets 
and prior to to 
an awision ot the community estate of 
..... .., ... ~->.,.., in an equitable manner. 
the of division and in confirming or 
of the parties for which the 
is Hable, the court shall characterize 
liabilities as """~'n ..... ..,. or community and confirm or assign 
to the parties accordance with subdivision (c) . 
As used in this "community estate" includes 
community quasi~community assets and 
30 liabilities of the parties. 
31 (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the court may 
32 divide the community estate as follows: 
SB 1341 -6-
1 interest of the other party in the community estate. 
2 (3) If the net value ofthe community estate is less than 
3 five thousand dollars ($5,000) and one party cannot be 
4 located through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the 
5 court may award all such property to the other party on 
6 such conditions as it deems proper in its judgment 
7 decreeing the dissolution of the marriage or in its 
8 judgment decreeing the legal separation of the parties. 
9 ( 4) Community estate personal injury damages shall 
be assigned to who suffered the injuries ._. .. '""""" 
11 the into account the economic 
condition and party, time that 
13 elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual 
of the cause of and all other facts the case, 
15 determines of 1m:tic:e 
disposition. a case, the 'l.:v:uu.uuJtu 
shaH 
mJury damages" means aU money or 
..... ... ,... ...... ., .... ., received or to be received by a person 
of a judgment for for his or 
injuries or pursuant to an 
26 settlement or compromise of a claim the damages, if 
cause of action for the arose during the 
marriage but is not separate as defined 
29 Section 5126, unless money or property has 
30 been commingled with other assets the community 
31 estate. 
{5) Notwithstanding subdivisions 
shall be ass1gm:~a 
to 
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l confirmed or divided as follows: 
2 ( l) Debts incurred by either spouse before the date of 
3 marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse 
4 who incurred the debt. 
5 (2) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of 
6 marriage but prior to the date of separation shall be 
7 divided as set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b). To the 
8 extent that community debts exceed total community 
9 and quasi-community assets, the excess of debt shall be 
10 assigned as the court deems just and equitable, taking 
11 into account factors such as the parties' relative ability to 
12 pay. 
(3) Debts incurred by either spouse after the date of 
14 separation but before entry of a judgment of dissolution 
15 or legal separation shall be confirmed as follows: 
16 (A) Debts incurred by either spouse for the common 
17 necessaries of life of either spouse or the necessaries of 
18 life of the minor children of the marriage, in the absence 
19 of a court order or written agreement for support or for 
20 the payment of these debts, shall be confirmed to either 
21 spouse according to the parties' respective needs and 
22 abilities to pay at the time the debt was incurred. 
23 (B) Debts incurred by either spouse for 
24 nonnecessaries of that spouse or minor children of the 
25 marriage shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse 
26 who incurred the debt. 
27 (4) Debts incurred by either spouse after entry of a 
28 judgment of dissolution but prior to termination of the 
29 parties' marital status or after entry of a judgment of legal 
30 separation shall be confirmed without offset to the spouse 
31 who incurred the debt. 
32 (d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), all separate 
33 debts, including those debts incurred by a spouse during 
34 marriage and before the date of separation that were not 
35 incurred for the benefit of the community, shall be 
36 confirmed without offset to the spouse who incurred the 
37 debt. 
38 (e) The court has jurisdiction to order reimbursement 
39 in cases it deems appropriate for debts paid after 
~0 separation but prior to trial. 
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1 (f) The court may make such orders as it deems 
2 necessary to carry out the purposes of this section. 
3 SEC. i. Section 4800.7 of the Civil Code is repealed. 
0 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 17, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE JUNE 5, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 1306 
Introduced by Senators Morgan and Seymour 
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Allen, Farr, Filante, Harvey, 
La Follette, Mojonnier, Moore, Speier, Statham, and 
Tanner) 
March 6, 1987 
An act to amend Sections 4600, 4600.5, 4607, and 4608 of the 
Civil Code, relating to family law. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 1306, as amended, Morgan. Custody. 
Existing law provides that custody of a child should be 
awarded in a specified order of preferences according to the 
best interests of the child. The first order of preference is to 
both parents jointly or to either parent. In making an award 
of custody to either parent the court is required to consider 
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the noncustodial parent. Existing law 
establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the best 
interests of a child where the parents agree to such an award. 
Under existing law, the court may in its discretion award joint 
custody subject to the best interests of the child. 
This bill would revise and recast the above described 
provisions relating to child custody to, among other things, 
eliminate the required consideration described above when 
making an award of custody to either parent; declare that it 
is the public policy of the state to assure a child of frequent 
and continuing contact with both parents after a dissolution 
of the parents' marriage or after a parental separation if it is 
in the best interests of the child; rather than the above 
- 145 -
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described presumption regarding joint custody, provide a 
presumption that an agreement of the parents as to the 
custody of a child is in the best interests of the child; speeify 
faders ~ fflt::J:M ee eoflsielerea a,. ~ eetift • .,._,rftefl malftftg ftfl 
arnara ef jeiffi eustoely up6ft ~ applieatiofl ef either pareflt 
require the court, in its discretions, in awarding custody, 
rather than joint custody, to consider not only the best 
interests of the child but, in addition, to consider a list of 
specified factors; and specify additional factors that must be 
considered in making an award of jeiffi physical custody with 
respect to an infant aged 3 years or less. 
The bill also would provide that in making a determination 
of the best interests of a child the court shall consider, in 
addition to factors required to be considered by existing law, 
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and 
continuing contact with the other parent where contact is in 
the best interests of the child. 
It also would make related changes with regard to the goals 
and effects of mediation proceedings. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 4600 of the Civil Code is 
2 amended to read: 
3 4600. (a) In any proceeding under this chapter 
4 where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the 
5 court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at 
6 any time thereafter, make such order for the' custody of 
7 the child during minority as may seem necessary or 
8 proper. If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason 
9, so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the 
10 court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of 
11 the child in making an award of custody or modification 
12 thereof. In determining the person or persons to whom 
13 custody should be awarded under paragraph (2) or (3) of 
14 subdivision (b), the court shall consider and give due 
15 weight to the nomination of a guardian of the person of 
16 the child by a parent under Article 1 (commencing with 
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1 Section 1500) of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of Division 4 of the 
2 Probate Code. 
3 (b) Custody should be awarded in the following order 
4 of preference according to the best interests of the child 
5 pursuant to Section 4608: 
6 ( 1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5 
7 or to either parent. In making an order for custody to 
8 either parent, the court shall not prefer a parent as 
9 custodian because of that parent's sex. 
10 The court, in its discretion, may require the parents to 
11 submit to the court a plan for the implementation of the 
12 custody order. 
13 (2) If to neither parent, to the person or persons in 
14 whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and 
15 stable environment. 
16 (3) To any other person or persons deemed by the 
17 court to be suitable and able to provide adequate and 
18 proper care and guidance for the child. 
19 (c) Before the court makes any order awarding 
20 custody to a person or persons other than a parent, 
21 without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding 
22 that an award of custody to a parent would be 
23 detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is 
24 required to serve the best interests of the child. 
25 Allegations that parental custody would be detrimental 
26 to the child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, 
27 shall not appear in the pleadings. The court may, in its 
28 discretion, exclude the public from the hearing on this 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
issue. 
SEC. 2. Section 4600.5 of the Civil Code is amended 
to read: 
4600.5. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that it 
is the public policy of this state to assure minor children 
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents 
after the parents have separated or dissolved their 
marriage where it is in the best interests of the child, and 
that parents should be encouraged to share the rights and 
responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this 
policy. 
(b) There shall be a rebuttable presumption, affecting 
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1 the burden of proof, that an agreement of the parents as 
2 to the custody of a child, whether in open court or 
3 otherwise, is in the best interests of the child, subject to 
4 Section 4608. 
5 (c) Upon the application of either parent, jetftf 
6 CHstedy ffiftY cilstody shall be awarded in the discretion 
7 of the court, subject to Section 4608 and consideration of 
8 all of the following factors: 
9 ( 1) The past and present abilities of the parents to 
10 cooperate and make decisions jointly. 
11 (2) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing 
12 of love, affection, and contact between the child and the 
13 other parent. 
14 (3) The geographic proximity of the parents as this 
15 relates to the practical considerations of joint custody. 
16 (4) Any history of child abuse, spousal abuse, or 
17 parental kidnapping. 
18 (5) The extent to which the conduct of each parent 
19 has promoted or frustrated the policy of the law to 
20 encourage cooperation in the resolution of child custody 
21 matters, insofar as the conduct has affected or may affect 
22 the best interests of the child. 
23 (6) The age and emotional maturity of the child. In 
24 detel'ffiifl:iftg vilietfter te a:wa-Pd jetftf physical eHstedy ef 
25 awarding the physical custody of an infant ege& age three 
26 years or less, the court shall consider, in addition to the 
27 other factors specified in this subdivision, all of the 
28 following: 
29 (A) The ability of the parents to communicate 
30 frequently about the child's daily. routine and the 
31 willingness of the parents to maintain similar 
32 childrearing routines. 
33 (B) The flexibility of the child including, but not 
34 limited to, the child's developmental capacity to adjust to 
35 repeated separations from each parent, frequent moves 
36 from one home to the other, and different patterns of 
37 parenting and caregiving, where those differences exist. 
38 (C) Each parent's child care arrangements and the 
39 ability of the parents to communicate about these 
40 arrangements on a regular basis. 
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1 (D) The benefit to the child of maintaining frequent 
2 and continuing contact with both parents and the 
3 detriment to the child of the absence of this contact. 
4 For the purpose of assisting the court in making a 
5 determination whether an award of joint custody is 
6 appropriate under this subdivision, the court may direct 
7 that an investigation be conducted pursuant to Section 
8 4602. 
9 (d) Whenever a request for joint custody is granted or 
10 denied, the court, upon the request of any party, shall 
11 state in its decision the reasons for granting or denying 
12 the request. A statement that joint physical custody is, or 
13 is not, in the best interests of the child shall not be 
14 sufficient to meet the requirements of this subdivision. 
15 (e) For the purposes of this part: 
16 (1) "Joint custody" means joint physical custody and. 
17 joint legal custody. 
18 (2) "Sole physic~l custody" means that a child shall 
19 reside with and under the supervision of one parent, 
20 subject to the power of the court to order visitation. 
21 (3) "Joint physical custody" means that each of the 
22 parents shall have significant periods of physical custody. 
23 ( 4) "Sole. legal custody" means that one parent shall 
24 have the right and the responsibility to make the 
25 decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of 
26 a child. 
27 (5) "Joint legal custody" means that both parents shall 
28 share the right and the responsibility to make the 
29 decisiqns relating to the health, education, and welfare of 
30 a child. 
31 (f) In making an order of joint legal custody, the court 
32 shall specify the circumstances under which the consent 
33 of both parents is required to be obtained in order to 
34 exercise legal control of the child and the consequences 
35 of the failure to obtain mutual consent. In all other 
36 circumstances, either parent acting alone may exercise 
37 legal control of the child. An order of joint legal custody 
38 shall not be construed to permit an action that is 
39 inconsistent with the physical custody order unless the 
40 action is expressly authorized by the court. 
f17 140 
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1 (g) In making an order of joint physical custody, the 
2 court shall specify the right of each parent to the physical 
3 control of the child in sufficient detail to enable a parent 
4 deprived of that control to implement laws for relief of 
5 child snatching and kidnapping. 
6 (h) In making an order for custody with respect to 
7 both parents, the court may award joint legal custody 
8 without awarding joint physical custody. 
9 ( i) In making an order of joint physical custody or joint 
10 legal custody, the court may specify one parent as the 
11 primary caretaker of the child and one home as the 
12 primary home of the child, for the purposes of 
13 determining eligibility for public assistance. 
14 (j) Any order for joint custody may be modified or 
15 terminated upon the petition of one or both parents or on 
16 the court's own motion if it is shown that the best 
17 interests of the child require modification or termination 
18 of the order. The court shall state in its decision the 
19 reasons for modification or termination of the joint 
20 custody order if either parent opposes the modification or 
21 termination order. 
22 (k) Any order for the custody of a minor child of a 
23 marriage entered by a court in this state or any other 
24 state may, subject to the jurisdictional requirements set 
25 forth in Sections 5152 and 5163, be modified at any time 
26 to an order of joint custody in accordance with the 
27 provisions of this section. 
28 ( l ) In counties having a conciliation court, the court or 
29 the parties may, at any time, pursuant to local rules of 
30 court, consult with the conciliation court for the purpose 
31 of assisting the parties to formulate a plan for 
32 implementation of the custody order or to resolve any 
33 controversy which has arisen in the implementation of a 
34 plan for custody. 
35 (m) Notwithstanding any other provision of law~ 
36 access to records and information pertaining to a minor 
37 child, including, but not limited to, medical, dental, and 
38 school records, shall not be denied to a parent because 
39 that parent is not the child's custodial parent. 
40 SEC. 3. Section 4607 of the Civil Code is amended to· 
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1 read: 
2 4607. (a) In any proceeding where there is at issue 
3 the custody of or visitation with a minor child, and where 
4 it appears on the face of the petition or other application 
5 for an order or modification of an order for the custody 
6 or visitation of a child or children that either or both such 
7 issues are contested, as provided in Section 4600,4600.1 or 
8 4601,. the matter shall be set for mediation of the 
9 contested issues prior to or concurrent with the setting of 
10 the matter for hearing. The purpose of the mediation 
11 proceeding shall be to reduce acrimony which may exist 
12 between the parties and to develop an agreement that is 
13 in the best interests of the child, as determined pursuant 
14 to Section 4608. The mediator shall use his or her best 
15 efforts to effect a settlement of the custody or visitation 
16 dispute that is in the best interests of the child, consistent 
17 with the considerations required by Section 4608. 
18 (b) Each superior court shall make available a 
19 mediator. The. mediator may be a member of the 
20 professional staff of a fainily conciliation court, probation 
21 department, or mental health services agency, or may be 
22 any other person or agency designated by the court. In 
23 order to provide mediation services, the court shall not be 
24 required to institute a family conciliation court. The 
25 mediator shall meet the minimum qualifications required 
26 of a counselor of conciliation as provided in Section 17 45 
27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
28 (c) Mediation proceedings shall be held in private and 
29 shall be confidential, and all communications, verbal or 
30 written, from the parties to the mediator made in a 
31 proceeding pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be 
32 official information within the meaning of Section 1040 of 
33 the Evidence Code. 
34 (d) The mediator shall have the authority to exclude 
35 counsel from participation in the mediation proceedings 
36 where, in the discretion of the mediator, exclusion of 
37 counsel is deemed by the mediator to be appropriate or 
38 necessary. The mediator shall have the duty to assess the 
39 needs and interests of the child or children involved in 
40 the controversy and shall be entitled to interview the 
- 151 -
fJ7 180 
SB 1306 -8-
1 
2 
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18 
19 
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21 
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37 
38 
39 
40 
child or children when the mediator deems such an 
interview to be appropriate or necessary. 
(e) The mediator may, consistent with local court 
rules, render a recommendation to the court as to the 
custody or visitation of the child or children. The 
mediator may, in cases where the parties have not 
reached agreement as a result of the .mediation 
proceeding, recommend to the court that an 
investigation be conducted pursuant to Section 4002, or 
that other action be taken to assist the parties to effect a 
resolution of the controversy prior to any hearing on the 
issues. The mediator may, in appropriate cases, 
recommend that mutual restraining orders be issued, 
pending determination of the controversy, to protect the 
well-being of the children involved in the controversy. 
Any agreement reached by the parties as a result of 
mediation-Shall be reported to the court and to counsel 
for the parties by the mediator on the day set for 
mediation or any time thereafter designated by the court. 
(f) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the mediator 
from recommending to the court that counsel be 
appointed pursuant to Section 4606. t9 represent the 
minor child or children. In making any such 
recommendation, the mediator shall inform the court of 
t:Gc reasons why it would be in the best interests of the 
minor child or children to have counsel appointed. 
SEC. 4. Section 4608 of the Civil Code is amended to 
read: 
4608. In making a determination of the best interests 
of the child in any proceeding under this title, the court 
shall, among any other factors it finds relevant, consider 
all of the following: 
(a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child. 
(b) Any history of abuse against the child. As a 
prerequisite to the consideration of allegations of abuse, 
the court may require substantial independent 
corroboration including, but not limited to, written 
reports by law enforcement agencies, child protective 
services or other social welfare agencies, courts, medical 
facilities, or other public agencies or private nonprofit 
- 152 -
-9- SB 1306 
1 organizations providing services to victims of sexual 
2 assault or domestic violence. As used in this subdivision, 
3 "abuse against the child" means child abuse as defined in 
4 subdivision (g) of Section 11165 of the Penal Code. 
5 (c) The nature and amount of contact with both 
6 parents. . 
7 (d) Which parent is more likely to allow the child or 
8 children frequent and continuing contact with the other 
9 parent, where contact is in the best interests of the child. 
0 
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Date of Hearing: August 19, 1987 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman 
SB 1306 (Morgan) -As Amended: August 17, 1987 
PRIOR ACTIONS 
Sen. Com. on JUD. 6-5 Sen. Floor 25-8 
SB 1306 
SUBJECT: This bill amends the custody and visitation statutes of the Family 
Law Act. 
DIGEST 
Existing law: 
1) Provides that custody of a child should be awarded in a specified order of 
preferences according to the best interests of the child. The first order 
of preference is 11 to both parents jointly or to either parent. 11 In making 
an award of custody to either parent, the court is required to consider 
which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing 
contact with the noncustodial parent. 
2) Establishes a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a 
child where the parents agree to such an award. 
3) Permits the court, in its discretion, to award joint custody subject to 
the best interests of the child. 
This bill revises the above provisions relating to child custody to, among 
other things: 
1) Eliminate the required consideration (as to which parent is more likely to 
allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial 
parent) when making an award of custody to either parent . 
2) Declare that it is the public policy of the state to assure a child of 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents after a dissolution of 
the parents' marriage or after a parental separation if it is in the best 
interests of the child. 
3) Provide a presumption that an agreement of the parents as to the custody 
of a child is in the best interests of the child. 
4) Delete the specific discretion of the court to award joint custody, when 
the parents have not so agreed, based on the child's best interests 
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standard. Instead, custody shall be awarded, in the court's discretion, 
subject to the best interests of the child and consideration of a list of 
specified factors. 
5) Specify additional factors that must be considered in making an award of 
physical custody with respect to an infant aged three years or less. 
6) Delete the reference in the definition of joint custody that it shall be 
shared by the parents so as to assure a child of frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents. 
7) Delete as a purpose of the mediation proceeding the requirement to develop 
an agreement assuring the children's close and continuing contact with 
both parents. It is replaced by the provision that such agreement shall 
be in the best interests of the child, upon determination by the court of 
the child's best interests. 
8) Provide that in making a determination of the best interests of a child 
the court shall consider, in addition to factors required to be considered 
by existing law, which parent is more likely to allow the child frequent 
and continuing contact with the other parent where contact is in the best 
interests of the child. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
COMMENTS 
1) The source of this bill is the Senate Task Force On Family Equity. 
According to the author: 
"This bill moves the phrase 'frequent and continuing contact' in the 
child custody law from the legislative intent section to a factor to 
be considered in determining the best interest of the child. Many 
believe that the inclusion of this phrase in legislative intent 
language has created a presumption in favor of joint custody. 
"SB 1306 will change this presumption and make the child's best 
interests the primary consideration in joint custody awards. This 
bill also identifies other factors to be considered in custody awards, 
including the parents' ability to cooperate, ability of each parent to 
encourage the child's love and contact with the other parent, 
geographical proximity of the parents, history of child abuse, spousal 
abuse or parental kidnapping, the age of the child." 
- continued -
- 155 -
SB 1306 
Page 2 
SB 1306 
Page 3 
2) The factors the court is to consider in making a custody award include 
following: 
a) The past and present abilities of the parents to cooperate and make 
decisions jointly. 
Is this factor intended to be used to deny joint custody on the basis 
that one parent has not or will not cooperate with the other parent? 
Critics have asserted that, if parents had such abilities to 
communicate and cooperate, they would likely have remained married. 
b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, 
affection, and contact between the child and the other parent. 
c) The geographic proximity of the parents as this relates to the 
practical considerations of joint custody. 
Critics are concerned that this provision will encourage a pa 
relocate in order to defeat a joint custody arrangement. 
d) Any history of child abuse, spousal abuse, or parental kidnapping. 
The courts currently have the authority to order restraining orders 
and neutral transfer points or third persons for the exchange of 
children, if there is a risk of continuing abuse between spouses. 
Critics are concerned that this factor will increase the motivation 
for false accusations of abuse. 
Should not this provision require that there be substantive 
independent corroboration of any incident of child abuse, spousal 
abuse, or parental kidnapping? Should not child abuse, spousal 
and parental kidnapping be defined? 
Should not the court be limited to considering a pattern of frequent 
and continuous spousal abuse with demonstrable impact on children? 
Similar provision is contained in SB 377 (McCorquodale), which is so 
to be heard on August 19, 1987. 
e) The extent to which the conduct of each parent has promoted or 
frustrated the policy of the law to encourage cooperation in the 
resolution of child custody matters, insofar as the conduct has 
affected or may affect the best interests of the child. 
- continued -
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This prov1s1on was suggested by members of the Santa Clara County 
family law bench in order to address their concerns that, without this 
provision, the bill "would encourage •stonewalling• by parties and 
make it more difficult for judges to resolve custody disputes by 
diluting the law's present policy of encouraging frequent and 
continuing contact between children and both parents." 
f) The age and emotional maturity of the child. When awarding physical 
custody of an infant age three years or less, the court is also to 
consider: 
i) The ability of the parents to communicate frequently about the 
child's daily routine and the willingness of the parents to 
maintain similar childrearing routines. 
Critics object to this provision as unrealistic, particularly 
since persons in intact marriages probably do not do as required 
herein. Further, they also question the ability of the court to 
determine whose routine is the better. 
ii) The flexibility of the child including, but not limited to, the 
child's developmental capacity to adjust to repeated separations 
from each parent, frequent moves from one home to the other, and 
different patterns of parenting and caregiving, where those 
differences exist. 
Critics raise the concern that this may require a mental health 
expert in every case where custody is disputed for a child aged 
three or under. 
iii) Each parent's child care arrangements and the ability of the 
parents to communicate about these arrangements on a regular 
basis. 
iv) The benefit to the child of maintaining frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents and the detriment to the child of the 
absence of this contact. 
The same Santa Clara family law bench members suggested this 
provision because the bill had been 11 inappropriately weighted 
against joint custody" with respect to the very young. 
3) The Family Law Section of the State Bar states, in support of this bill 
that it "will encourage courts to take a more thoughtful approach to joint 
custody orders and mediation agreements instead of adopting a 'cookie 
cutter• approach to the needs of children in family law actions." 
- continued -
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4) Opponents of this bill, including a number of mental health professionals 
and attorneys have raised stated the following concerns: 
a) The policy statements regarding custody need to be maintained as the 
centerpiece of all custody processes, including that relating to joint 
custody, in order to reduce manipulation by the parents to gain 
leverage. 
The relocation of the frequent and continuing contact language 
substantially dilutes encouraging parents to share their children. 
b) This bill is contrary to the large and growing body of research on 
children of divorce. Further, longitudinal studies under the existing 
six year old law are not yet completed, but preliminary reports are 
positive as to the impact of existing law. 
c) The current legislative directives toward frequent and continui 
contact, (including the requirement that the court is to consi 
which parent is most likely to allow the child frequent and continui 
contact with the non-custodial parent in the event of awarding sole 
custody), are important tools to encourage the parties to have a more 
healthy, sharing relationship with their children. This bill 
substantially dilute these directives, in that it does not promote 
equality of rights between parents nor encourage the fullest shari 
of custody. 
d) This bill conveys a not-so-subtle message about how to defeat joint 
custody, in contrast to existing law's message that parents are 
expected to continue as joint custodians. It may encourage the parent 
who seeks sole custody to make unilateral decisions regarding the 
children; to refuse to cooperate with the other parent pertaini 
custody or other child related issues; to create geographical barri 
to maintaining joint custody; and to make false allegations of s 
and child abuse. 
e) The loss of joint custody is really a disaster for the woman, for 
is most often the one who must carry the burden of children whose 
lives have been traumatized by being excessively deprived of 
parent. 
Enforced separation of child and parent is always and inevitably 
traumatic for the child and likely to lead to pathological 
consequences. Both parent-child bonds are equally powerful bonds 
are essential to normal and health development of children. 
- continued -
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f) There is no need to take the drastic measures proposed by this bill 
until the issues have been clearly studied and exposed to a careful 
consideration. 
g) Studies have demonstrated that joint custody has encouraged compliance 
with support obligations, whereas this bill may discourage it. 
h) Joint parenting/custody should not be denied based on the arbitrary 
obstacles the factors stated in the bill create, such as geographic 
distance, parental cooperation, age of the child, parental 
interaction, whether or not decisions are made jointly, differences in 
style of communication, different patterns of caregiving, etc. 
Parents are be able to comply with joint custody orders without regard 
to the above factors. The factors are not necessarily relevant to the 
award of joint custody. 
i) This bill reduces the policy requiring frequent and continuing contact 
to one of a number of coequal factors to be considered by the court. 
5) The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts has stated in opposition 
to this bill that: 
a) The deletion of the preamble statement of policy to encourage frequent 
and continuing contact with both parents and moving it to the joint 
custody paragraph, 11 Undermines one of the crucial benefits of" 
existing law, which has been in effect for six years. The effect of 
this preamble is to encourage parents to cooperate in raising 
children. 
b) A signal is sent to parents that only if they consider joint custody 
do they need to cooperate. 
c) Additional litigation may be encouraged, which will be lengthened by 
the requirement of the court to consider each of the factors. 
d) The consideration of the factors will likely detract from the focus on 
the needs of the children. In particular, the factor requiring 
consideration of abuse and kidnapping is overbroad and will lead to 
lengthy and strategic maneuverings among family law litigants. 
6) According the Frank Williams, M.D., Director, Family and Child Psychiatry, 
at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 11 there is no ideal situation for children 
after divorce, but years of sole custody has wreaked havoc on children. 11 
Further, the work with children and parents of divorce at the Center has 
shown that: 
- continued -
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a) Traditional sole custody has played a significant role in the later 
development of chronic depression in children. 
b) Structured shared joint custody has a better chance of achieving some 
level of cooperativeness between warring parents than unilateral sole 
custody. Parents can learn to cooperate and joint custody is a 
preferable milieu for such learning. 
c) Unless an evaluation indicates otherwise, joint custody should be 
preferred. 
d) Continuing and frequent contact with both parents is emotionally 
life-saving for most children. 
Support 
Parents Without Partners, Inc. 
California 
Family Law Section, State Bar 
Children Under Shared Parenting 
D. DeBow 
445-4560 
ajud 
Opposition 
Equal Rights For Fathers, Inc. 
Family Law Coalition 
Dads Against the Discriminating 
System 
The Joint Custody Association 
Concerned Parents For Children's Rights 
Association of Family & Conciliation 
Courts, California Chapter 
Coalition of Free Men (national) 
Parents For Equal Custody 
Fathering Education Services (Illinois) 
American Journal of Family Therapy 
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SB 1306 -- Joint Custody 
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
JOINT COMMITTEE FOR 
REVIEW OF THE MASTER 
PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUCATI0"-1 
I want to clear up possible misconceptions about this 
important legislation. There appears to be a mass letter writing 
campaign indicating that SB 1306 eliminates joint custody. Many 
of the people participating in this campaign have never seen the 
bill and are receiving their information and directives from a 
third party. 
SB 1306 does not eliminate joint custody. It clarifies the 
law so that joint and sole custody are considered on an equal 
basis by the judge who awards child custody. SB 1306 also lists 
factors to be considered in making custody decisions, such as the 
geographic proximity of the parents, history of child abuse, the 
parents' ability to cooperate, and the age of the child. 
SB 1306 is designed to insure that the child's best interest 
is the primary standard to be used in awards of custody in 
California. This bill is sponsored by the Senate Task Force on 
Family Equity and endorsed by the Family Law Section of the State 
Bar Association. I have attached the letter of support from the 
State Bar for your further consideration. 
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LONGER-TERM ADJUSTMENT IN CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: 
CONVERGING FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
Joan B. Kelly, Ph.D. 
Since 1974, the number of divorces in the United States 
has exceeded one mi I 1 ion each year. While the di.vorce rate 
has declined in the past two years after climbing steadily 
since 1960, more than one mill ion children each year 
experience-the divorce of their parents. It is estimated 
that 33 percent of American children born in the 80's will 
spend some time in a single parent family before they reach 
the age of 18 <GlicK, 1979). Substantial numbers of these 
youngsters may experience remarriage and, in some instances, 
the redivorce of at least one of their parents. 
In response to this significant social phenomenon, 
practitioners and social scientists turned their attention to 
the nature of the divorce experience itself, and to the 
immediate ar.d longer-rar.ge impact of divor·ce on children, 
adolescents, and adults. The divorce 1 iterature of the past 
two decades reflects the diversity of those who have 
considered the multiple facets of divorce, and is uneven in 
it~. usefulnes~ .. The clinical liter·atur·e has cor.tair.ed 
reports of children and families who have sought therapy 
after separation or divorce for difficulties assumed to be 
related to divorce. As expected, this literature has 
emphasized pathological findings more so than indications of 
adaptive coping, and has led many mental health practitioners 
to generalize these findings and observations to the larger, 
normative divorcing population. 
The divorce research conducted by clinicians and social 
scientists have also shared substantial methodological and 
conceptual 1 imitations including smal 1, mostly white and 
middle class non-representative samples; retrospective and/or 
cross-sectional designs, rather than prospective and 
longitudinal studies; absence of control or,comparison groups 
for evaluating child adjustment after divorce; failure to 
differentiate between children of different ages and sex; 
nearly exclusive concentration on mother custody fami 1 ies; 
restricted focus on one or two rather than multiple relevant 
variables, insufficient data and statistical controls 
regarding socio-economic, situational, and ~arent adjustment 
factors; and failure to use rei iable, valid, and repeated 
measures. 
The resultant intermingling of ~ound ~ata, unreliable 
data, clinical observation, social myth, and unsubstantiated 
or irrelevant theory has created confusion~ strongly voiced 
opinion, and unevenness in information available to parents, 
clinicians, schools, lawyers, courts, and .the media. 
Fortunately, the more recent interest of social scientists, 
In Press, Journal of Family Psychology 
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particularly child developmental psychologists, in divorce 
outcomes has brought an increasing methodological rigor to 
divorce rese~rch. The result has been a broadened and 
considerably more comp 1 ex knovJJ edge base, and the emergence 
of consistent and coherent findings regarding the impact of 
divorce on children. It is unfortunate that the majority of 
such studies are reported in publications not generally 
familiar to the practicing mental health professionals or 
others assisting families during the divorce process. 
Reliable information regarding the longer-term consequences 
of divorce is important, not only to enhance the 
effectivene:.:. of clinical interventions. to divorcing or post-
divorce families, but also to create a more rei iable data-
based framework for for·ensic evaluations and recommendations 
regarding custody, visiting, and parenting after divorce. 
There is considerable need, as well, for educational programs 
designed to assist parents in making developmentally sound 
decisions about their children at separation and divorce. 
This paper summarizes some of the more reliable and 
convergent findings regarding the longer range impact of 
divor·ce on children. Situational, par·er.tal, :.ocial, and 
socioeconomic variables are examined that have been 
demonstrated to be sigificantly 1 inked to the social, 
academic, and psychological adjustment of children post-
divorce. Some implications. for clinical pr·actice wi 11 be 
suggested based upon these data. 
The Heterogeneity of Divorcing Families 
A prevalent stereotype of the divorcing family has 
included the view that daily married and family 1 ife pre-
separation was characterized by considerable conflict, poor 
commurtication, and lack of coc•per·ation. While this 
stereotype accurately describes substantial numbers of 
divorcing fami 1 ies <Emery, 1982) ~ there is evidence of 
considerable variation in marriaoes that end in divorce 
( Ke 1 1 >', 1 982; Ke- l l y, G i g>' S< Hau ~.;.an , 1 988; !Ala I 1 erst e i n & 
Kelly, 1980). In the 1980-'s~ the pr·e-divorce experience of 
fam i I i e-s that ~-epar·a te is he ter·ogenec•us., r·a ther· than 
homogeneous, and parents and children begin the divorce 
process with diverse family histories of marital and parent-
child relationships. Such variation may determine the 
child-'s own psychological r·esources and competencies in 
dealing with the stress of the separation and divorce. 
In a longitudinal study of mediated and adversarial 
divorce, the r•esponses of 435 men and women to a Reasons for 
Divorce Checklist indicated eight different marital 
constellations leading to divorce. Correlations between 
these factor-based scores and other marital history variables 
revealed that while some types of marriages were indeed 
characterized by intense marital conflict, frequent child-
specific conflict, and poor communication, other marriages 
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ending in divorce clearly were not <Kelly, 1988a). 
Substantial numbers of divorcing couples, for example, chose 
to divorce b~cause there had been a gradual loss of love and 
mutual regard, or a divergence in 1 ifestyles and values. 
High level<;:. of anger or pc•or child-specific communication and 
cooperation during the marriage were not significantly 
associated with these factors. In contrast, those who chose 
to divorce because of an angry, demeaning or violent spouse, 
or an emotionally unstable, substance dependent spouse were 
more 1 ike 1 y to report in ten<E.e mar· ita 1 conf 1 i c t and poor 
child-specific communication. Two different studies have 
found that while approximately one-half of divorcing couples 
acKnowledged frequent and in tense conf 1 i c t, 25~~ to 30~-:: of men 
and women r·eported either· minimal or· nc• conflict in the twc• 
years preceding the separation <Kelly, 1982; Kelly, Gigy, & 
Hausman, 1988; Wa 11 erste in and Ke 11 >', 1980). In the<E.e 
particular families, the children may have experienced less 
conflict and disharmony than youngsters in discordant 
families that remain married. 
Further, there is evidence that even in pre-divorce 
fami 1 ies when parents enaaaed in moderate to high conflict, 
there may be somewhat diif;rent behaviors regarding the 
children. Overall, divorcing parents repor·ted significantly 
le<E.s child-specific cc•nfl ict than mar·i tal conflict, and 
significantly better cooperation at separation regarding 
their· children than over·all levels of cc•oper·ation <Kel])-, 
et.al, 1988). Further·, while six differ·ent aspects of 
marital communication were reguarded as poor by both men and 
women, adequacy of communication regarding the chi 1 dren wa:. 
perceived by these respondents to be significantly better. 
Thirty-eight percent of parents communicated "well" or "very 
well" about the children, and an additional one-third said 
child-specific communications were "adequate." Only 29% 
rep or· ted their communication to be 11 poor·" or· 11 ver·y poor 11 
<Kelly, et al, 1988). It would appear· that in many 
mar·r·iages., the par·entir•g functior., as. distinct from the 
marital relationship, was the most positive and successful 
aspect of the marriage. Such data suggests that broad 
assumptions regarding marriages that end in divorce should be 
discarded and replaced by a more discriminating view, one 
that is more 1 ikely to result in a hierarchy of interventions 
available to families. 
Children's Reactions at Separation 
Although few studies have studied children;s reactions 
immediately after parental separation, there is gener·al 
agreement that parental separation precipitates a crisis for 
most children. The vast majority of youngsters are not 
anticipating divorce when it occurs, even when there has been 
considerable conflict between their parents, and only those 
experiencing repeated, intense conflict and family violence 
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ar·e f'el ieved. The most common c:risis-engendef'ed f'eac:tions 
include intense anxiety about their future well-being and 
caretaking, s~dness and acute reactive depressions, increased 
anger, disruptions in concentration at school, distress about 
the Joss of contact with one parent, loyalty conflicts, and 
preoccupation w th reconciliation CEmery, Hetherington, & 
Dila11a, 1985; Kurdek & Siesky, 1980; Waldron et al, 1986; 
Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980; Warshak & Santrock, 1983). 
For most children and adolescents, the most acute 
responses to parental separation diminished substantially 
within the first six months to year after separation <Waldron 
et al, 1986; Wa11er·stein & Kelly, 1980>. l..Jhile divc•rce has 
been determined clearly to be a transitory stressor for 
children, less apparent was whether the divorce and the post-
divorce experience resulted in longer-term adJustment 
problems. Could children of divorce be distinguished in the 
years after divorce from children in non-divorced and 
remarried populations? If so, what particular factors or 
experiences were 1 inked to psychological dysfunction as well 
as healthy adjustment in children in divorced children. 
longer Term Outcome for Children of Divorce 
Frc•m multiple s:.tudies utilizing c•bJective, ~.tandardized 
measures and adequate samples, there is converging evidence 
that chi ldr·en in divorced fami 1 ies, when compar·ed tc• children 
in intact families, exper·ience a dispropor·tionately gr-eater 
number of social, academic, and psychological adjustment 
pr-oblems. It is important to note that these studies have 
almost exclusively assessed children in mother-custody 
fami1 ies whose contacts with their fathers have been 
circumscribed by traditional visiting arrangements. Parallel 
to these research data are reports that children of divorce 
ar·e overr·epr·esen ted in r·efer·r·a 1 s to c 1 in i c popu 1 at ion~., in 
private psychotherapy, and in referrals to school 
psychologi-:.t-:. (Guidubaldi, Per·ry, l!< Clemin~.havJ, 1984; Kalter, 
1977; z i 1 1 ' 1983) • 
The longitudinal multi-method~ multi-measure study of 
Hetherington et al (1982>, using matched groups of 144 middle 
class white pr·esc:hool chi ldr·en, follo•.~.•ed fami 1 ies star·ting 
two months after final divorce. Children in mother-custody 
divorced fami I ies, when compared to those in nondivorced 
families, shovJed more anti-social, acting out and impulsive 
behaviors, mor·e non-compliance and aggression with authority 
figures and peers, more dependency behaviors, gr-eater 
anxiety, more depression, more difficulty in peer 
relationships, and more problem behaviors in school. The 
problems were found to be more severe and enduring for boys 
than for girls. These findings were found to persist at a 
second fo1lowup two years after· final divorce <Hetherington 
e t a 1 , 1 982) • 
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A second lonoitudinal study of 341 children from 
divorced hom~s an~ 358 children from two parent families 
confirmed and amplified these findings <Guidubaldi, 
Cleminshaw. Perry & Mclauohl in, 1983; Guidubaldi & Perry, 
1984. 1985j. This nationil ly selected random sample of boys 
and ~irls in grades 1, 3, and 5 (ages 6-11) had 1 ived an 
average of 4 years in a single-parent family, 90% mother 
custody, at the time of the first data collection. Using a 
multi-method, multi-measure design, information was obtained 
from parents, children, psychologists and teachers. Children 
of divorced homes performed more poorly than intact family 
children in two major arenas: social-behavioral, and academic 
competence. Children in intact families had superior 
performance on 21 of 27 social-behavioral criterion measures, 
including dependency, aggression, withdrawal, anxiety, and 
peer popularity. Similar to Hetherington's findings, boys 
had significantly more difficulties than girls. Differences 
in socioeconomic status did not account for these social-
behavioral differ·ences. On measur·es of academic competence, 
intact fami 1>' children :.cor·ed :.ignificantly better· on 8 of '7' 
measures, including Wide Range Achievement scores in reading, 
spelling, and math, on IQ measures, and grades. Again, boys 
had more problems than girls. While the majority of the 
intellectual or academic achievement group differences 
disappeared when controlling for income <Guidubaldi, Perry, & 
Nastasi, 1987), these findings, as wel 1 as that of 
Hetherington <1982> and Zill <1983), point to consistent 
achievement problems for children of divorce. Overall, 
Guidubaldi found differences between intact and divorced 
family children to be stronger and more pervasive for boys at 
the higher grade levels. In contrast, divorced family girls 
in the 5th grade were distingui:.hable fr·om intact famil>' 
girls on only a few measures. 
Six years post-divorce Hetherington et al <1985) found 
considerable stability of behavior over time, with 
externalizing behavior problems more stable for boys, and 
interr.al izing behavior:. more :.table for· girls. Hoc.,H?ver, the 
presence of earlier externalizing behaviors such as 
impulsivity, acting-out, and aggression in both boys and 
girls was significantly 1 inked to the development of later 
internalizing behaviors including withdrawal, depression, and 
anxiety <Hetherington, et al, 1985). The gr·c•up compar·isons 
at this third follo~A•up of these 124 Vir·ginia families were of 
the remaining intact fami 1 ies, the divorced families, and 
remarried families of the original divorced family group. 
Now 10 years of age, girls in divorced families were similar· 
in adjustment to the non-divorced girls. However, as before, 
the boys in divorced homes showed more aggressive and acting-
out behaviors and less social competence than boys in the 
non-divorced families. The behavior was found to be 
consistent across settings, and reported by peers, mothers, 
teachers, and sons. Although there was significantly less 
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income in the divorced households, socioeconomic status was 
not significantly 1 inked to any of the social-behavioral 
findings.. · 
Zill's <1983) national survey of 2161 children between 
aQes 7 and 11 found that children in divorced families 
r;por· ted more 1 one 1 i ness and bor·edom compared to chi 1 dren in 
intact families. They felt more rejected and belittled than 
children in happily married fami 1 ies, and perceived their 
home environment in more negative terms. v..•hen 1 iving with 
their mother without a father present. Children of unhappily 
married fami 1 ies reported the most neglect and humiliation 
when compared to the happily married family children and the 
separated and divorced groups. 
Specific Variables Associated with Post-divorce Outcomes 
While the evidence is persuasive that divorced children, 
and particularly boys, have a greater number of social 
competence and behavioral problems, there is a substantial 
population of youngsters who have 1 ived in single-parent 
families for· s.ome years and v..•ho are t"'•ell adjusted in their 
social, academic, and psychological adjustment <see, for 
example, Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980 and Warshak & Santrock, 
1983). What differentiates the experiences of those children 
who have coped succes.s.ful in the year·s after divorce from 
those identified to be at risk? A number of variables have 
been identified thus far that rel iab]y· predict different 
outcomes., including: conflict, the ad,jus.tment of the 
custodial parent, the relationship with the non-custodial 
parent, child-rearing practices and child care, remarriage, 
and type of custody arrangement. 
Conflict 
When divorce has resulted in reduced conflict between 
parents, children have reported this as the ma,jor positive 
outcome of the divorce (KurdeK & Berg, 1983; Warshak & 
Santrock, 1983). Unfortunately, some parents continue 
expressing their hostilities in the years after divorce, 
often embroiling their children in their struggles. While 
the exact number·s are unknown, Kelb' (1988b) found that 15/. 
of parents at the time of final divorce reported 
"considerable" or "extreme" disagreement regarding visiting 
or co-parenting arrnagements. This paralleled the finding 
that 15% of men women described themselves as "extremely" or· 
"very" angry at their spouses at final divorce, whereas 30/. 
remained moderately angry and 55% reported 1 ittle or no 
anger. Only 20% of the parents believed that they could 
cooperate "not at all" or "very 1 ittle" regarding their 
children at final divorce <an average of 20 months after 
separation). 
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Intense and frequent marital conflict has been 
associated with poorer psychological adjustment among 
children in intact fami 1 ies as well as divorced families 
Emery, 1982). Hetherinoton (1979) found divorced children in 
loc...•-c~nflict environments to be better adju!:.ted than children 
in high conflict: intact fami 1 ies. For· chi ldr·en of divorce, 
the presence of high cordl ict between parents in the year·s 
after· divor·ce has. been consistently 1 in~~ed tc• more 
personality and behavioral problems. Johnson et al <1987) 
r·epor·t:ed more s.omat i c S>'mptoms. in chi 1 dr·en whos.e par·ents had 
very high levels of conflict and were engaged in protracted 
disputes, and Crosbie-Burnett (1988) found that higher 
coparental conflict after divorce was associated with an 
increase in psychosomatic problems and loyalty conflicts 
among adolescents in remarried fami 1 ies. Kline et al <1988) 
reported a significant r·elationship beh•Jeen par·ental conflict 
at a one-year followup and the :.ocial and beh;;..vic·r·al 
adjustment of 93 children at a two year followup. In 
general, dir,.•or·ced children •.~-•er·e better adjus.ted when conflict 
between parents was minimal after divorce <Hetherington et 
a 1 , 1 982; l!Ja 1 1 erst e in & Ke 1 1 y 1 980) , a.n d decreased con f 1 i c t 
between for·mer· spous.e-:. t1.Jas. s.ignificantly linked tJ.Jith better· 
conduct and classroom behavior, and higher· reading grades, 
particularly for boys <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985>. 
The adjustment of the custodial parent 
The psychological adjustment of the custodial parent 
after divorce takes on increasing significance in determining 
the eventual outcome of the child. (,,lhereas dur·ing mar·r·iage, 
one parent can create a buffer and balance for the other 
parents/ erratic, angry, neglectful or disturbed behavior, 
the child is more at risk after divorce if the custodial 
parent has significant psychiatric disorders or psychological 
-:.ymp toms. (,Ia 11 erste in & l<e 1 1 y ( 1980) rep or· ted that being in 
the custody of a psychologically disturbed parent, or a 
parent who was neglectful or minimally invested in parenting 
responsibilities was significantly 1 inked to serious 
deterioration in the behavioral, social and academic 
functioning of childr·en five year·:. after· s.epar·atic•n. 1-<line 
et al <1988) found that depression/anxiety scores of the 
custodial parent at Time 1 (within 12 months of filing for 
divorce) significantly predicted children's emotional and 
social adjustment two years la+er <Time 3). Maternal reports 
of their own functioning, including depression, lethargy, and 
increased smoking were significantly correlated with maternal 
ratings of their children/s symptoms <Guidubaldi & Perry, 
1985, Kurdek & Burg, 1983). And mothers' self-reported 
alcohol abuse predicted teacher ratings of their children/s 
inattention in the classroom and social overinvolvement with 
peers <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985). Presumably such findings 
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would be found among father-custod>' fami 1 i es '"''er·e father 
custody su~ficiently normative to be studied in adequate 
numbers. 
• 
Relationship ~ the non-custodial parent 
The primary negative aspect of divorce reported by children 
in numerous studies was loss of contact with a parent 
<Hetherington et al, 1982; Kurdek & Berg, 1983; Wallerstein & 
Kelly, 1980; WarshaK & SantrocK, 1983). The traditional 
visiting pattern of every other weekend, most often a maximum 
of four overnights spent with the father per month, created 
intense dissatisfaction among children, and especially young 
boys. Youngsters expressed profound feelings of deprivation 
and loss, and reactive depressions were frequently observed 
in young school aged s <Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980). 
Childr·en in mother·-custody families. perce-ive that the-;•' 
ha•Je les.s. father cc•ntr·c.J, les.:. father· suppc•r·t, and Je-ss 
father punishment compared to children in intact fami1 ies 
<Amato, 1987). They also have a less positive view of the 
father-child relationship over time <Nastasi, 1988). 
Divorced youngsters have demonstrated this growing 
peripheral i ty and loss c•f suppor·t C•f the father· after divorce 
in their drawings <Isaacs & Levin, 1984), as wel 1 as in 
clinical and research interviews (Amato, 1987; Wallerstein & 
Kelly, 1980; Warshak, 1986>. The distress of children in 
response to the abruptly delimited role of fathers in their 
I ives is echoed in the distress expressed by many fathers at 
becoming a substantially Jess important figure in their 
chi ldr·en·'<.:. 1 ive<.:. b>' vir·tue of the vis.iting r·ole assigned to 
them after divorce (Hetherington, et aJ, 1976; Jacobs, 1983, 
1986; Waller·stein & Kel 1y, 1980). 
Predictable and frequent contact with the non-custodial 
parent has been repeatedly demonstrated to be associated with 
better adjustment unless the father is very poorly adjusted 
or extremely immature. This is particularly true for boys 
<He:.s 1!.~ Camera~ 1979; Hetherington. et al, 1982; (..Jal Jer·:.tein 
& Kell)', 1980; !Aiarshak, 1'?86). I:.a<:o.c:. (1'7'8-)fc•und the 
stability of the visit to be more predictive of child 
adjustment than frequency of visits. The relationship 
between visiting frequency and good adjustment in children 
was particularly strong when the custodial mother approved of 
the father's continued contact with the chi 1d, and rated the 
relationship positively (Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985). 
Behavioral scores and peer relationships were better, and 
Wide Range Achievement Test spell g and math scores 
significantly higher, particularly for boys. Several other 
studies found a significant relationship between infrequent 
visiting and poor academic functioning in older boys several 
years after divorce, as well as poor self-esteem, depression, 
and anger CHess & Camera,. 1979; Kel Jy, 1981; Wallerstein & 
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Kelly, 1980). The value of the father as role model after 
divorce is also suggested by Nastasi <1988), who found that 
after income, the educational level of the father <but not 
the mother) is the best predictor of child performance after 
divorce on a majority of social and achievement criterion 
measures. 
One particular problem has been the significant decrease 
in contacts between fathers and their children in the first 
two years after separation <Furstenberg & Nord, 1985), and 
the subsequent deterioration of the father-child relationship 
(Hetherington et al, 1982; Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980, 1982). 
Kline et al (1988) repor·ted that children in maternal custody 
were significantly more 1 ikely to experience paternal drop 
out than children in joint custody families. Surprisingly 
1 ittle research has addressed the causes of attrition in the 
father-child relationship, despite its relevance to not only 
child adjustment, but continued economic support by the 
father as wel 1. The 1 imi ted research focusing on factors 
determining father involvement after divorce has reported a 
s.ignificant 1 ink between the amount of conflict in the 
marital relationship and the amount of contact with the child 
after divorce <Koch & Lowery, 1984; Kurdek, in press), with 
fat.her·s. in high conflict mar·riages. vis.i ting their chi ldr·en 
less often, less regularly, and for smaller amounts of time. 
Child rearing practices~ child~ 
A number of studies have reported that custodial mothers 
have considerable difficulty in disciplining their children 
after divorce. Custodial mothers report more problems with 
discipline than do custodial fathers <Hetherington, et al, 
1982; Maccoby, et al, 1988; Santrock, WarshaK & Elliot, 
1979), and mothers with custody have more difficulty being 
patient, consistent, and firm than mothers or fathers of 
childr·en in dual r·esidence. The incc•r,s.istent dis.cipline and 
diminished controls with children after divorce may be a 
contributing factor to the increased aggression and conduct 
disturbances noted in divorced children. Authoritarian child 
rearing styles on the part of the custodial mother were 
significantly 1 inKed to a large number of negative outcomes, 
particularly for boys. In contrast, while a permissive child 
rearing style was related to negative adjustment for boys, 
this was not true for girls <Guidubaldi & Perry, 1985). 
Authoritative child rearing practices were significantly 
related to better academic competance and fewer peer 
problems. 
Nastasi (1988) repor·ted that children in intact families 
did more homework, watched less TV, and had more organized 
home routines, and engaged in more joint activities with 
their parents than children in mother custody divorced homes. 
Higher levels of weekday and weekend TV viewing was related 
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Several t to determine whether the 
post-divorce c ildren was elated to the type 
of custody arrangeme t, at is, whether the child was 1 iving 
primarily in a sole materna , so e paternal, or joint custody 
situation. Warshak and Santroc:k (1983> studied children agt>s 
6 to 11 in 23 father cus homes~ mother cust homes, 
and 19 nuclear families using matched comparison groups and 
a multi-method design Camera (1985 studied 82 children, 
ages 9 to 12, in matched omp son s of d orced and 
non-divorced fam es 1 hem homes. 
Custody status alone d d no p e ct he ch ld's post-
divorce adjustment in these two stud es ma erna1 and 
paternal cust stat s No d f erenc s were found in 
children's self-esteem, anxiety, sex role typing, maturity, 
independence, psychosomatic and behavior problems, and social 
competence. There were no differences observed in the 
quality of p~rent-child relationships among custodial fathers 
when compared to custodial mothers, including scores on 
measures of nurturance and involvement with child. Other 
studies have reported satisfactory levels of competence of 
men in rearing children as custodial parents <Chang & 
Dienard, 1982; Orthner & Lewis, 1979). Men as well as women 
with primary custody reported that they were closer to their 
children since divorce CWarshak, 1986). Similar to the 
mother-custody studies reported earlier, the adjustment of 
children in father custody was related to the degree of 
conf1 ict and cooperation in the co-parental relationship, and 
parenting style. 
In those studies comparing maternal and paternal 
custody, a striKing finding was that children 1 iving in the 
custody of the same sex parent were better adjusted than 
children 1 iving with the opposite sex parent. Father-custody 
boys and mother-custody gir1s showed significantly more 
social competence, maturity, cooperativeness, and self-
esteem. Father-custody girls desired more contact with their 
mothers than did father-custody boys, while mother-custody 
boys wanted more visits with their fathers than mother-
custody girls <WarshaK & SantrocK, 1983). Camera (1985) 
found that for girls in father custody a positive 
relationship with the non-custodial mother was associated 
with competence in peer relationships. Although these 
well-designed studies utilized matched groups, the sample 
sizes were small. The issue of the importance of same-sex 
and cross-sex identications with custodial and non-custodial 
parents in the longer-term adjustment of children is one 
which deserves greater study. 
While research on the impact of joint physical custody 
arrangements on child adjustment after divorce is sti11 
1 imited, there are indications that custody agreements that 
a11ow youngsters to continue both parental relationships on a 
frequent and predictable basis are beneficial for many 
children. Research on joint custody has most often defined 
joint physical custody as a time sharing arrangement in which 
the child is spending at least 30% of the time with one of 
the parents, and the remaining time with the other. 
Three California studies demonstrate that when Joint 
custody is a legal option available to parents for a number 
of years (8 years>, the number of fami1 ies involved In such 
time sharing is substantial. Between 20 and 30% of the 
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a1 
unpublished data; Haec e omposi e 
sample of 100 children <rang ng n age frorr, 4 to 15 years) 
from three different studies of families referred for 
counseling for protracted, hi ly contes ed custody disputes, 
Johnson et a1 (1988) found no difference in ustment of 
children in sole or joint cust families. However, "joint 
custody was highly related to more frequent access, and we 
found consistent evidence tha children who had more frequent 
access were more emot ona y troubled and behaviorally 
disturbed." Girls wer more e tlve y affected by frequent 
access and trans tions han were Among a less 
conf1 icted group of parents see or divorce ounsel ing, 
custody oup did not p edic adjustment <K1 ine et a1, 1988; 
Leupnitz, 1986>, whe as the ty scores of the 
parents were 1 inked to child dless of group 
<Kline et a1, 1988). 
Only a few stud es have compar d matched oups of joint 
physical custody versus sole cust children. Joint custody 
boys between ages 6 and 11 were reported by mothers and 
teachers to have fewer emotional and behavioral problems than 
materna1 custody boys (Shiller, 1986a) Boys in joint 
custody were more comfortable in acKnowledging negative 
feelings toward both parents, and expressed less yearning for 
close contact with the father than did sole custody boys. 
Family drawings suggested that maternal custody boys were 
more preoccupied with reconciliation fantasies than were boys 
in joint custody <Shi 11er, 1986b>. Loyalty conf1 icts did not 
differ according to custody group. 
Pojman <1982) reported that joint custody boys did not 
differ from boys in happily married families on measures of 
self-esteem and overa11 adjustment. These joint custody and 
happily married family boys were also significantly better 
adjusted than boys in sole custody or unhappily married 
families. Boys in happily married families had significantly 
higher social adjustment scores than either joint custody, 
sole custody, or unhappily married family boys. 
Fathers with joint custody were more involved with their 
children one year after divorce than were non-custodial 
fathers on three measures, the amount of contact with their 
chi 1 dren, the degree of par en ta 1 i nvot verner• t, and sharing of 
parental responsibilities (Bowman & Ahrons, 1985; Leupni tz, 
1986). Father "dropout" occurred significantly more often in 
sole custody arrangements compared to joint custody <K1 ine et 
al, 1988). Among Leupnitz/ (1986) 43 families, one half of 
the sole custody children never saw the other parent, whereas 
a11 bf the joint custody chi1d~en had regular contact with 
the other pa~ent. 
Maccoby~s (1988) second fo11owup of 982 families found 
that dual (joint> residence pa~ents reported significantly 
less difficulty finding time to play or chat with their 
children than did parents in primary <sole) residential 
arrangements. Joint cust mothers also reported more 
respect for their former spouses/ parenting ability, and 
perceived their former spouses to be more supportive and 
understanding compared to maternal custody mothers <Maccoby 
et a1, 1988; Shi11er, 19B6a). The majority of parents 
sharing custody have reported that there was an initial 
period of adjustment requiring some working out of routines, 
communications, and keeping track of children~s activities 
and friends. For most, interparental communications improved 
and sharing custody became smoother in the first six months 
<Ahrons, 1981, 1983; Irving et al, 1984; Leupnitz, 1982). 
Parents have expressed high 1eve1s of satisfaction with 
shared physica ust 
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Parents with cou t red t cust eported being 
less satisfied than parents volu tari y e tering into joint 
custody, and spouses epor·t ng i eve s of mar I tal 
conf1 ict tended to be ess sat sfied as we with their joint 
cust situation <I ng et al, 1994 There s evidence, 
however, that jon ust e1 gate significantly 
Jess often after d v e th parents <Ilfeld, 
et al, 1982; Leupn t 1986 • Further, jo nt custody fathers 
pay child support more regu1ar1 than sole cust fathers, 
and parents in join cust ar an nts rely pon each 
other signif cant y more often for chi d Larger 
studies comparing Jo nt and sole cust act family 
children in jur sd ct ons p our ng joint 
physica cust are ecessar to ssue of whether 
joint cust pare ts are un sual y mo ated d we11 
adjusted o begin wi h 
Discuss! 
There is sti1 much to be learned about the longer-range 
impact of divorce on the overall ustment of children and 
adolescents. There remains the contin ing need for large, 
well-designed studies with comparison or· contr·o1 groups which 
uti1 ize similar instruments in different but carefully 
delineated populations, sites, and jur sdictions. The 
1 iterature summarized in this paper points to a number of 
important variables that nf1uence the post-divorce 1 ives of 
children, and which need to be furthe examined. Among these 
are the sex and age of the chi1d; the quality of marita1 and 
parent-child relationships prior to separation; parent-child 
relationships after divorce; variat ons In custody and 
visiting arrangements; the physical and mental health of the 
parentsJ the co-parental re1atlonshlp after divorce including 
parental support, cooperation and conflict; social and 
economic supports for the single parent family; and the 
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child;s own d~v~1opm~nta1 and psychological str~ngths and 
w~aknesses. Any or all of th~se may overburden .th~ child's 
normal patt~~ns of coping, or may enhance the child's 
adaptation in the years after divorce 
One of the inter sting questions ra sed th s research 
is what accounts for the greater diffi u ties experienced by 
boys after divorce when compared to girls. Boys and girls 
both often experience diminished parenta contro , some 
degree of conf1 ict, the loss of parental contact and support, 
and dramatic changes in family structure and economics. 
Beyond these, boys may be even more burdened by several 
additional factors in the typ cal divorce situation. 
Independent of divorce, have be n obs~rued to b~ more 
adversely affected by conflict en parents than are girls 
(Rutter, 1970). Boys in divorced fami1 ies also appear to be 
more exposed to conf1 ict than are girls <Hetherington et at, 
1982; Johnston et al, 1988). react more strongly to the 
loss of daily contact with the father than do girls, and 
express greater desire for more time with their fathers than 
do girls after separation and divorce <Emery et a1, 1984; 
Kelly, 1981; Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980; WarshaK & SantrocK, 
1983). Mothers with cust of their sons not only report 
increased problems discip1 ining their after separation, 
but complain frequently that the remind them of their 
divorced spou with whom they remain angry <Wallerstein & 
Kelly, 1980) All of these factors may serve to increase the 
male child's ulnerabil ity. ua11y important is the 
evidence eme ging in the child development 1 iterature 
regarding the role of the father in children's development 
and psychological ustment. thers appear to have 
important unique, as we11 as overl ping, contributions to 
make to their chi1dren;s development ( , 1981) which are 
too often denied the hi1d afte d ore Central ~mong 
these are the role modeling and ide t fications related to 
achievement, social competence and academic motivation. 
These observations, and those rep ed earl er, would 
suggest the need for greater scrutin of the reflexive 
tradition of awarding sole physical cust and control to 
mothers while severely delimiting the father's role and 
influence on the ch 1d after divorce. The apriori 
presumption for mother custody after divorce is not supported 
by current research ta, and may, i some nstances, 
directly create negat ve ou come for youngsters. The more 
positive data regarding stment when there is 
greater contact with fathers in mother custody homes, as well 
as the research on n fathe ust and joint custody 
homes suggests tha a11 th se tions should be considered 
more seriously. Whe women retain p mary residential 
custody, the ority of fathe sand chil en should be 
assisted to structure mor expanded and frequent contacts 
within that framework. Despite enormous social change 
inc1uding the very high percentage of mothers now in the 
workplace, at.titudes regarding custody after divorce have 
been slow to change <Mace , Mnookin & Depner, 1986). 
The research to date points to a need to re-examine the 
way in which couples divorce in our society, and the ro1e 
that extended family, friends, mental health practitioners, 
lawyers, the courts play in the process. Too often there is 
unconscious and conscious encouragement of hostile and 
destructive divorce actions which then have long term 
consequences for ail family members. The surprisingly 
cavalier termination of parental and other important extended 
family relationships which had meaning to children prior to 
the divorce should also be scrutinized. The accumulated 
evidence suggests that children who are not forced to divorce 
a caring parent are more 1 ikely to be better adjusted after 
divorce, and that overall the impact of the fathers~ 
continued involvement on the child's social, emotional, and 
academic competence is considerable. 
In educational and therapeutic interventions with 
divorcing and post-divorce fami1 ies, c1 inicians have a 
central role to play which may enhance the longer-term 
adjustment of children. It is important to provide parents 
with the forum and the too1s they need to separate the 
unsatisfactory marital relationship from their continuing 
role as parents after divorce. To the extent the newly re-
structured post-divorce parenting relationship can become a 
business-1 ike, civilized partnership, whatever conflict 
occurs will not place the child at substantial risk. While 
many parents intuitive1y understand that conf1 ict can create 
adverse effects on their children, the direct presentation of 
data regarding the impact of conflict on their child/s 
adjustment can provide a powerful incentive to high-conflict 
parents to re-evaluate their behaviors and interactions. 
There is considerable need to assist families in 
focusing on the role of the father in the post-divorce 
family. There is ample evidence that non-custodial fathers 
seem to have considerable difficulty in restructuring and 
maintaining their relationships with their children after 
separation, and there is 1 ittle support or guidance available 
to assist them <Friedman, 1982; Hetherington et al, 1976; 
Jacobs, 1986; Koch & Lowery, 1984; Wa11erstein & Kelly, 
1982). Fathers report contradictory expectations about post-
divorce parenting from spouses, extended family, mental 
health practitioners and society at large, and those fathers 
who do wish to remain involved in a substantial way after 
divorce have been viewed with some suspicion. The absence of 
role models appears to have burdened or paralyzed the 
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decision-maKing p~ocess ~o~ separated.fathe~s, with one 
~esult being that fathe~s f~equently failed to estab1 ish and 
stabilize a v'isiting o~ pa~enting plan which would allow fo~ 
continuity in thei~ ~elationships with their child~en 
(Kelly, 1981; Wal le~stein & Ke1 ly, 1980; 1982). They a~e 
given 1 ittle help by their spouses, whose own need fo~ daily 
contact with thei~ child~en is often in di~ect conflict with 
the fathe~/s wish to maintain continuity as well. One study 
found that mo~e than half of fathe~s and mothe~s had only 
ve~y 1 imited o~ no discussion of thei~ plans and wishes fo~ 
custody and pa~enting at the time of the sepa~ation <Kelly, 
unpublished data). The~e appea~s to be ve~y 1 ittle 
thoughtful planning that taKes place about child~en;s needs 
after divo~ce, although the~e is much 1 ip se~vice given in 
the legal system to the "best interests" of the child. Until 
quite ~ecently, child custody decision-maKing ~ooted in past 
t~adition and ~estrictive divo~ce statutes have actively 
discouraged the meaningful participation of the interested 
fathe~ in the child/s 1 ife <Friedman, 1980, 1982>. Several 
studies have noted the deep sense of loss and depression 
experienced by fathe~s denied f~equent access to their 
children, whether by their own failu~e to assert their needs 
as pa~ents, their spouses~ unilateral decision maKing o~ 
legal p~actices <Greif, 1985; Jacobs, 1983, 1986; Tepp, 1983; 
Wallerstein & Kelly, 1980>. 
Mental health p~actitioners can assist parents in 
developing custody and parenting plans which will maintain 
a positive relationship that the child has with both the 
father and mother after divorce. When both parents love and 
care about the child, one goal can be to advocate a balanced 
and ~normal i:zed" relationship with each that incorporates 
relevant aspects of the child's 1 ife, including school, 
friends, worK time, and leisure time. Too often, visiting 
arrangements seriously distort the mother/s and father/s 
relationship with the child in the direction of too much or 
too 1 ittle responsibi1 ity, too much or too 1 ittle fun. And 
too often, the restrictive traditional visitation schedule 
depletes and eventually destroys the father's longer-range 
relationship with his children in the service of preserving 
the mother-child relationship, even when the evidence 
suggests that the majority of children need continuity in 
their relationship with each parent after divorce. 
In educational, therapeutic, and mediative 
interventions, parents can be helped to understand that the 
divorce~~ will not determine their child's adjustment, 
but rather the condit ons and agreements that they create 
during and after the divorce. Parents have important choices 
to maKe regarding their behavior and their post-divorce 
relationships with their child and ex-spouse. If parents are 
encouraged to develop post-divorce relationships which 
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sustain or promote child-specific communication and 
cooperation, and are provided the forums for negotiating 
agreements wh.ich legitimize the child's need for both parents 
after divorce, the children of divorce studied in the 1990's 
may present us with more positive findings regarding longer-
range adjustment. 
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Mediation Center 
Assemblyman Elihu M. Harris 
December 16, 1987 
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box 942849 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
I want to thank you for the opportunity to meet with the 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary yesterday. It was an 
extraordinary format for allowing thoughtful dialogue on 
these very complex and important bills. I hope that my 
input was useful. 
I did not say this succinctly yesterday, but want to state 
now that Senator Watson's bill (1306} is not simply an attempt 
to "clarify" the meaning of the current custody statute. It 
essentially imposes additional requirements on one or both 
parents attempting to share custody, making joint custody much 
more difficult to obtain. It is not a gender neutral bill. 
It does not require similar behavior on standards of sole custody 
situations, which is most unfortunate. 
Please note my correct address on the letterhead (100 Tarnal 
Plaza, not 300) . 
JBK/jr 
Sincerely, 
<--llJ-W-$ ~(at/~ 
Joan B. Kelly, Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
cc: Deborah Debow 
100 Tarnal Plaza 
Suite 175 
Corte Madera, CA 94925 
(415) 927-1422 
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In anticipation of the enactment of a bill 
requiring, among other provisions, a survey 
of all custody dispositions, Los Angeles 
County in 1982 implemented a survey of all 
custody dispositions in the County's Centrql 
District, which handles 40% of all custody 
decisions. A total of 901 surveys were tabu· 
lated over a three-month period. These sur-
veys were sent to families by the County 
Clerk and the person, or party, picking up the 
final divorce was required to file the com-
pleted survey. 
This survey is the first detailed informa-
tion of custody dispositions available that 
includes all cases coming through the di-
vorce process in the Los Angeles Superior 
Court. In addition, this custody disposition 
survey procedure serves as a vehicle for ad· 
ditional research and evaluation, such as 
answering the questions: What families and 
children are best suited for joint custody? 
How do families arrive at their ow~ privately 
ordered decisions? What educational help 
might assist them in achieving plans that is 
bestforthem and their children? A number of 
other administrative issues are clarified by 
this survey. 
Even from the limited scope of this sur· 
vey, the following important obserVations 
can be made. 
1. Trial courts see just a little less than 5% 
of all families that have children. Therefore, 
this population must be very special, espe-
cially since they have had an opportunity to 
resolve their disputes in the Conciliation 
Court. This would account for the small 
number of joint custody awards made in the 
trial court, as reflected by this survey. Candi-
dates who cannot resolve the dispute in the 
•Data collection and analysis completed by Girma 
Zaid, Administrative Intern assigned to the Los 
Angeles County Conciliation Court by the U.C.LA. 
School of Social Welfare. 
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Conciliation Court probably are not likely 
candidates for joint custody decisions. 
2. Children from the age of 5 to 12, are 
over-represented in the sample, while chil-
dren under the age of 2 are somewhat 
under-represented. Nevertheless, a signifi· 
cant number offamilies are ending their rela-
tionship where the children are under 5 years 
of age. In the sample, this number is 40%, if 
the child is male, and 32%, if the child is 
female. This sex difference becomes less as 
the children grow older. 
3. The largest number of agreements ar-
rived at were by the parents themselves, rep-
resenting 62% of the sample, while the next 
largest group were by the parents in consul-
tation with their attorneys, representing 
27%. This fact points out the value of our 
educational program in reaching this popu-
lation through our custody options seminar, 
and the divorce seminars that we have put on 
periodically. An educational means may be 
the most cost-effective way to reach these 
families and will have a prophylactic, or pre-
ventative, contribution to post-divorce dif· 
ficulties and assist parents in arriving at 
meaningful plans. 
This survey also underscores the value 
of having some research capability to look at 
both the administrative policy, as well as the 
broader implications contained in surveys 
such as this. 
Methodology- A one-page information form 
was used to gather the necessary information. 
Once the form was collected, information· 
was fed into the computer with the following 
coding: 
i. DivorctJ Number- The numbers themselves. 
II . . Numbor of Children - 1, 2. 3, 4, 5. or more. 
Ill. Ages of Children -Male Ages of Child~n-Female 
A- Under tWo 
B - Two to five 
A- Under two 
B - Two to five 
C - Five to twelve C - Five to twelve 
D -Twelve to eighteen 0 -Twelve to eighteen 
CONCIUATlON COURTS ReYlEW/VOLUME 2'1. NUMBER 2/0ECEMBER 1913 
' . 
.I 
jo -Joint legal and physical custody 
jm -Joint legal custody with primary physical 
custody to mother. 
jf -Joint legal custody with primary physical 
custody to father. 
sm -Sole custody to mother 
sf -Sole custody to father 
sp -Split custody (ctlildren divided among 
parents) 
ss -Custody to social services 
V. Arrangement arrived at primarily through: 
a -Agreement of the parties by themselves 
b -Agreement of the parties in consultation 
with attorney 
c -Agreement of the parties in consultation 
with private mental health professionals 
d -Agreement of the parties in consultation 
with Conciliation Court 
e -Decision by a judicial officer in a ..:ontested 
custody trial. 
VI. Rscommendation FoJJowed 
y- yes .n ·no 
1. ResuJts of Ute SW"Vey 
The total number of Child Custody. Disposition 
surveyed .................................. 901 
The total number of Child Custody Disposition 
Survey with no children •••••••••••••••••••• 374 
The total number of survey with children .•. 527 
2. The total number of children involved •••••• 882 
3. The total number of families 
with 1 child .. • • • .. • • • • • • .. • • • .. 278 x 1 • 278 
The total number of families 
with 2 children ................. 175 x 2 • 350 
The total number of families 
with 3 children • .. • • .. • • • • .. .. • • 53 x 3 • 159 
The total number of families 
with 4 children • • • .. • • • .. .. • . • • • 15 x 4 • 50 
The total number of families 
with 5 children .. • • • • • • . • .. .. .. • 7 x 5 • 35 
Total 882 
4. The total number of male children 478 
The total number of female children 404 
Total 882 
5. Total number of male children in 
percentages • 
Total number of female children in 
percentages • 
54.3% 
45.7% 
ages 0-2 = 81 
2-5 = 112 
5-12 ... 178 
12·18- 105 
Total 481· 
Total number of female children 
ages 0..2 "" 41 
2-5 ... 90 
5-12 ""' 171 
12-18 ... 99 
Total 401· 
17% 
23% 
37.5% 
22.5% 
10% 
22% 
43% 
25% 
As the survey indicates ages of children involved 
in the Child Custody Disposition appears to be high in 
the 5 to 12 age group in both male and female categories: 
As to the final decision regarding custody, the sur-
vey clearly indicates that sole custody to mothers ap-
pears to be the category of final decisions. 
Joint legal and physical custody 33 
Joint legal custody with primary 
physical custody to mother 194 
Joint legal custody with primary 
physical custody to father . • • 1 
Sole custody to mother • . . . . . . 253 
Sole custody to father . . • • • . . • 33 
Split custody (children divided 
among parents) . . • • .. • .. • .. 12 
Other- (DPSS Protective 
Custody) .••••••••••••••••• • __1 
Total 527 
6.5% 
37% 
0 
48% 
6.5% 
2% 
0 
7. The survey indicates that 62% of the arrangement 
regarding final deci'!ion was arri·.-::o at h';' the par-
ties themselws. Agreement reached in consultation 
with Conciliation Court was 5.8%. Agreement of 
the parties in consultation with attorney was 27%. 
Arrangement arrived at by a judicial officer in a 
contested custody trial was 5%. There were only 
two decisions made in consultation with private 
mental heatth profesaional wl"dch amounted to ..2%. 
~ngementof~on 
A- Agreement of parties by themselves. 
B - Agreement of parties in consultation with 
attorney 
C - Agreement of parties in consultation with 
private mental heatth profes.aionals. 
D - Agreement of the parties in consultation with 
Conciliation Court. . . 
e - Decision by a judicial officer in a contested 
custody trial. 
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JFa. 
JMo. 
JO 
SF a. 
SMo. 
Split 
Other 
TOTALS 
z 
CUSTODY DISPOSITIO~i SUP.VEY 
Central District 
Agreement Attorney Mental Hlth. Cone. Contested Total 
Parties Profusion. Court 
0 l 0 0 0 l 
sa 74 0 17 7 194 
16 10 2 3 l 33 
25 4 0 0 l 33 
179 47 0 s . 17 253 
8 3 0 2 0 12 
l 0 0 0 0 l 
327 143 2 29 26 527 
62'Z 27'Z 0, 1(1. 51 S'Z 
J Fa • Joint legal custody wieh primary physical custody to father. 
J Mo • Joint legal custody with primary physical custody to mother. 
JO .. Joint legal and phfsical custody. 
s Fa • Sole leg a!. ar.d p:1ysi cal custody :c ~: ... .,.., ...... -
-""'-···-· ~ 
S Mo • Sole legal and physical custody to mothe_~. 
Split• One child, or more, 'IITieh each parent. 
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36 
6 
6 
49 
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Based on a very large sample families, a classification system 
is developed that helps the mediator to assess the nature of 
the custody dispute and determine the most appropriate 
course of action. 
Toward a Classification 
of Child Custody Disputes: 
An Application of 
Family Systems Theory 
Hugh Mcisaac 
This chapter begins by presenting some key concepts of systems theory. A 
systems analysis of a typical child custody dispute follows. This analysis 
focuses on the role of the family mediator in resolving the dispute. Finally, 
a classification system, based on more than 35,000 families who used the 
Los Angeles Conciliation Court since 1977 to resolve their custody disputes 
is described. The value of this classification system and of the use of family 
systems concepts is that they enhance our ability to assess the nature and 
elements of a dispute, to determine the appropriateness of mediation as a 
way of resolving the dispute, and to recommend the most effective course 
of action. 
Family Systems Theory 
The value of family systems theory for the mediation of child cus-
tody disputes is developed by Saposnek (1983), who links the cybernetic 
interaction of the family to functional strategies. The analysis of the family 
systems begins with the identification of the component parts and proceeds 
D. T. Saposnek (ed. ). Applying Family Therapy Perspectives to Mediation. 
Mediation Quarterly, no. 14/15. San Francisco: Jossey·Bass, Winter 198>/Spring !987. 39 
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to the members' needs and interests. The goal of mediation in custody and 
visitation disputes is to develop a parenting plan that is in the best inter-
ests of the children and that marshals all the strengths of the family system 
to achieve this task. Because families are often extremely complex after 
divorce, family systems analysis provides the best way of understanding 
the new family subsystems. Ironically, the new family after divorce closely 
resembles extended family networks that existed prior to the industrial 
revolution, and, by viewing the family after divorce from the perspective 
offered by systems theory, we can begin to chart the evolution of the family 
as a fragile, human network, that interacts with forces within the larger 
social, political, and economic systems. 
Concepts from family systems theory provide important insights 
into the divorce process and into the experiences of families as they transit 
that process (Anderson and Carter, 1978; Bertalanfy, 1967; Haley, 1976; 
Koestler and Smythies, 1971; Watzlawick and Weakland, 1977). These con-
cepts establish a useful theoretical base for understanding this process and 
the family dynamics involved. Let us examine some of these concepts. 
Systems Are Synergistic or Entropic. A system consists of a whole 
made up of interrelated and interdependent parts that interact in a way 
that is distinct from their interaction with other entities; this interaction 
occurs over some period of time. Two notions are inherent in this defini-
tion: the notion of rules or principles of action and the notion of compo-
nents, to which specific roles are assigned. Systems can be synergistic, that 
is the roles can complement one another, and as a result more energy 
flows from the system as a whole than from the sum of its individual 
parts. Systems can also be entropic, that is, the component parts compete 
with one another, and as a result the system either fails to create energy at 
all or creates less energy than the sum of its individual parts. 
The value of these concepts is readily apparent when they are 
applied both to the family and the legal system. The rules and roles of the 
legal system are spelled out in statutory and case law. The system is syner-
gistic when the roles of client, parent, child, attorney, judge, mediator, and 
evaluator complement one another and work together to help the family 
resolve its conflict. The system is entropic when these roles are in conflict. 
Systems Are Rule Governed. Murray Bowen (1978) observed that the 
family is a rule-governed system. Families transiting the process of divorce 
are in the process of reorganizing. Mediation helps families to resolve 
conflict by developing new rules for future conduct. Thus, the family as a 
rule-governed system takes on a new form. According to Bowen (1978), 
family rules can be implicit or explicit. Implicit rules are unwritten, often 
unconscious, rules about how the system operates. Actors within the sys-
tem observe these implicit rules, often unconsciously, and these rules 
become apparent to the trained observer only over time. Such rules can be 
as simple as "Don't wake Mom on Saturday mornings" or as complex as 
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"Dad is an this is our secret." These rules are not written 
down. They are not even spoken. the members of the family 
system behave in accord with these rules, and it is the role of the trained 
mental health professional to identify and help the family change these 
rules when they threaten the functioning of the family system and the 
family seeks help. 
In mediation, the task is to create explicit rules about how the fam-
ily will function in the future (Folberg and Taylor, 1984). We do this 
through a written agreement. The agreement can be incorporated into a 
formal court order, so that its conditions are enforceable, and the court 
system can intervene in the family system in order to encourage com-
pliance. Explicit rules are dearer and easier to change than implicit rules, 
because they are open to examination and review by all members of the 
family system. This fact makes mediation at the time of dissolution a very 
powerful change agent, because unhealthy intrinsic rules can be modified 
and made explicit; for example, the written agreement can state, "Father 
agrees to seek outside professional help to deal with his excessive use of 
alcohol. Father will not drink alcoholic beverages when in the company 
of his minor children." Rules dealing with distributive issues, such as 
property or support, are based on principles of equity and fairness to the 
parties who have adverse interests. Rules dealing with integrative issues, 
such as parenting after divorce, are more pragmatic, since they are con-
cerned with what works and with what is best for the child. 
Systems Are Homeosmtic. Homeostasis is another important systems 
concept. All systems seek to maintain a balance or steady state. This steady 
state regulates the flow of energy and exchange between the system and its 
external environment and between components within the system itself. 
Failure to achieve a balance will result in destruction of the system. Any 
change requires adaptation and a restoration of homeostatic balance. The 
most obvious example is body temperature. The body regulates its temper-
ature to 98.6 degrees. Any deviation in excess of 10 percent results in death. 
In a similar fashion, the family that transits divorce seeks a new homeostatic 
balance at each stage of the divorce process. Mediation and court interven-
tion help the family to find a new homeostatic balance and help to create a 
new family system that is rooted in a new homeostatic balance . 
Systems Are Micro and Macro. The concept of micro examines the 
functioning of a single system, and the concept of macro looks at how 
systems interact. The whole is greater than the sum of its individual parts. 
In much the same way, the interaction between the divorcing family and 
the court system is larger than the family and court systems combined. 
Any effective analysis requires an examination of the larger context A 
classic example of the conflict between macro and micro interests can be 
found in the issues of confidentiality or joint custody: What may be best 
on the macro level may fail when it is applied to the individual case. 
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Summary. The use of "v~'"'"'" 
is an enabler, not a changer. ,..,,., • .,,.,u 
the mediator 
family and the contexts within which it of family 
systems theory helps us to about the effects of change and to 
assess the relationship of members within the system more realisti-
cally than we can with other Family systems also helps 
to define crucial points of intervention where the greatest benefit may be 
created. Finally, it provides a unifying context between of human 
development and the notion of law and 
Let us now consider the inner "'"'"'1""" dispute from 
a Clalssluc:au,on of the patterns that can the systems viewpoint and 
be observed in disputing ......... ,...,. 
Child Custody: Anatomy of the D:Ui;pute 
Between 11 and 15 percent of all divorce involve a child 
custody dispute. Most child decisions are made the parents 
themselves (62 percent) or in consultation their attorneys (27 percent) 
(Mcisaac, 1981 ). To understand the role of the mediator in such 
disputes, the anatomy of a child must be delineated and 
analyzed. 
Levels of Divorce. and divorce are a 
occurring over time. One of the great mtsccmc:ep,ucms 
a marriage suddenly ends and a divorce 
on three levels: a a a level. 
Psychological Divorce. The first level is that of the psychological 
divorce (Jackson and divorce involves having 
one or both of the partners to think outside the relationship 
and about severing the bond. The becomes viewed 
as a problem or and Lederer, 
1968). Psychological and 
usually one party it without UA<"""'""'""' 
mediator needs to identify who 
it was initiated, and whether it has been '-V''"'""'"'·""'· 
that drives a custody is failure 
divorce. As a result, remain enmeshed. 
Social Divorce. The second level is that of the social which 
has a clear set of stages through which the members pass. Isolina 
Ricci (1980) uses a interactional to describe the divorce 
process: In stage one, both the 
traditional nuclear family. In 
tension caused by some system. families go 
through this stage, and most families oscillate between stages one and two 
throughout the history of their In the 1s 
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undergoing severe stress. down. One of the 
partners may have ""',.."''"'" 
taken official steps by During this 
stage, many families seek outside Often families in this 
stage move back to stages one and two. In stage four, one of the parties 
moves out of the home. Physical separation is always extremely traumatic 
for everyone in the family. No matter how psychologically divorced a per-
son may be, a change in the physical structure of the family causes enor-
mous stress for all family members. Questions of economics, future 
parenting, and the whole nature of the family compete for immediate 
attention. According to Wallerstein and Kelly (1980), 80 percent of all 
children experiencing divorce wake up one morning to find that one of 
the most significant persons in their lives has moved out Most children 
are very poorly prepared for this step in their lives, and this event creates 
tremendous stress. Stage five is characterized by the establishment of two 
homes and by contact with an attorney to seek legal representation if such 
contact has not already been made. In stage although two homes have 
been established, general patterns of living have not been formally 
adopted. This is a period both of much experimentation and of much 
storm and stress. Stage six is often with the greatest degree of 
conflict and confusion in the divorce process. of our institutional 
structures and legal concepts focus only on this of divorce, when in 
reality most families move beyond it. The seventh and last stage in the 
divorce process involves the creation of two new homes. Frequently, both 
parents have remarried, or at least they have settled into a comfortable 
routine. Parents feel satisfied with their lives, and are able to refocus 
their energies as parents. Unfortunately, many families do not arrive at 
this stage, and many casualties occur the way. 
Legal Divorce. The last level is that of the legal divorce. This is the 
level of divorce with which we are most familiar. The legal divorce defines 
the parties' rights in relation to each other and develops a parenting plan 
for the period after divorce as well as a for distribution of the assets 
of the now dissolved nuclear family structure. 
Distrilrutive Versus Integrative Issues. Two distinct classes of issues 
(Raiffa, 1982; Mcisaac, 1981) exist in the context of divorce. The first class 
involves the distributive issues regarding property and, to a lesser degree, 
support. Each spouse has adverse interest in these issues. The role of the 
attorney is to represent these adverse interests in the adversary system to be 
sure that the rights of his or her dient are adequately represented and 
answered. 
The second class of issues involves the integrative issues regarding 
parenting after divorce and the parents' continuing responsibility for rais-
ing their children. Resolution of the integrative issues requires coopera-
tion. Since the standard for decision making is the child's best interests, 
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the hostility 
between the parties. 
Is the parent afraid of the unknown? Does the parent have a realis-
tic fear of the capacity of the other parent to be a good parent? What are 
the needs of the children, both individually and collectively? The task at 
this point is not to propose a solution but rather to identify basic, funda-
mental needs. Maslow's (1968) hierarchy of needs is a useful paradigm for 
analysis: Physical, security, belonging, love, esteem, and self-actualization 
define an ascending order of needs that the families transiting divorce 
must meet. 
What Are the Options for Mutual Gain? What arrangements would 
benefit all? If conflict exists, what arrangement is best for the children, 
considering their ages and stages of development? The basic focus should 
be on parenting plans that can best meet the children's needs, not on who 
is the better parent The process of answering these questions is similar to 
the process of drafting an environmental impact study, not to a contest 
between disputing adults. Such an ordering of questions is also more likely 
to permit the family to preserve its autonomy and to answer such ques-
tions in the future without outside intervention. 
What Are the Prospects for Settlement? An analysis of the potential 
for settlement is also critical. Enormous amounts of time can be spent on 
a conflict that is not ready for solution or that requires a decision-making 
intervention from outside. The mediation process may require a step-up 
agreement, where the parties agree about how to disagree, or about the 
criteria that should be used in resolving the dispute, or about the precon-
ditions that need to be met in order to resolve the dispute. A review of the 
potential for settlement will help to address these process issues. 
What Really Happens in This Family? Answering this question 
involves the application of Richard Gardner's "grandma's criteria" 
(Gardner, 1982): Who puts the child to bed? Who takes the child to school? 
Who helps the child with homework? Who takes the child to the doctor? 
How is each parent involved in the life of the child? What parenting plan 
provides the child with the greatest continuity with both parents and gives 
the child the parenting patterns with which he or she is most familiar? 
Major Themes 
In dealing with any set of data, it becomes essential to identify 
patterns. After working with more than 35,000 custody disputes in the Los 
Angeles Conciliation Court, I have detected seven major themes. I do not 
claim that the list is definitive, only that the seven themes described here 
serve as helpful guides in answering some of the question just raised. 
The family constellation depicted in Figure 1 involves two people 
who have decided to end their relationship and who have not become 
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relationship, which means that the outcome is unsatisfactory for all con-
cerned. A large percentage of families seen in the courts involves this kind 
of dispute, which occurs after divorce. Disputes in these families are good 
candidates for mediation, since both parents are competent parents, and 
helping the parents to work out appropriate role behavior usually serves 
to resolve the dispute. 
Figure 3. Child Preference 
Ellen,40 Harold, 45 
...... 
...... 
John, 12 Joejr .. 17 
In the type of disputes depicted in Figure 3, the child, because of 
developmental needs or perhaps because of the behavior of parents, has 
made a choice about the parent with whom he or she wishes to live, and 
the child has declared this choice. Frequently, children in this category are 
either in latency (between six and twelve) or adolescence (between thirteen 
and eighteen) and choose the parent of the same sex in order to continue 
the identification process. Disputes in these families are good candidates 
for mediation, but involvement of the child in the mediation process is 
even more essential here (Drapkin and Bienenfeld, 1985) than it is else-
where, since the child has declared a choice that may or may not be in the 
child's best interest. 
Figure 4. Parent with Deficit 
Marge, 31 
Yolanda, 7 Pauljr .. 13 
- 197 -
48 
In disputes of the type depicted in Figure 4, one of the parents has 
severe deficits that limit his or her ability or capacity to parent the couple's 
children. Disputes in these families are not good candidates for mediation, 
although mediation may help such families to agree to pursue an evalua-
tion. Evaluation is essential in order for the court to have the information 
needed to make a decision in the best interests of the children. Disputes of 
this nature are best resolved by an independent trier of fact, who makes a 
decision about what is best for the child. These families are not good 
candidates for joint custody. One of the parents is so severely disturbed 
that he or she does not provide an adequate model for the child. Again, 
psychiatric evaluation is essential in order for the court to understand the 
facts of the situation and to recommend the parent to whom sole custody 
should be awarded. 
Figure 5. Enmeshed Parents 
\ Helen. l 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ Linda. :1 1 Jane.-! \..,_ ____ ..J 
Harrv. 6 months 
I 
1 Rhonda.~' 
'--------
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In disputes involving the type of family system shown in Figure 5, 
both parents are involved in an ongoing emotional morass and do not 
seem to be able to work through the divorce process. Children caught in 
such a web have great difficulty and feel very threatened. This family 
system is one of the most intractable and difficult to work with, since the 
family seems to need conflict in order to survive. In fact, one of the dues 
that suggests that the family with whom one is working is one of these is 
that a solution disappears just as soon as it is at hand, just like a mirage 
in the desert. These families paraphrase Descartes: "I fight, therefore I 
am." They can consume incredible amounts of a mediator's time. Such 
families may benefit from a psychiatric evaluation, and need a firm, 
fair, and final decision by some independent trier of fact. Sometimes, they 
are successful in mediation. More often, they drain enormous resources 
and do not use the mediation process effectively. 
The family system depicted in Figure 6, involves grandparents as 
well as parents in the raising of the child Recent legislation in California 
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~farv, 67 Joe, 1'2 
o-r--o 
Deceased 
I \i---..------1 \ . 
~Iorrie, :11 Candace. '29 
(married when Don was I) 
Don,3 
49 
Dan, 30 
Darrin. 5 
and other states now permits grandparents and stepparents to seek visita-
tion with their grandchildren or stepchildren following divorce. The com-
plex disputes arising from such family systems can often be resolved 
through the mediation process. However, unresolved intergenerational 
conflict that has been present in the family for generations tends to persist 
in these family disputes and this can make mediation a challenge at best. 
Figure 7. Change of Circumstance 
Tom,38 Mary, 34 John,34 
(both will move to Los Angeles) 
Sherry, 3 Johnjr.,i 
The family system shown in Figure 7 involves an inadvertent 
change of circumstance, such as the move of one or both parents away 
from the community. Disputes involving such family systems are difficult 
to resolve, because both parents have an equal claim. Where both parents 
have been equally involved in the life of the child, these disputes often 
involve a joint physical custody agreement. In these kinds of disputes, one 
needs to find "tiebreakers" or to identify key criteria, such as the child's 
developmental needs, that can be used to make the decision. In developing 
their parenting plan, many parents include a clause to handle such events 
in the original agreement, and in the "shadow" (Mnookin and Korn-
hauser, 1979) of this agreement family members negotiate their own pri-
vately ordered solution. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter only scratches the rich possibilities inherent in the 
application of family systems theory to the context of family and media-
tion. As we have seen, even the divorce process is best understood through 
family systems concepts and an interactional model. 
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December 18, 1987 
MICHAEL l. ODDENINO 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
SUITE 711 
199 SOUTH LOS ROBLES AVENUE 
PASADENA. CALIFORNIA 91101 
(818) 584-8828 
Elihu M. Harris, Chairman 
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
Room 6005 
P.O. Box 942849 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001 
TESTIMONY RE: SB 1306 
Dear Chairman Harris: 
I am submitting the following written testimony on SB 1306: 
The u.s. Supreme Court long ago noted that a parent's right 
to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or 
her children" is an interest "far more precious " than any 
property right. May v. Anderson, 345 u.s. 528, 533, 97 L. Ed. 
1221, 73 s. ct. 840, 843 (1952). In Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Services, 452 u.s. 18, 27, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 102 S. Ct. 
2153, 2159-60 (1981), the Court stressed that the parent-child 
relationship "is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants 
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, 
protection.'" quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 u.s. 645, 651, 31 
L. Ed 2d 551, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972). See also Franz v. United 
States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-602 and 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(interest of non-custodial parent in consortium with child 
constitutionally protected); Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 207 
(7th Cir. 1987) (parental association a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest). 
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Seaton Hall Professor Holly Robinson has recently spelled out 
this argument in detail: 
Read together, the cases clearly establish a zone of 
privacy around the parent-child relationship, which 
only can be invaded by the state when the state 
possesses a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. 
As a result, when the marital breakdown occurs, both 
parents are entitled to constitutional protection of 
their right to continue to direct the upbringing of 
their children through the exercise of custody. 
Adequate protection of this parental right requires 
that parents be awarded joint custody [or expansive 
visitation] ... unless a compelling state interest 
directs otherwise. 
H. L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 
Cinn. L. Rev. 27, 40-41 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
It follows, therefore, that before the state, through its 
family law courts, can impair a parent-child relationship through 
issuance of a limited visitation/sole custody order, it must make 
a determination that it has a compelling reason for doing so. 
Trial courts must, as a matter of constitutional law, fashion 
orders which will maximize the time children spend with each 
parent unless the court determines that there are compelling 
justifications for not maximizing time with each parent. 
Maximizing time with each parent is the only legitimate 
manner by which a parent is able to maintain a meaningful parent-
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child relationship after divorce. While geographic distance, 
school schedules and the like must be factored into the 
custody/visitation calculus, trial courts faced with a 
custody/visitation decision must accord appropriate 
constitutional respect to maintaining a healthy parent-child 
relationship by granting each parent as much time as possible 
with the child under the circumstances of each case. "No bond is 
more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the 
law as the bond between parent and child." Carson v. Elrod, 411 
F. Supp. 645, 649 (1976). 
Application of constitutional protections to 
custody/visitation rights is a necessary corollary to the Bill of 
Rights because individual liberty cannot be secured unless 
"certain kinds of highly personal relationships" are afforded "a 
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by 
the state." See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 
Yale L.J. 624 {1980). Providing constitutional shelter for a 
parent-child relationship simply reflects the realization that 
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from such 
relationships and that the sanctity of family relationships is 
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history." Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 u.s. 494, 503 (1977). 
This proposition that the parent-child relationship in a 
traditional custody/visitation dispute commands constitutional 
respect is only recently being recognized. At least one federal 
court found that the paucity of cases recognizing the Testimony 
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constitutional sanctity of this relationship is readily explained 
by the relative rarity of divorce in American society in the 
past. That court further held that the historical absence of a 
strong tradition should not result in denial of the 
constitutional protection for such relationships as they become 
increasingly prevalent. See Franz v. United States, supra. 
Maximizing the child's time with each parent is the 
constitutional mandate absent a compelling state interest of 
protecting the child from harm. 
As women join the work force in ever increasing numbers and 
break the shackles of gender-based stereotypes many fathers in 
turn discover the challenges and rewards of being a nurturing 
parent. These social changes, coupled with the rising divorce 
rate and concomitant increase in children of divorce, have forced 
a critical examination of our traditional method of dealing with 
child custody questions. Research reveals new insights into how 
children of divorce are affected by the custody and visitation 
arrangements imposed on them by the family law of our 
nation. 
The emotional stability of children of divorced parents is 
directly related to the quality of their continuing relationships 
with both of their parents. "We have repeatedly described the 
dissatisfaction of so many youngsters who felt they were not 
seeing their fathers often enough. If custody and visiting issues 
are to be within the realm of the 'best interests of the child,' 
then such widespread discontent must be taken very seriously." J. 
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Wallerstein and J. Kelly, Surviving the Breakup, 142-143 (1980). 
see also, D. Luepnitz, Child custody. A study of Families After 
Divorce, (1983). 
Numerous shibboleths about so-called impracticalities of 
joint custody or expansive visitation arrangements have been 
disproved. The evidence is simply overwhelming that joint 
custody or expansive visitation is an extremely effective way to 
promote the best interests of the child in maintaining a healthy 
relationship with both parents. 
One common misconception about joint custody is that it is 
not appropriate where the parents are hostile or non-cooperative 
with one another. While, to be sure, a children's best interests 
are always furthered by cooperation between their parents, 
failure of one or both parties to do so should not be cause for a 
court to deny joint custody. such a ruling would give the non-
cooperative parent veto power over a joint custody plan. 
Dr. Joan B. Kelly, Director of Northern California Mediation 
Center, Co-Director of California's Children of Divorce Project 
(1970-1980), and co-Author of Surviving the Breakup. How Children 
and Parents Cope with Divorce (1980), has observed: 
I am concerned about the position that argues 
joint custody should not be awarded when parents do not 
agree. In these cases, it is almost always the woman 
who is opposed to joint custody. Women do not need to 
ask for, nor agree to, joint custody. They are 
presumed by society, lawyers, the courts, and 
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themselves to have a right to 
their care and protection. It is the must 
ask for joint custody and it is often in the mother's 
power to agree or disagree. The mother's position is 
particularly enhanced if she knows a refusal to 
share parenting with her spouse will preclude a joint 
custody order regardless of her reasons for denying 
joint custody. 
In these various instances, may no 
legitimate reasons based on the father's capacity to 
parent for refusing to consider joint custody. Yet the 
beneficial. 
Kelly, "Further Observations on Joint 
L. Rev. 762 at 769 (1983). 
Indeed hostility between parents 
custody rather than against 
prohibited by court order from 
alternate weekends is at a 
former spouse. The time between his 
f 16 u. if. D. 
itates in favor of joint 
except on 
a hostile 
the 
child too often becomes an indoctrination period in which the 
hostile spouse works to destroy the parental relationship. Equal 
time-sharing is actually the a s 
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where there is hostility between the parents. 
As summarized by one commentator: 
It is extremely questionable whether warring 
parents could cooperate with any greater success in an 
arrangement involving limited visitation than one where 
custody is split more evenly. Regardless of the 
form of the custody decree, children can be expected to 
suffer damaging effects from parental conflict and also 
from the extended absence or nonavailability of one 
parent. . . • No custody arrangement can guarantee 
protection against the former, but joint custody at 
least prevents the latter. In fact, noncustodial 
parents easily could argue that it is precisely in the 
"hostile parent" situation that they are most in need 
of the legal protection afforded by joint custody. 
H. L. Robinson, Joint custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 
Cinn. L. Rev. 27, 33-34 (1985) (footnotes omitted). 
Indeed, sole custody arrangements with limited visitation by 
the non-custodial parent have resulted in children suffering a 
broad range of emotional disorders including deep feelings of 
loss and abandonment, strained interactions with both parents, 
disturbances in cognitive performance, and sex role 
identification problems. Trombetta, Joint custody: Recent 
Research and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to 
custody Disputes, 19 J. Fam. L. 213, 217-20 (1980). 
An important study conducted on 414 Los Angeles custody 
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cases over a two year period 
Considering that the best 
. 
. 
the 
children are foremost, all professionals should 
recognize a strong positive indication for joint 
custody. Unless future data our 
findings, the burden of j custody 
would not be in a child's best interests should be on 
the parent requesting sole custody. 
Ilfeld, Ilfeld, and Alexander, 
Look at outcome Data of Relitigation, Am. J 139:1 
(Jan. 1982) • 
Far too often parents 
in terms of the parents wants and 
political questions of child 
reduced to questions of men versus women 
attempting to retain historical 
historical disadvantages. 
best interests of the children" 
secure political advantage. Power is 
custody adversaries. Legislation 
power. Yet, SB 1306 implicitly does 
My experiences both as a family 
child custody disputes and as a 
nine-year old daughter and seven-year 
SB 1306, if enacted, will 
seeks the irresistible power 
's best interests 
are 
to "serving the 
is to 
of 
to seek 
attorney specializing in 
of a 
son, convince me that 
1 as each side 
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One of the most significant contributions California has 
made to the nation's approach to family law is the legislative 
directive that it is the policy of this state to insure children 
frequent and continuing contact with each parent after divorce. 
Cal. Civ. Code§ 4600(a). A second significant contribution is 
the legislative directive that in deciding a custody dispute 
courts are to favor the parent who has shown the greater 
willingness to allow the children frequent and continuing contact 
with the other parent. Cal. Civ. Code§ 4600(b) (1). 
SB 1306 replaces the emphasis on parental cooperation with 
an emphasis on power. This unnecessary and ill-advised dramatic 
philosophical about face will only create turmoil in the custody 
courts of California and the lives of our children. 
Legislation has two primary purposes with respect to the 
people the legislation affects: (1) behavior modification, and 
(2) education. Legislation inevitably directs people to modify 
their behavior in light of the consequences stemming from the 
legislative decrees affecting a particular matter. Legislation 
also has a didactic character, such as civil rights legislation 
which not only encourages behavior modification but also 
instructs the body politic as to what is desirable behavior in a 
society concerned with equal justice for all. 
By diminishing the importance of shared parenting after 
divorce, SB 1306 encourages divorcing parents to seek to exclude 
the other parent from meaningful participation in child-rearing 
since divorcing parents will have the signal from the legislature 
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that cooperation with respect 
considered important. 
SB 1306 simply fails to 
dynamics of childhood development. 
love from their parents whether 
assumptions which underlie SB 1306 are 
powerfully destructive at worst. We can 
insight of Daniel J. Boorstin, 1 of 
of Congress that "the main 
but the illusion of knowledge. 11 
SB 1306 not worthy state of i 
children deserve better. 
Thank for the 
much 
the 
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James A. Cook 
President 
December 9, 1987 
RE: SB 1306, Custody 
Assemblyman Elihu Harris 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Assemblyman Elihu Harris: 
Mon., Dec. 14, 1987 hearings 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Appellate and Supreme Court case rulings usually comprise the major guide 
whether a statute needs amending legislatively. 
We have, and are examining, 360 recent Appellate and Supreme Court case 
rulings from 45 states, primarily on joint custody and custody-related issues. 
Four initial observations emerge from this body of reference: 
1. There is no significant reason or justification (judging from this 
review) for any further amendment at this time of California's 
"joint custody" statute (CC 4600 & 4600.5) 
2. Most often, appeal from a joint custody decree is instigated by a 
parent seeking sole custody sequestering of a child predicated on 
petty complaints that the higher court thereupon deems insuficient justification for terminating a joint custody decree. 
Havin~ failed to achieve a sole custody reversal of a joint custody 
decree, some of the parents, adamant for sole custody, occasionally 
pursue an end-run around the courts by seeking legislative amendment 
changes that will give credence to complaints that the court had 
previously considered an insufficient justification for conversion from joint to sole custody. 
The justifications hinge, generally, on personal interpretations 
of ''best interests"; a competition as to which parent can best 
satisfy their personal definition of what amounts to "best interests." 
In most such cases, both parents are good-enough parents (falling 
within a 'normal' range for most psychiatric tests) and their 
argument resorts to fault-finding in a no-fault era. 
3. Some of the earlier appellate cases indicated that there is no basic 
flaw (in custody statutes similar to California's) but that a more 
thoroughly spelled-out decree by the trial court jurist will 
minimize litigants returning to court for further definition. 
4. Generally, there appears to be a certain dynamics taking place in 
the divorce war between .the sexes which, when recognized by 
legislators and jurists, helps in understanding why the current 
statute needs to be upheld: 
a. Increasingly, more divorce filings are now initiated by women 
than men. (Reportedly as high as 85% filing by women, now, in 
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the metropolitan locations, as compared to about 505-50% 
equal split at the close of the 'fault era') This observation 
is not meant to imply that men are that much more worthy of 
being divorced than previously, but is related to the following: 
b. Guilt. There is still a slight, lingering aura of 'guilt' 
with the phenomenon of divorce (although there has been much 
social effort to dispell, deny or minimize guilt.) For a 
divorce-initiator this leads to the following: 
c. Anger. A mechanism to obliterate a personal feeling of guilt is 
to generate anger. Anger, as a reason, submerges feelings of 
guilt. Hence, it is not unusual that, during and immediately 
following divorce, there appears to be more anger than relations 
during the marriage justify. The anger-to-obliterate-guilt 
generates fault-finding. That often relates to the following: 
d. Weaning. An Age-old problem, most societies the world-over 
have developed rituals, customs and procedures to help growing 
children to gradually separate from one parent and to see both 
parents, and both sexes, as unique and worthy individuals. 
The pursuit of sole custody upon divorce is a mechanism to 
thwart society's practice of weaning, and to curry favor by 
one parent under the guise of protection. 
The Assembly Judiciary Committee was the original forum which gave legislative 
credence to joint custody ... and to a concept that has now gone on to over 34 states 
and several foreign countries. 
The concept includes the nudge of "preference" and of "rebuttable presumption." 
(The statute does not include categorical presumption, merely rebutta e presumption .. 
.• which has the overwhelming advantage of re~oving the burden attack and litigation 
from the shoulders of a parent willing to share and work-with the opposite parent, 
while requiring a burden of proof from the parent intending to isolate a child in 
captive sole custody.) 
The concept of preference and rebuttable 
most significant contributions to defusing 
in the divorce war between the sexes. 
sumption is one of lifornia•s 
ucing the li on pressure 
Furthermore, the concept satisfies social, scienti c 
evolutions: 
1 it i ca 1 
1. Repeatedly, the children of divorce who survive the best are those 
who are assured of "frequent and conti ng contact" with both 
parents. "Frequent and continuing contact" 1s the ifornia 
phrase most-often repeated in other states' statutes as part of 
the criteria assuring 11 best interests. 11 
2. Equality ... the equality of civil rights, relations among the races, 
between the sexes ... is the major and determining political reality for 
the last half of this Century. Equality is "best intere " for 
children as well as parents. 
3. A rising divorce rate of the Seventies, and the present plateau, has 
extended 11 no fau1t 11 in custody as well as divorce as the most rational 
answer in less-than-perfect divorce. 
4. For continued development of both 
decree of joint custody is the best 
sexes, 
a custody 
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prov1oe 1 es each unduly kling one parent 
of dhorce. 
SB 1306 promotes 16 unecessa and 
California's current custody law. 
it1ca11y dangerous changes in 
California•s current 
eight times as the criteria for 
for a jurist to "best 1 
emphasizes "best interests" 
is no lack of ability-
on for their ruling. 
On the other hand, SB 1306 eliminates or lutes California's joint custody 
statute by inserting the term "best interests" as it to substitute for or to mask 
the omissions amended-out the law by 1306 
Dangerously, SB 1306 proceeds to 
by inspiring arguments of: 
methods defeating joint custody 
- Geographic location; a potentially uncon tutuonal limitation that 
promotes deliberate ng by a vindictive parent. 
- Abuse1 allegation; increases the indiscriminate and 
unexamined allegations though s allegations are not necessarily 
indicative of relations between a parent and child. 
- litigation shopping list; proposals to defeat joint custody with no 
equally exha ive li of reasons for a court decline sole custody. 
- Investigations; y for nt custody no similar investigation 
to determine worthiness for sole custody. 
- Elimination of joint c agreeing parents; 
an unwary parent into ng e custody as 
equally within a child's best interests. 
al for entrapping 
solution were 
- Categorical presumption against joint ; when, in fact, the 
alternative of sole custody might not be in a child's best interests. 
- Diminishing the parent most willing to facilitate contact; the effect of 
downgrading an otherwise desirable response which current law now 
encourages. 
- Destroying the preamble; current law establishes a goal of joint custody 
at the outset, SB 1306 removes the opening guideline and buries it 
later in the statute with the implication that "best interests" could 
be raised to defeat frequent and continuing contact. 
SB 1306 stems not from altruism but from a purposeful intent to weaken 
and diminish joint custody and to do so to the advantage of a parent pursuing 
sole and exclusive isolation of a child divorce. 
Protect our curr~nt joint custody law .... widely acclaimed as the most 
significant affirmative advance in family law since the advent of "no fault 11 
divorce over a decade and a half ago. 
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1ncerely~~ 
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I/ 
JOINT CUSTODY \COMPARE THE CONSEOU NCES 
Enact legislation for the divorcing pu~-not lor "the trade". \}/ 
Preference/Presumption 2!: Option 
lSI preference lor join! custody, 
presumed unless, etc 
Presumption/Preference 
National trend: Up, 1979 and since. 
'Frequent & continuing Yes 
contact' by child with 
both parents: 
Guidance to parents: Yes, what law expects. 
Trails cultivated: 
Psychological reaction: 
Child's reaction, 
pressure on child: 
Child encouraged 
choose, 
Promotes joint custody 
Mediation stimulus 
Litigation stimulus: 
Typified as: 
Who promotes?: 
Remunerative: 
Emotional scars, 
resentments: 
Outcome: 
Appeals: 
Future negotiation: 
Cooperativeness 
Equanimity, 
anticipates favoritism 
lor forgiveness, 
cooperation. 
Less 
No choosing necessary, 
Less guilt 
Yes 
Yes, Presumption begets 
mediation 
Less likely, unnecessary lor 
for forgiving, cooperative parent 
"parent not wanting divorce·, 
"altruist" 
Usually parent 'left' by mate, 
Parents practicing JC, parents 
reluctant to litigate/attack. 
To parents & child, possibly 
less expensive. 
For counselors. 
Less likely 
Everona wins something, 
Balance, "fairness" 
'Cleaner' issues 
Possible because balance 
ot power. 
Raising sole 
custody to 
equality with 
joint custody. 
Option 
Down, since 1979 
a pre-1978 outlook 
No. nol necessarily 
No. up-lor-grabs. 
Cultivates 
possessive 
potential 
Litigiousness 
High anxiety, need 
to allackldelend 
to assure access 
Unstable, possible 
parentectomy. 
Fawned on to 
choose, lifetime 
guilt 
No, not necessarily 
Unlikely. Focus 
to "winning• 
Uligiously. 
Increases 
likelihood, 
uncertainty breeds 
attack 
·a judge's bill" 
(because of option 
availability) 
•a lawyer's biU" 
(because ol 
litigation 
potential) 
Peevish, · 
vindictive. 
Believers ol truth 
results from 
litigation, 
justifying their sole 
custody. 
For attorneys,aides 
Highly likely if 
option is sole 
custody 
Winner/loser 
Imbalance. Long 
term 
resentment it sole. 
Less efficient 
appeals 
Unlikely it option 
was winner/loser. 
Winner neadn t 
negot1ate. 
;.._liOOSt ~nevltdCJB, j 
~;::110n resw.ts .n 
.;ole eustacy 
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December 10, 1987 
The Honorable Elihu M. Harris, Chairman 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Chairman Harris: 
RE: SB 1306/Repealing Joint 
Custody Presumption 
(OPPOSITION) 
We implore you and your committee to not fall prey to a bill 
that claims to be in the best interests of the children, but 
is not. SB 1306 seeks to erode delicate parent-child relation-
ships by placing it on equal footing with joint custody and 
tagging it with excessive restrictions. 
As parents and spouses who have each suffered through a divorce, 
our experiences with sole custody arrangements have shown it 
to be a deterrent to healthy parent-child relationships. For 
example, mothers become burned out by the tremendous demands 
and responsibilities sole custody brings, leaving little quality 
time for themselves or the children; visiting fathers lose their 
parental authority and rights and are eventually ''squeezed out" 
of the lives of their children; and children suffer because they 
have less frequent contact with both parents as a result. Sole 
custody also makes it easier for the custodial parent to reduce 
contact between a child and the non-custodial parent. It should, 
therefore, NOT be placed on equal footing with joint custody, as 
prescribed by SB 1306. 
The law should encourage divorced parents to perform their parental 
duties jointly as in the presumption for joint custody. Joint 
custody contracts can be modified later if the situation warrants. 
But the presumption for joint custody should be STRENGTHENED within 
the law, not diluted. 
SB 1306 is a step backward for children of divorce. We, therefore, 
strongly urge you and your committee to OPPOSE SB 1306. 
Respe"lctf ly, 
- !dt_pq~· 
I 
Dan and Lyn Kosewski, 8785 Kelsey Dr., Elk Grove, CA 95624 
cc: Assemblyman Phil Isenberg 
Senator Rebecca Morgan 
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Sacramento Single Fathers 
Support Group 
December 15, 1987 
~o~ ~rK./11..--
4930 8th Avenue 
Sacramento, CA 95820 
(916) 736-1544 
JOINT CUSTODY: IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF OUR CHILDREN 
We never divorced our children. But when sole custody is 
awarded to just one parent -- mother or father, the effect is 
the same. And the children lose. 
For the last seven years the Sacramento Single Fathers 
Support Group has worked to help dads and their kids survive 
in a system that treats men as second class parents and 
routinely deprives children of the love and attention of 
their own fathers. 
Our support group is not a political action organiza-
tion, nor are we in any way against women. (After all, they 
are the mothers of our children.) 
Nonetheless, we feel compelled to speak out against 
Senate Bills 1306, 1341 and any other legislation which makes 
an already bad situation even worse. Our children are the 
real victims of divorce, and we believe such legislation 
perpetuates and perpetrates the further victimization of our 
kids. 
The system which claims to be working in the best inter-
ests of our children is systematically stripping these kids 
of their birthright: to have equal and loving access to both 
their mommy and daddy. 
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In its worst abuses, and there are many, sole custody is 
tantamount to court-ordered child abandonment, a forced 
divorce from own children. 
The non-custodial parent (and nine times out of 10 it's 
a man) has his children legally taken from him at a time in 
their lives when they are most frightened and most in need of 
both their parents' loving attention. 
According to clinical psychologist Edward Teyber and 
developmental psychologist Charles Hoffman of the California 
State University at San Bernardino: 
One of the strongest determinants of a child's 
healthy adjustment to divorce is the extent of the 
father's continued participation as a parent. 
Children of divorce suffer socially, emotionally 
and intellectually when their fathers are not 
actively involved as parents •••• The best adjusted 
children of divorce have frequent access, without 
conflict, to both parents •••• The only solution is 
for children of divorce to have a dependable rela-
tionship with both parents -- one allowing for 
frequent, regularly scheduled and conflict-free 
access to both mother and father. 
Legislation like SB 1306 and the other proposed bills 
undermine the most humane and sensible approach to protecting 
the children of divorce -- joint custody. 
We are asking you, for our children's sake, as well as 
our own, to consider more rational laws which will foster 
rather than restrict active parenting by both the mother and 
father after divorce. 
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Such legislation would include the following: 
1. We need more mediation and counseling --
and less litigation. The courts should 
recognize that parents who can't settle 
custody in mediation are possibly commit-
ting unconscionable emotional violence on 
their children. In such cases, it should 
be presumed the family is in need of 
immediate and if necessary, mandatory 
counseling -- especially the children. 
2. In any litigation, the court must pay 
much more attention to the welfare of the 
kids. Children are the only parties 
without lawyers in court proceedings. 
They are not property. They are people 
young people who are little more than 
pawns in game they do not understand and 
cannot win. 
3. We must create a much stronger presump-
tion in the law that joint custody is 
indeed in the best interests of the 
children -- unless the parents agree 
otherwise, or it is proved otherwise. In 
spite of the current presumption, courts 
and society still treat fathers as 
inherently inferior parents, and the 
children thus lose meaningful, loving 
contact with their dads. 
4. The law must prevent and if appropriate, 
punish capricious and vindictive actions 
by either parent which are designed 
solely to deprive their children of the 
love and attention of the other parent. 
For example: unnecessary moves over long 
distances or out of state, or false 
accusations of molestation or abuse. 
5. We advocate tough and equal enforcement 
of all court orders: both of child sup-
port and joint custody or visitation. 
California has vigorous enforcement of 
child support. What it does not have is 
equally vigorous enforcement of child 
- 219 -
3 
SACRAMENTO SINGLE FATHERS 12/15/87 
custody and visitation orders. Withhold-
ing child support and withholding visita-
tion are both crimes against children. Is 
money more important than a parent's 
love? 
All we are asking for is reasonable and compassionate 
legislation that will guarantee us the equal opportunity to 
carry out all our parental responsibilities. There's more to 
being a dad than child support. 
We have not abandoned our parental responsibilities. We 
have been prevented from carrying them out. The legislation 
presently under consideration will make the tough job of 
being a divorced parent even more difficult. 
SB 1306, 1341 and other such laws are in the best 
interests of our children. 
# # # 
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EQUAL KIGHTS FOR tATHERS, INC. 
A nonprofit organization concerned with the rights of children, parents, and second families. 
December 23, 1987 
Elihu M Harris, Chairman 
Assembly Committe on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, Calif. 
Dear Chairman Harris, 
Several of our members attended your hearing on December 14, 1987. 
We wish to thank you for holding the hearing and inviting written 
comments. 
We were impressed with the quality of testimony of several of the 
panel members and were particularly impressed with Dr Joan Kelly. 
It is obvious that Dr Kelley has much meaningful research and expert 
experience to share. We remain opposed to the "package" of bills 
produced by the Task Force on Family Equity and continue to believe 
that the efforts of this task force are largely advocacy for a point 
of view rather than a legitimate and unbiased effort. We believe that 
our familylaw policies should be carefully developed with full 
participation by all experts, consider all points of view, be fair 
and unbiased, and include the views of the affected public. To that 
end we share the following views. 
CHILD CUSTODY 
We feel that the ~lM~;RY purpose of family law is to define an expected 
standard of behavior. Much is made of the inability of divorced 
parents to cooperate in raising children. It is assumed that this 
is a natural and unavoidable consequence of divorce. We propose that 
the current law has much to do with this situation. Our current 
custody law is unclear as to public policy on child custody. Some 
judges read it as a no preference statute, others view it as a prefer-
ence, some see it as a rebuttable presumption, and most see it as a 
sole custody statute unless parents voluntarily consent to joint 
custody. Our current law leans heavily toward providing a legal arena 
for parents to fight for sole custody or for mothers to oppose the 
attempts of fathers to gain joint custody. We are convinced that the 
inability to cooperate is caused by current law. A rebuttable pre-
sumption for joint custody would end most of the fighting over children. 
There are several presumptions governing family law and we believe 
that a presumption of joint custody is logical and appropriate. We 
were pleased to hear Dr Kelly testify that disagreements over child 
rearing are seldom the cause of divorce indicating that ex-spouses 
can be encouraged to cooperate. We must have laws that encourage 
cooperative parenting and out of court settlements. If SB1306 
succeeds our courts will be swamped with litigating parents. We 
are opposed to any attempt to amend current law to eliminate the 
implied preference for joint custody. Such an amendment sends a 
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Growing with Chapters in: 
Berkeley - Chico - Marin - Redding - Sacramento San francisco San Jose - Yuba City 
Equal Rights for Fathers, Page 2 
' message that sole custody is the ~referred cus ial arrangement. 
We have several chapters around the sta e and ea jurisdiction is 
different. We have found that where a,preference r presumption is 
is enforced by the local court, it work~admirably 0 get pa~ants 
t o c o o per at e r a the r than 1 i t i g a t e . 0 n the o the r d , s 0 me 1 0 c a 1 
courts harbor a preference for unconsent sole cus y 
over uncon-
sented joint custody. Thousands of our members have oyed 
unconsented joint custody and have found ~bat mother 11 cooperate 
with fathers if the judge makes it clear th~; it is ted and 
t h a t con t in u i n g s t r u g g 1 e s f o r s o 1 e c us t o d y w i i,l b e f r u e s s . 
It is a myth that unconsented sole custody works bette than 
sented joint custody. We believe that the av~ lable ev'enceuncon-
plus clinical opinion shows that unconsented joi~t custttr ( h 
. . , • w ere both parents des1re phys1cal custody) works better than 0 t d 
W h b . "N nsen e sole custody. e can assure you t at e1ng a on-ct:sto , 1 " 
parent discourages many parents from continuing in an act e 1 . ro e 
after d1vorce. 
The opponents of joint custody have created several myths t t cannot 
stand up under scrutiny. One of the favorite arguments is ~ 
"stability" theory; one set of rules, one bed, one toothbru~­
parent figure, etc. Yet, most mothers (married and divorced 
and place the child in the care of strangers for 10 or more 1 
per day. This person has more contact than either custodial 
non-custodial parent yet this fact escapes the "stability" the 
promoters. The era of a child being raised by a non-working m 
was a short lived phenomenon in 20th century Western societies 
it is now over. Most children have been raised by a number of 
and the exper@ince is enriching rather than detrimental. Custo 
parents re-marry or cohabit yet there is no inquiry by the State 
to whether this change will be in the child's "best interest" an 
"stable". Sole custodial parents regularly uproot their children 
from enighborhoods and schools to move about the state or country, 
yet no provisions are made in law to determine if these moves are 
"stable" or in the child's 11 best interest". In view of this it is 
illogical for our legal and mental health system to spend so much 
time trying to choose between two perfectly adequate parents as to 
who will have custody based on which parent is in "the best interes 
of the child". Clearly, the stabillity theory is a hoax. We agree 
with Dr Joan Kelly that "parallel parenting" works. The theory 
about the "ability to cooperate" is also a sham. The average child 
care worker and/or stepparent is more confusing to a child than one 
of their natural parents whom they already know and love. Also, 
these persons are not as likely to "cooperate" as a biological parent. 
The bottom line is simple; there are no judges or mental health 
professionals who can pick between parents as to ich one should have 
sole custody. It is ridiculous to make a custody choice and then 
totally ignore what happens to the child in the care of babysitters 
and stepparents on the misbegotten idea that the custodial parent 
selected by the court is sufficient to be in the "best interest" of 
the child. 
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FAMILY HOME 
We agree with the testimony of the majority of the panelists that 
the disposition of the family home should not be tied automatically 
to the custody of the children. Use of the family home for the 
benefit of the children should be left to the discretion of the 
courts using the "Duke" standards. 
CHILD SUPPORT FOR ADULT COLLEGE STUDENTS 
We remain opposed to "child" support for adult daughters and sons 
of divorced parents who are attending college. They are adults, 
not children, and are not entitled to child support. we also agree 
with the testimony of the panelists that such a policy would have 
many negative legal and psychological ramifications. We would also 
like to point out that high school is provided totally free to all 
minors as a public policy but college is not free to all persons up 
to a certain age (21 ?). Therefore, it is irrational to create a 
right of "support" for a benefit that is not provided at nu cost by 
the government. 
SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
We remain opposed to SB 1296. From the looks of the "mark up" bill 
it is dead but we remain concerned. We agree with Judges King and 
Murphy. The purpose of spousal support should be short term and 
rehabilitative where possible. Any spousal support policy must 
strongly encourage employment and aim for self-sufficiency where 
possible. The idea of equalizing the post-divorce standard of 
living is at odds with no fault divorce. It also doesn't make 
economic sense. 
We find that wives are initiating divorce in most cases. Our members 
consistently describe that their wives divorced them for unfathomable 
reasons as "desire to grow", "freedom", "the relaticnship doesn't 
work any longer", etc. All one needs to do is read the dozens of 
womens "psychology" books to understand this phenomenon. This 
was discussed by Dr Joan Kelly and her research shows wives initiatir1~ 
divorce by a 3 to 1 ratio. The Task Force on Family Equity created 
a myth when they promote the idea that it is men who seek divorce i 
almost all cases. Who are the victims? 
No fault divorce did not cause the "feminization of poverty". The 
real problem is that most men barely make enough to support one 
household Jet alone two households. It is well known that the "real" 
wages of American workers have stayed constant in the past 25 years 
due to increasing world competition and world trade. It takes both 
spouses working full-time to maintain an increasing standard of living. 
It would be nice to turn the clock back to those halcyon days when 
full-time housewifing was a career but we can no longer afford it. 
The solution is for women to partcipate fully in the world of work. 
Dividing the same size economic pie between two households wiJl not 
solve Lhe problems. 
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M. H fHHO 
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December 19, 1987 
Douglas Henry 
4040 Johnson Dr. 
Oceanside, California 92056 
Elihu M. Harris 
Chairman, Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box 942849 
Sacramento, California 94249-0001 
SUBJECT: SB 1306, Assembly Judiciary Hearings of December 14, 1987 
Mr. Harris: 
I attended the Assembly Judiciary Committee Interim Hearing on 
Family Law on December 14, 1987 as an individual citizen concerned 
with assuring adequate protection of children's rights to maintain 
meaningful relationships with both of their parents after divorce 
or separation. It has been my personal experience that even the 
present law does not adequately protect a child's rights to access 
to her/his parents, and I oppose SB 1306 because it will dilute 
that protection even further. 
I strongly oppose SB 1306 because it would make a substantial 
change to the public policy of the State of California regarding 
the rights of children to have and maintain relationships with both 
parents after separation or divorce. SB 1306 removes from Section 
4600 the statement that "it is the public policy of this state to 
assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both 
parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their 
marriage." That statement of public policy is unqualified and 
states explicitly what I and many others believe to a right of 
children that is self-evident, i.e., the right to have and maintain 
a relationship with both parents. By definition, the only custody 
award that is consistent with that public policy is an award of 
joint physical custody. A review of the Civil Code definitions of 
custody (attachment 1) shows that joint custody assures the child 
of frequent and continuing contact with both parents while sole 
custody does not. An award of sole custody is contrary to public 
policy, and can be justified only as a second preference when it is 
found to be in the "best interest" of the child pursuant to the 
provisions stated in Civil Code Section 4608 (ref. Civil Code 
Section 4600 (b)). 
SB 1306 modifies the statement of public policy and ammends Section 
4600.5 to read "it is the public policy of this state to assure 
minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents 
after the parents have been separated or dissolved their marriage 
where it is in the best interest of the child." SB 1306 even 
removes the assurance of frequent and continuing contact from the 
definition of joint custody. Under SB 1306, the rights of children 
to frequent and continuing contact with their parents after 
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separation or divorce are not protected in the same manner that 
those rights are protected under the present law. Under SB 1306, 
the court must determine that it is in the best interest of the 
child to have frequent and continuing contact with both s, 
whereas, under the present law the right of children to have 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents is stated 
explicitly and is unconditional. The wording of the present law is 
appropriate and represents a responsible public policy on the 
rights of children. 
During the December 14 hearings, Senator Morgan gave an example, in 
support of her bill, of one of her contstituents who moved from 
Ventura county to San Mateo County and sought to change a custody 
order that provided the child with contact with the other parent 
one week during each month. The Superior Court in San Mateo 
refused to change the order. Senator Morgan said that the order 
was inappropriate under the circumstances in that, among other 
things, the child was attending school. Contrary to Senator 
Morgan's claim that the present law is to blame for an 
inappropriate order in this case, it shows that the Superior Court 
in San Mateo used its discretion properly and the present law 
successfully protected the child's right to frequent and continuing 
contact with both parents despite one parent's effort to obstruct 
this right by moving a great distance away from the other parent. 
Senator Morgan s example illustrates an example of the way the law 
should work to protect children's rights and provide deterents 
against actions such as those taken by Senator Morgan's 
constituent. 
Regretably, even the present law is not always sufficiently clear 
to provide children with adequate protection of their rights to 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents. During the 
hearings, Senator Morgan asserted that, due to the present law, 
mediators are encouraging joint custody and judges feel obliged to 
award joint custody. This assertion is untrue. In my personal 
experience in San Diego County, I have found the opposite to be 
true, i.e., the mediators recommend against joint custody and 
judges oppose joint custody unless it is agreed to by both parties. 
Judge Thomas Murphy of San Diego county, who presided at our 
hearing on December 4, 1987, refused to grant the father's request 
for joint custody despite the fact that both psychologists involved 
in the case (for a total of 2 years of observation and evaluation) 
testified that joint custody would be in the child's best interest. 
The San Diego Family Court Services mediator (who was not a 
psychologist and had never seen the child), testified that he felt 
that, despite the exhaustive effort of both psychologists (one of 
whom was even selected by the counselor), joint custody was 
inappropriate because a three-year-old child should have one 
primary caregiver. The child's mother also opposed joint custody 
and Judge Murphy ordered that sole physical custody be retained by 
the mother, citing, among other things, the fact that the parents 
disagreed on the custody issue. In San Diego county, the court 
interprets the present law so liberally that joint custody can be 
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denied simply on the basis of one parent's refusal to agree. 
During the December 14 hearings Judge Murphy even told Assemblyman 
Isenberg that he did not award joint custody when the parents 
disagreed. While disagreement between spouses should be 
justification for the court to order joint counseling or mediation 
after separation for the ultimate benefit of the children, it 
should not be justification to deprive the children of frequent and 
continuing contact with their parents unless it can be demonstrated 
that the children would be hurt more, as a result of the 
disagreement, than by the deprivation of their relationship with 
one of their parents. 
Judge Thomas Murphy's position is in clear conflict with the public 
policy as stated under the present law. The present law, however, 
is not strong enough in its assertion of children's rights to 
frequent and continuing contact to prevent individual judges from 
exercising discretion in this manner. Given the adversarial nature 
of many divorce cases, children often become the pawns in a game of 
bitter resentment between divorcing spouses. In their anger, 
spouses often seek to deprive one another of contact with their 
children forgetting that in doing so the children are also 
deprived. Children need more protection from the hostility and 
bitterness of divorce, not less. SB 1306 will allow even more 
children to be deprived of relationships with one of their parents 
as a result of the hostility of the other. Please vote against SB 
1306. 
cc: Tom McClintock 
Lloyd Connelly 
Terry Friedman 
Phillip Isenberg 
Pat Johnston 
Tim Leslie 
Sunny Mojonnier 
Larry Stirling 
Maxine Waters 
Nolan Fri zelle 
Douglas Henry 
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CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE DEFINITIONS 
Physical Custody 
Sole Physical Custody: means that a child shall reside under the 
supervision of one parent subject to the power of the court to 
order visitation. 
Joint Physical Custody: means that each of the parents shall have 
significant periods of physical custody. Joint physical custody 
shall be shared by both parents in such a way so as to assure a 
child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. 
Legal Custody 
Sole Legal Custody: means that one parent shall have the right and 
responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, 
education and welfare of a child. 
Joint Legal Custody: means that both 
responsibility to make the decisions 
education and welfare of a child. 
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 17, 1987 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY JULY 14,1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE MARCH 3, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE FEBRUARY 23, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 13 
Introduced by Senator Morgan 
(Coauthors: Senators Bergeson, Davis, Bill Greene, Leroy 
Greene, Marks, Robbins, and Watson) 
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Bane, Bradley, Dennis 
Brown, Eastin, Harvey, Hauser, Hayden, Hughes, Kelley, 
Killea, La Follette, Leslie, Molina, Moore, Polanco, 
Quackenbush, Speier, and Tanner) 
December 1, 1986 
An act to add Section 4709 to the Civil Code, relating to 
parent and child. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 13, as amended, Morgan. Parent and child. 
Existing law provides that the father and mother of a child 
have an equal responsibility to support and educate their 
child, as specified. Under existing law, generally, this 
obligation terminates when the child reaches the age of 18 
years. However, existing law provides that a parent has a duty 
to support an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 
if he or she is a full-time high school student and resides with 
the parent until the child completes the 12th grade or attains 
the age of 19, whichever first occurs. 
This bill would provide that an order for child support 
issued pursuant to the Family Law Act may provide, or may 
be amended to provide, that child support shall continue to 
be paid , as specified, on behalf of or to any l:lmB:Mrie(j eftHEi. 
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wfte ts ft fulbffime student duf'ifl:g ffte tteademic ~ ifl: geeft 
stttnding, ifl: ftft 8:CCf'edited institution ef ffigftCf' learning, ftS 
defined, student in good standing, who is attending an 
accredited institution of higher learning on a full-time basis 
during the academic year, with certain exceptions, until such 
time as he or she graduates or attains the age of 21 years, 
whichever first occurs. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. The Legislature finds the citizens of 
2 this state have a substantial the education of 
3 the people of California, as evidenced by the state's 
4 extensive system of postsecondary and vocational 
5 education programs. The Legislature has recognized the 
6 importance of parental support while a child is attending 
7 school by the enactment of Section 196.5 the Code 
8 which provides for the continuation the parental duty 
9 of support even though the child has attained age of 
10 18. If the child is unmarried, is a full-time high school 
11 student, and resides with a parent, that duty continues 
12 until the child completes the 12th grade or attains the age 
13 of 19, whichever first occurs. 
14 The Legislature finds, however, of 
15 parents whose marriage has been dissolved often face 
16 disadvantages respect to of educational 
17 expenses for postsecondary age of 18 
18 that are not experienced by children in families. 
19 The Legislature therefore finds and declares that the 
20 ability of judges to award child support for educational 
21 expenses for postsecondary studies beyond the age of 
22 majority is necessary both to protect the children of 
23 divorced parents from undue hardship to promote 
24 the state's interest in a well-educated citizenry. 
25 SEC. 2. Section 4709 is added to the Civil Code, to 
26 read: 
27 4709. Notwithstanding any other 
28 order for child support issued pursuant to 
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1 provide, or may be amended to provide, that support 
2 shall continue to be paid on behalf of or to any U!l:lftMried 
3 eftHft wfte :ffi ft full:ttime StuaeHt auring ffte ftCftaeftlie ,.etli'; 
4 ift gee& stftflaiHg, ift ftfi aeeretiitee iHstitutioH ef higher 
5 leam:iHg, student in good standing, who is attending an 
6 accredited institution of higher learning on a full-time 
7 basis during the academic year. Support may continue 
8 until such time as he or she graduates or attains the age 
9 of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The student is not 
10 eligible for child support if he or she marries, enters 
11 military service, or is living separately from his or her 
12 parent as an emancipated adult. The court may order 
13 child support from either or both parents. 
14 As used in this section, "accredited" means a degree or 
15 certificate granting institution that has been assigned 
16 accredited status by a regional accrediting association, if 
17 located in the United States, or by a comparable public or 
18 private accrediting institution if located a foreign 
19 country. 
20 As used in this section, "institution of higher learning" 
21 means a public or private institution providing 
22 postsecondary education or occupational training. As 
23 used in this section, "on behalf of" means that support 
24 payments may be directed by the court to be made to the 
25 educational institution or another adult or institution as 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
trustee. 
This section does not apply to support agreements 
made, or judgments entered, before January 1, 1988. 
Nothing in this section shall be interpreted so as to limit 
a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support 
or to limit the court's power to inquire whether such an 
agreement has been made. 
0 
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Date of Hearing: August 19, 1987 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M HARRIS, Chairman 
SB 13 (Morgan) - Amended: August 17, 1987 
PRIOR ACTION 
Sen. Com. on JUD. 7-3 Sen. Floor 21-14 
SB 13 
SUBJECT: This bill permits the court to continue child support until age 21 so 
long as the adult child is a full-time student. 
DIGEST 
Existing law authorizes a court, under the Family Law Act, to order either or 
both parents to pay for the support, maintenance, and education of the child 
until his or her majority or until the child has completed high school. 
Parties to a family law action may stipulate to continue support for any child 
after the age of 18. 
This bi 11: 
1) Permits an order for child support to provide for a nuation of 
support until age 21 or graduation from an institution of higher learning, 
whichever occurs first. The court may order child support from either or 
both parents. 
2) Provides that such support shall only be payable during the academic year 
on behalf of or to a full-time student, who is (a) in good standing, and 
(b) in an accredited institution of higher learning. The term "on behalf 
of" is defined to mean that the court could order the support payable 
directly to the institution or another adult or institution as trustee. 
3) Terminates eligibility for such support when the student marries, enters 
military service, or is living separately from his or her parent as an 
emancipated adult. 
4) Is limited to child support orders entered pursuant to the Family Law Act. 
5) Defines accredited institution and institution of higher learning. 
6) Prohibits the application of this act to those "support agreements made, 
or judgments entered, before January 1, 1988." 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
- continued -
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1) According to the author, "when California reduced the age majority from 
21 to 18 years, court ordered child support was eliminated for these three 
years ... and it became the burden of the custodial parent to bear the full 
support of these adult children ••• The present cutoff for child support 
does not take into account plans for college that would have been 
implemented in the absence of divorce. 11 
2) The author refers to the study by Judith Wallerstein, Ph.D., Executive 
Director of the Center For the Family in Transition. 
Dr. Wallerstein has studied the impact of divorce on 131 children of 60 
middle-class divorced couples (not randomly selected and no control group) 
in Marin County since 1971. She states that many of these fathers will 
not help pay for their children's college education, which is creating a 
group of under-educated people. Most of the parents in her study, she 
concludes, would have sent their children to college if they had not 
divorce. 
In Marin, 85 percent of high-school graduates enrolled in college compared 
to only 47 percent of Wallerstein's subjects. Of those young people from 
the study who entered college, one-quarter dropped out primarily for 
financial reasons. She states that many of the divorced fathers were 
financially able to assist their children with college expenses but chose 
not to do so because they felt their obligation ended when the child 
turned 18. Typically, these fathers had university educations and a 
quarter of them were professionals such as doctors and lawyers. 
Although the Marin County study points out that many di parents do 
not help their children through college, the researcher rms that it is 
not a random sample. Further, there (a) is no control group and (b) are 
no comparable statistics provided as to the number of married parents who 
also refuse to help their children through college. 
3) Presumably, the Agnos Child Support Standards Act 1984 is to be applied 
in determining the amount of support payable to an adult child. Thus, 
adult and minor children will be treated in the same manner for purposes 
of determining the amount of support. 
If an adult child is able to establish extraordinary expenses, then an 
additional amount of support may be awarded to the potential detriment of 
the minor children. 
nued -
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Should not a parent's obligation to support any minor or disabled adult 
children take priority over the educational support for an adult child? 
4) The author intends for this bill to authorize the court to provide in the 
original child support order, entered while the child is still a minor, 
for the continuation of the same support level beyond the age of 18. 
However, the court always has discretion to modify a support order upon 
good cause. The court will look at need of the student and the parent's 
ability to pay the expenses of tuition, room, and board. Thus, there is 
likely to be good cause for an increase in the support award. If there 
are minor children also being supported by this same parent, it is likely 
that their support will need to be reduced in order to meet some needs 
level of the student. 
Should not there be a limitation on the amount of support to be awarded to 
a student? Should not the factors be specified which are to be used in 
measuring the amount of support to be awarded? 
5) This bill requires, among other things, that the student be in good 
standing. However, privacy laws foreclose parents from obtaining 
information from the educational institution necessary to make the good 
standing determination, without a written waiver from the student. 
Further, if a child misrepresents enrollment, attendance, or other factors 
relevant to the determination of eligibility for continued support, should 
not the parent have the right to recover support paid during the period of 
i ne 1 i g i bil ity? 
6) This bill lacks clarity where it provides that it is "limited to support 
agreements made, or judgments entered on or after January 1, 1988." 
Support agreements between two parents are not necessarily court orders 
and, to the extent they are not orders, are not legally enforceable. 
Furthermore, if it is the author's intent that the limitation is to apply 
to support "orders'' such should be clarified. Since support orders 
continue to be modifiable, should not the bill specify that the court 
lacks jurisdiction to modify pre-bill orders to continue child support 
pursuant to this bill? 
Further, it is unclear as to whether "judgment" refers to a child support 
judgment or to either the judgment dissolving of marriage or the legal 
separation judgment. 
Should not this bill be limited to only apply to those parties who file 
for dissolution, legal separation, or nullity on or after January 1, 1988? 
- continued -
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7) Many of the arguments rai 
applicable to this bill. 
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s 
a) Is vague, generalized, and i including i lure to define 
support; to take into consideration a chi1d 1 s aptitude; and to specify 
applicable enforcement actions. 
b) 
c) 
Fails to incorporate arrangements 
children in college, such as partial s 
child, placing certain conditions on 
considerations of the choice schools. 
longer be an option for divorced 
Fails to consider the adult child's abili 
him/herself, including the child's income 
d) Fails to consider the potenti ly 
parents and 
, loani money to the 
nued support, and 
These arrangements would no 
ide for 
any source. 
be imposed upon parents who do provide 
available to their children upon majority and substantial 
is bill. disincenti to establish trust funds 
e) Forecloses parental input into decisions 
child does (i.e., fails 
school, lives with a person 
activity contrary to the 
f) Inappropriately permits s 
relationships. 
g) Creates an uncons 
are similarly situated 
children; children of 
parents. 
Supporters argue 
permissible in that they bear a 
state purpose. (See 1 egi sl ve i 
such support is necessary to protect 
marriage has been ved from 
state's interest in a well 
h) Assumes incorrectly 
have a college 
basic human right 
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i) Makes no prov1s1on for a "second" family, wherein there are minor 
children. Further, adult children of an intact second marriage would 
not be able to enforce support for education, although a half-sibling 
of the first marriage would be entitled to such support. 
j) Subjects divorced parents to a new and often unaffordable duty. 
8) The term "accredited institution of higher learning" is broadly defined to 
include postsecondary education or occupational training in an institution 
which grants a degree or certificate and has been given accredited status 
by any regional accrediting association. 
9) Also pending before this Committee is SB 215 (Watson) which is limited to 
children under age 22 who may be full or part-time students receiving 
appropriate education or training. However, SB 215 limits the 
availability of support by requiring the court to award support if a 
parent would have provided for support during college "but for" the fact 
that the parents were separated or divorced. The bill sets forth the 
various factors the court is to consider in making this determination. 
Further, support is to continue during summer vacation periods and may be 
extended to age 23 due to illness or accident. 
SB 13 provides for the continuation of support only to a child (except if 
married, in military service, or living separately as an emancipated 
adult) who is a full-time student, in good standing, in an accredited 
institution of higher learning, until such time as the child graduates or 
attains the age of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The court is given 
no guidelines as to when to deny support, if at all, once a child has met 
the above criterion. Thus, educational history of the family is 
irrelevant. 
10) The California Family Support Council states that the district attorney 
(DA) should be specifically excluded from responsibility for the 
enforcement or establishment of support for any child covered by this 
bi 11. 
Should the DA be given exemption from enforcement and establishment of 
support awards created by this bill? 
- continued -
- 235 -
SB 13 
1Jage5 
Support 
Commission on the Status of Women 
California Federation of Republican 
Women 
Association of Family and 
Conciliation Courts 
Santa Clara County Commission on 
the Status of Women 
American Association of University 
Women, California State Division 
Single Parents United 'N Kids 
Women's Economic Agenda Project 
Child Advocacy Council of San Mateo 
and Santa Clara Counties 
California PTA 
D. DeBow 
445-4560 
ajud 
Opposition 
Equal Rights for Fathers, Inc. 
Committee on Moral Concerns 
Parents for Equal Custody 
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY 8, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 29, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 215 
Introduced by Senators Watson ftft6: MM"ks, Marks, and 
Morgan 
(Coauthors: Assembly Members Bane, Chacon, Speier, and 
Tanner) 
January 21, 1987 
An act to amend Sections 4351, 4700, and 7010 of, 
Section 4700.8 to, the Civil Code, relating to child 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 215, as amended, Watson. Child support. 
Existing law, the Family Law Act, authorizes a court, in any 
proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor 
child or a child who is in need and who is unable to maintain 
himself or herself by work, to order either or both parents to 
pay an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and 
education of the child. It also authorizes a court to approve a 
stipulated agreement by the parties to pay child support for 
the support of any adult children or for the continuation of 
child support after a child reaches the age of 18. 
This bill would authorize a court, upon a finding that but for 
the parents' separation or the dissolution of their marriage, a 
parent would have provided support for appropriate 
education or training of a child, to order the payment of 
support for the costs of maintenance and education or 
training of the child after the age of majority, as specified. The 
bill would provide that the court fftf:l1' shall order the payment 
to be made directly to the child, and authorize the seeking or 
the enforcement of the order by either the child or the other 
parent. The bill would provide that these provisions do not 
apply to support agreements made or judgments entered 
- 217 - g; 50 
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before January 1, 1988. 
The bill also would specify that in making an order for 
support pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act, a court shall 
apply the same standards as are applicable under the Family 
Law Act in making an order for child support. 
The bill also would make related changes. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. The Legislature finds that the state and 
2 its citizens have a substantial interest in the education of 
3 the inhabitants of California, as evidenced by the state's 
4 extensive system of community colleges and universities, 
5 vocational and other educational programs. 
6 The Legislature finds, however, that the children of 
7 parents who live apart or whose marriage has been 
8 dissolved often face disadvantages with respect to the 
9 payment of educational expenses beyond the age of 18 
10 which are oftentimes not experienced by children in 
11 intact families. The Legislature further finds that parents 
12 who could have been expected to provide an education 
13 for their child who has attained the age of majority absent 
14 their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, may 
15 not do so fullovtiag ~ a dissolution, for any number of 
16 personal reasons. 
17 The Legislature does not intend to create an absolute 
18 duty of support for the educational expenses of a child 
19 who has attained majority by parents who live apart or 
20 whose marriage has been dissolved, but rather, to give 
21 the courts the discretion to determine when the 
22 provision of support for educational expenses is 
23 appropriate. The Legislature intends support for the 
24 purposes of educational expenses to include, but not be 
25 limited to, monetary support. For example, support may 
26 include extended payments for medical and dental 
27 expenses and insurance and continued access to 
28 transportation and housing. 
29 The Legislature therefore finds declares that the 
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1 ability of judges to child support for educational 
2 expenses beyond the age majority is necessary both to 
3 protect the children of parents who live apart or whose 
4 marriage has been dissolved from undue hardship and to 
5 promote the state's interest in a well-educated citizenry. 
6 SEC. 2. Section 4351 of the Civil Code is amended to 
7 read: 
8 4351. In proceedings under this part, the superior 
9 court has jurisdiction to inquire into and render any 
10 judgment and make such orders as are appropriate 
11 concerning the status of the marriage, the custody and 
12 support of minor children of the marriage and children 
13 for whom support is authorized under Section 196.5, 206, 
14 or 4700.8, the support of either party, the settlement of 
15 the property rights of the parties the award of 
16 attorneys' fees and costs; provided, however, no such 
17 order or judgment shall be enforceable against an 
18 employee pension benefit plan unless the plan has been 
19 joined as a party to the proceeding. 
20 SEC. 3. Section 4700 of the Civil is amended to 
21 read: 
22 4700. (a) In any proceeding where there is at issue 
23 the support of a minor child or a child for whom support 
24 is authorized under Section 196.5, 206, or 4700.8, the court 
25 may order either or both parents to pay any amount 
26 necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of 
27 the child. At the request of either party, the court shall 
28 make appropriate findings with respect to the 
29 circumstances on which the order for the support of a 
30 miBOJ:' child is based. Upon a showing of good cause, the 
31 court may order the parent or parents required to make 
32 the payment of support to give reasonable security 
33 therefor. All payments of support shall be made by the 
34 person owing the support payment prior to the payment 
35 of any debts owing to creditors. Any order for child 
36 support may be modified or revoked as the court may 
37 deem necessary, except as to any amount that may have 
38 accrued prior to the date of the filing of the notice of 
39 motion or order to show cause to modify or revoke. Any 
40 order for child support, as well as any order of 
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29 occurrences 
30 rights or at 
31 efforts to exercise 
32 six months prior to 
33 Attorney's 
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36 (c) When a court 
37 payments for 
38 minority, or 
39 emancipated, or 
40 a specified event is 
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1 authorized ......... , .......... ~~ft 
2 the liability 
3 terminates upon 
4 a custodial 
5 custody ef eftiM; to nrhr....n 
6 fails to notify ,.. ... ....;,,. .. ,,A 
7 payments, or the of-f.n ..... u:nr 
8 to pay support, 
9 continues to acc:!etn stmnort 
10 refund any 
11 the happening the 
12 overpayments shall first be ....... ,., .... ._,""" 
13 payments which are then in The court may, in 
14 the original order for support, order the custodial parent 
15 or other person to whom payments are to be made to 
16 notify the person ordered to make payments, or his 
17 or her attorney of· record, of of the 
18 contingency. 
19 (d) In the event obligations for support of a child are 
20 discharged in bankruptcy, the court may all proper 
21 orders for the support, maintenance and education of the 
22 child, as the court may deem just. 
23 SEC. 4. Section 4700.8 is added the Civil Code, to 
24 read: 
25 4700.8. (a) Upon a finding that but for the parents' 
26 separation or the dissolution of their marriage a parent 
27 would have provided support for appropriate education 
28 or training of a child, the court may order such support 
29 as is appropriate for the child's maintenance and 
30 education or training after the age majority, including 
31 support during normal school vacation periods. 1ft Proof 
32 that the child or other family members have previously 
33 received parental support for education or training after 
34 the age of majority raises a presumption affecting the 
35 burden of proof that support for the child's appropn'ate 
36 education would have been provided but for the parents' 
37 separation or the dissolution of their marriage. An 
38 absence of that proof, however, supports neither a 
39 presumption nor an inference that the support would not 
40 have been provided. 
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1 parent. 
2 -tet ~ 
3 made ay ~ 'Bftf~~ :a~'ifieift 
4 im)90Se ftft tifl:aHe fl~:HifH:B 
5 (b) The court 
6 support under 
7 (c) No of granted pursuant to 
8 this section for post education or training 
9 ~ tftftft fflf' completion ef e: certification J9FOgFam 
10 Felated ffi -the pFcbacealaUI'ea:te education et' tFaining .. 
11 (d) The order of shall that it shall be 
12 teFminated .,. .. ,,,_,._.""'"''"" .... 
13 is soug~t the 'C'U.'U'-<lLILlU.UCU nrt"TT'--'TT1 
14 reasons than illness or accident. 
15 (e) No support section shall 
16 extend past the date on which the child for support 
17 is sought l'eftCfteS the ftge ef Q3; et' ~ the 4a:te ef ftis et' 
18 fte1' maYriage, ·.vh:iefl:ever occurs ~ exee)9t -te 
19 com)9ensate fflf' flm:e ietK: dt:te -te illness et' accident. is 
20 sought reaches the 22, to compensate for 
21 time lost, up to one academic year, due to illness or 
22 accident. 
23 (f) This section does not support agreements 
24 made or judgments January 1, 1988. 
25 Nothing in this section shall be interpreted so as to limit 
26 a parent's ability to agree to provide additional support 
27 or to limit the court's power to inquire whether such an 
28 agreement has been made. 
29 (g) Child support pursuant to this section shall be in 
30 an amount that does not reduce a parent's ability to 
31 provide appropriate support for any other child or adult 
32 for whom a duty of support is owed if the support is 
33 actually being paid. 
34 (h) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a 
35 child support order under this section is enforceable in 
36 the same manner as an for the support of a minor 
37 child. 
38 (i) Notwithstanding any provision of law, the 
39 ' district attorney may, at his or her discretion, enforce 
40 child support orders under this section. 
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1 SEC. 5. Section Code is ......... .._, ................... to 
2 read: 
3 7010. (a) The judgment 
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SUBJECT: This bill permits the court to award the payment of maintenance and 
education or training expenses an adult child until age 23, as specified. 
DIGEST 
Existing law authorizes a court, under the Family Law Act, to order either or 
both parents to pay for the support, maintenance, and education of the child 
until his or her majority or until the child has completed high school. 
Parties to a family law action may stipulate to continue support for any child 
after the age of 18. 
This bill: 
I) Authorizes a court in any child support proceeding to order support for the 
maintenance and appropriate education or training of an adult child up to 
age 22, which may be extended up to one academic year due to illness or 
accident. The court must first determine if the parent would have provided 
support for appropriate education or training but for the separation or 
dissolution of marriage. The court, in making its determination, may 
consider various specified factors. 
2) Provides that a presumption (that parental support for education/training 
would have been paid but for the parents' separation or dissolution) is 
created when the child or other family members have previously received 
parental support for education or training as adults. However, an absence 
of that proof supports neither a presumption nor an inference that the 
support would not have been provided. 
3) Provides that either parent or the child may petition 
order or its modification, or may enforce the order. 
ordered to provide support. Enforcement is available 
a child support award for a minor. 
the court for such an 
Both parents may be 
in the same manner as 
4) Requires the court to order direct payment to the child and to specify 
events upon which support shall terminate or be suspended. 
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5) Requires the support 
education program for 
6) Provides that these provisions 
judgments entered before January 
7) Provides that child support for an 
shall be in an amount that does not 
appropriate support for any other 
is owed if the support is actually 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
COMMENTS 
1) According to the author, the 
disadvantages experienced by 
court with the discretion 
when certain criterion are met. 
psychological hardship experi 
by several studies (see below). 
A more extensive statement 
legislative ndings and decla 
Specifically disclaimed is the 
support for the educational 
parents whose marriage has 
intended to give courts 
educational support is appropri 
2) The author refers to the 1 ies: 
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or 
provi in this bill 
ility to provide 
a duty of support 
the 
iding the 
i 1 dren 
c and 
tantiated 
in i 
a) Lenore Weitzman, Ph.D .• in 
footnote 51, states in her.......,;.;;;....,-~~,....;;..,~;...;;._..:.:..:-~ 
allow the courts to extend a 
twenty-one (e.g., Col , 
child is not disabled but is s 
full-time student. The 
the realistic concern that 
self-sufficient in 
b) Judith Wallerstein, 
Family in Transition, 
of 60 middle-class di 
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• 
states that many of these fathers will not help pay for their 
children's college education, which is creating a group 
under-educated people. Most parents in her study, she 
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concludes, would have sent their children to college if they had not 
divorce. 
In Marin, apparently 85 percent of high-school graduates enrolled in 
college compared to only 47 percent of Wallerstein's subjects. Of 
those young people from the study who entered college, one-quarter 
dropped out primarily for financial reasons. She states that many of 
the divorced fathers were financially able to assist their children 
with college expenses but chose not to do so because they felt their 
obligation ended when the child turned 18. Typically, these fathers 
had university educations and a quarter of them were professionals such 
as doctors and lawyers. 
Although the Marin County study points out that many divorced parents do 
not help their children through college, the researcher affirms that it is 
not a random sample. Further, there (a) is no control group and (b) are 
no comparable statistics provided as to the number of married parents who 
also refuse to help their children through college. 
3) According to the California Commission on the Status of Women (CCSW), and 
reiterated by other proponents, this bill protects the right of children to 
receive additional college education or vocational training which would 
otherwise be provided had the parents' separation or marriage dissolution 
not occurred. Minimum requirements of most career fields and the demands 
of our society as a whole merit additional educational degrees or 
specialized training beyond the high school level. Further, the current 
trend toward the elimination of government-sponsored student loan programs 
will reduce the availability of financial aid for needy students. 
4) This bill provides the court with factors to consider in making a 
determination to award support to an adult child who continues his/her 
education or training, as follows: 
a) Relevant statements or plans made or acquiesced in by the parent prior 
to, during, or subsequent to the parents' separation or dissolution of 
marriage, including discussions between the child and parent concerning 
the type of educational institution, the costs involved, and the type 
of training or degree sought. 
b) The professional standing of the parent. 
c) The standard of living of the parent. 
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d) The child's 
training. 
e) The child's past and anned 
education or training. 
or in or 
on 
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Further, this bill creates a presumption or other family 
members have previously received parental support on or training 
after the age of majority. Should "other family members" specified, 
since it is unclear as to degree ly members incl (such as the 
child's parents, cousins, sibli es)? 
Should an adult child's ability 
by a parent's or remote relative's 
Does this bill encourage and support 
born into better educated families? 
5) It is unclear as to whether 
or any other child support gui 
amount of support payable to an 
children will be treated in the same manner 
amount of support to be awarded. 
However, this 11 specifically 
adult child shall not reduce a 
support for any other child or 
paid. This provision may 1 t 
support will be awarded to a minor 
support had been awarded an lt 
The reference to "adult" s 
whom the duty of support is 
children receiving educational 
equally, without a 
attending college 
Should not a parent's obligation 
over the educational support of an 
6) This bill requires the 
shall terminate or be sus 
a) Completion of the 
No order of support 
or training. 
a 
il 
lt 
ted 
have been 
the 
the 
the 
and 
ority 
were ordered. 
education 
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b) Coursework or other specified or nconsistent with the 
contemplated education or training. 
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The court is also given discretion to modify, extend, or prospectively 
reinstate the order for support, upon good cause. According to the author, 
these provisions permit the courts to take into consideration any lengthy 
illness, work schedules, accidents, or military draft if reinstated. 
7) This bill permits an adult child to work either full or part-time towards 
appropriate education or tra ning and continue to receive support. Support 
may be ordered to continue during normal school vacation periods. 
According to the author. she is convinced that a specific limitation on 
"number of years or requirement for full-time attendance would be 
especially harmful to children of working class families ... These children 
may have to work and go to school concurrently, only able to carry less 
than a full load, since parental contri ions would cover less than the 
full schooling cost." 
8) The bill would authorize the court to order a divorced or separated parent 
to make payments for the "appropriate education or training" of his or her 
child. What specific costs related to a person's education would be 
included in the support award? Should 11 appropriate education or training" 
be defined? 
9) Many of the arguments raised by critics 
applicable to this bill. In short summary, 
SB 13 argue that this bill: 
(Morgan) are equally 
tics of both SB 215 and 
a) Fails to incorporate arrangements common made between parents and 
children in college, such as partial support, loaning money to the 
child, placing certain conditions on continued support, and 
considerations of the choice of schools. These arrangements would no 
longer be an option for divorced parents. 
b) Fails to consider the adult child's ability to provide for 
him/herself, including the child's income from any source. 
c) Fails to consider the potentially substantia1 tax liability which may 
be imposed upon parents who do provide educational trust funds to be 
available to their children upon majority and the substantial 
disincentive to establish trust funds created by this bill. 
d) Forecloses parental input into decisions and power to control what the 
child does (i.e., fails to attend classes, chooses an inappropriate 
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school, lives wi a 
activity contrary 
e) Inappropriately permi 
relationships and creates an 
parent and the child which 
sex, 
f) Creates an unconstitutional on between classes 
are similarly situated. It creates 
divorced or separated parents 
for their adult children, but 
intact marriages or who have 
Further, the opponents as 
divorced parents differently 
Supporters argue that the as 
permissible in that they bear a 
state purpose. ( l isl ve 
such support is necessary 
marriage has been dissolved 
state's interest in a well-educated 
Should college-age 
be enti ed to 
affords children 
g) Assumes incorrectly 
have a college education 
basic human right to 
h) Makes no provision 
children. Further, 
not be able to 
of the first marriage 
i) Subjects divorced 
10) This bill lacks clari 
agreements made, or j 
It is unclear as to whether 
a child support judgment, 
marriage or the legal 
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Since support orders continue to be modifiable, should not the bill 
specify that the court lacks jurisdiction to modify pre-bill orders to 
continue child support pursuant to this bill? 
11) The California Family Support Council states that the district attorney 
(DA) should be specifically excluded from responsibility for the 
enforcement or establishment of support for any child covered by this 
bill. 
Should the DA be given exemption from enforcement and establishment of 
support awards created by this bill? 
12) Also pending before this Committee is SB 13 (Morgan), which provides for 
the continuation of support under the Family Law Act only to a child 
(except if married, in military service, or living separately as an 
emancipated adult) who is a full-time student, in good standing, in an 
accredited institution of higher learning, until such time as the child 
graduates or attains the age of 21 years, whichever first occurs. The 
court is given no guidelines as to when to deny support, if at all, once a 
child has met the above criterion. Thus, educational history of the 
family is irrelevant, although it is significant factor in SB 215. 
In contrast, SB 215 permits support to continue until age 22 (extendable 
to age 23), for both part and full-time students. SB 215 limits the 
availability of support by requiring the court to apply the "but for" test 
with its various factors set forth above. 
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